Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States by Covich, Skylar Joseph
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/50z8d10k
Author
Covich, Skylar Joseph
Publication Date
2017
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
Santa Barbara 
 
 
Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the 
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy 
in Political Science 
 
by 
 
Skylar Joseph Covich 
 
Committee in charge: 
Professor M. Stephen Weatherford, Chair 
Professor Eric R. A. N. Smith 
Professor Kathleen Moore 
 
June 2017 
  
  
The dissertation of Skylar Joseph Covich is approved. 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Eric R. A. N. Smith  
 
  ____________________________________________  
 Kathleen Moore 
 
  ____________________________________________  
 M. Stephen Weatherford, chair 
 
 
May 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States 
 
Copyright © 2017 
by 
Skylar Joseph Covich 
  
  
iv 
 
Dedicated to my wife, 
Theresa Russ Covich  
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This project was inspired by a multitude of life experiences. I have deep friendships 
with those whom I would describe in this project as being on the Christian Left, the 
Christian Center and the Christian Right, and I have deep respect for all their points of view. 
The hard part, of course, is turning all that experience and the initial set of questions into 
academically distinct research questions, developing an analytical process for answering 
them, and organizing chapter outlines. My advisor, Steve Weatherford, patiently dealt with 
this task. He helped me narrow down the policy areas to be discussed, often read over 
outlines of chapters before I drafted them, and always encouraged me to think in terms of 
political science to answer the research questions, rather than my constant inclination to add 
in many historical facts out of context. His caution regarding the “rather anodyne” 
statements issued by religious groups proved correct, as I soon found it better to look at 
media accounts and congressional hearing transcripts. 
My other committee members, Eric Smith and Kathleen Moore, provided generous 
assistance throughout the research process. Smith’s seminars on Congress and public 
opinion were great opportunities to learn about some of the key topics in this research 
project, and his insights about the writing process were very valuable. Moore, a religious 
studies professor, provided valuable insights early in the research process regarding the 
relationship between politics and religion in the United States. I am also grateful to the 
extremely supportive community of faculty and graduate students, past and present, in the 
Department of Political Science at UC Santa Barbara. Special thanks goes to Shyam Sriram, 
a passionate advocate of interfaith cooperation, with whom I am co-authoring an article 
based on part of this research. 
  
vi 
I have seen first-hand the necessity of governmental programs as a blind student in 
need of many special services. My parents navigated the sometimes difficult process of 
getting these services for me, which illustrates the complex uneven policies for the 
disadvantaged I am exploring professionally. I have been fortunate to have studied with two 
political scientists who are also blind, Hisham Ahmed and Amit Ahuja. Ahmed, with whom 
I took classes as an undergraduate, guided me on my graduate school application process; 
Ahuja provided much helpful insight on the research process. 
While I did not conduct interviews as part of this research, I had informal 
conversations with several clergy whose insights had a big influence on this project. Father 
David Gentry-Akin, a passionate advocate of what I call Christian Center politics, was one 
of my mentors during my time as an undergraduate at Saint Mary’s College of California. 
Thanks also goes to Father John Love, Brother Pascal Strader and Rev. Dr. Ken Walters. 
Last but not least, my family provided the love and support I needed, both before and 
during this writing process. My father, Frank Covich, has always been there to support me in 
so many homework sessions, with moving in and out of student apartments, and with 
building a professional reputation. My mother, Linda Mitchell, first cultivated my interest in 
religion, history and politics, which she also shares. Finally my wife, Theresa Covich, is 
kindly formatting this dissertation. More importantly, though, she and her family have 
taught me new perspectives on theology, church history, and the philosophy of labor which 
have changed some of the emphases of this project. Our intellectual discussions are 
ontologically good, not to mention thought-provoking and edifying. 
  
  
vii 
VITA OF SKYLAR JOSEPH COVICH 
EDUCATION 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science. Degree expected March 2017. 
Dissertation: “Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States” 
M.A., Political Science, 2012. 
Subfields: American Politics, Politics and Religion 
 
Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Syracuse University. Certificate, 2013. 
 
Saint Mary’s College of California, Moraga, California 
      B.A., Politics, Minor in Theology/Religious Studies, magna cum laude, 2009. 
Hagerty Award for the Most Distinguished Student in the School of Liberal Arts 
  
TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTERESTS 
American Government 
Interest Groups 
Politics and Religion 
American Institutions (Presidency, Congress) 
Political Parties 
Elections and Voting 
 
SELECTED FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS 
UC Santa Barbara Graduate Division 
Graduate Opportunity Fellowship, 2015-2016 
 
College of the Holy Cross, Boston, Massachusetts 
Graduate Fellow, Collegium: A Colloquy on Faith and the Intellectual Life, June 2011. 
 
National Federation of the Blind 
National Scholarship Award, 2007. 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
“Economic Performance and Presidential Trait Evaluations.” With Lisa Argyle, Marcus 
Arrajj, E.G. Garay, Julian Gottlieb, Heather Hodges, and Eric Smith. Electoral Studies, 
September 2016. 
 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
“Forming a Circle of Protection.” Presented with Shyam Sriram. Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, April 2017. 
“Catholics, Liberal Protestants and American Health Care Policy.” Poster Presentation, 
American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting. San Francisco, California, 
September 2015. 
“Christianity and the Politics of the Minimum Wage in the United States.” Symposium on 
Religion and Public Life. Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 2015. 
 
  
viii 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS, CONTINUED 
 “Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States.” Christians in Political 
Science Conference, Azusa Pacific University, Los Angeles, May, 2014. 
“Economic Performance and Presidential Trait Evaluations: A Longitudinal Analysis” with 
Lisa Argyle. Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April, 2012.     
 
UNIVERSITY TEACHING 
Department of Political Science, California State University Channel Islands 
Lecturer  – Full responsibility for course, including preparing syllabus and course 
lectures, course discussions and grading. 
Introduction to American Government, Fall 2016-Present. 
 
Department of Political Science, UC Santa Barbara 
Teaching Associate – Full responsibility for course, including preparing syllabus and 
course lectures, course discussions and grading. 
US Political Interest Groups (Political Science 153, 30 students) 
Summer 2015, Summer 2016. 
Summer Teaching Institute for Associates cert., UCSB Instructional Development, 2015. 
 
Guest lectures at UC Santa Barbara 
“Interest Groups, Religious Organizations, Social Movements and Political Parties in 
American Foreign Policy” Political Science 127, Winter 2015. 
“Religion & International Relations.” Political Science 7, Winter 2013. 
“Why does the United States Have a Two-Party System?” Political Science 12, Winter 
2011 
 
Teaching Assistant – Lead discussions, hold office hours, grade papers & exams. 
American Foreign Policy (Political Science 127) 
Winter 2015 
Introduction to Comparative Politics (Political Science 6) 
Winter 2013, Spring 2014. 
Introduction to International Relations (Political Science 7) 
Fall 2012, Fall 2013, Winter 2014.  
Introduction to American Politics (Political Science 12) 
Winter 2011, Spring 2011, Fall 2011, Spring 2012, Fall 2014.  
US Interest Groups (Political Science 153: Spring 2010. 
 
SELECTED UNIVERSITY SERVICE 
Peer reviewer, March 2015. 
At request of journal editors, reviewed a submitted manuscript for academic publication. 
Department of Political Science, UC Santa Barbara 
President, Political Science Graduate Student Association, 2010-2013. 
Graduate Student Association, UC Santa Barbara 
Member, Excellence in Teaching Award Committee, 2015. 
Department Representative to Student Assembly, 2013-2014. 
Graduate Representative, Advisory Committee on Campus Access, 2010-2016. 
  
ix 
ABSTRACT 
 
Christianity and the Politics of Poverty in the United States 
Skylar Joseph Covich 
 Christian organizations in the United States take positions in favor of or against 
progressive efforts to address poverty primarily based on theological considerations. In 
order to support governmental programs and regulations such as welfare, comprehensive 
health care and higher minimum wages, they must believe that structural changes, rather 
than an increase in religious faith, will likely solve intergenerational poverty. However, 
religious organizations effectively lobby in favor of such efforts primarily in their capacity 
as providers of charity and health care services to the poor. Because opinion within most 
denominations on poverty is divided, there are competing theological interpretations which 
weaken the standing of denominational leaderships and lobbyists to speak for their traditions 
when they use religious rhetoric. Some conservative evangelical organizations have slowly 
come to accept governmental programs because of the long-term interests of their charitable 
agencies. I argue that the Catholic Church lobbies more effectively than mainline Protestant 
denominations in favor of governmental programs because of its larger charitable agencies. 
This is despite the fact that the Catholic Bishops occasionally oppose governmental 
programs, such as Democratic comprehensive health care reform proposals, because of the 
possibility that they may fund abortions. Though opposition to abortion is a theological 
priority for the Catholic Church, the bishops remain close to the Democrats on economic 
issues despite increasing political polarization. I argue that minimum wage policy has 
provided an opportunity for Catholic, mainline Protestant, black Protestant and progressive 
evangelical congregations to come together on a relatively simple and popular policy issue 
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where change can and must occur at the local and state level. My primary methods are 
examinations of media accounts and congressional committee hearing transcripts. 
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Dramatis Personae 
The following is a list of major organizations discussed in this project. 
Southern Baptist Convention 
Founded in 1844 in a split over slavery, it is the largest Protestant denomination with 
over 16 million adherents; many, though not all, of its churches are in the South. Three of 
the last six Democratic Presidents (Harry Truman, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton) have been 
SBC members. Despite a general inclination to be suspicious of state power, it was once 
willing to support welfare programs. As a leading advocate of the separation of church and 
state, it was among the last groups to support some faith-based partnerships with 
government. But just as the tide was turning on that issue, a group of theological 
conservatives took over the Southern Baptist Convention in the 1980s, and its leaders, such 
as Richard Land, director of the denomination’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Coalition 
(ERLC), began to support cuts in welfare and oppose health care reform. It generally argues, 
as in its 1987 resolution on hunger and poverty, that it is the responsibility of churches to 
address issues of hunger, and that this includes bringing the poor to religious faith. Since 
Russell Moore, who belongs to the SBC’s African-American minority, took over the ERLC 
in 2014, the SBC has moved to the left on immigration and softened its general tone. 
National Association of Evangelicals 
Founded in 1943 as a coalition of northern evangelicals who sought to combine 
conservative theology with more political engagement than had been displayed by the 
fundamentalist Protestant faction in recent decades, the NAE is a coalition of denominations 
of which the largest is the Pentecostal group Assemblies of God. Its denominations come 
from a variety of different traditions of Protestantism, which makes presenting a coherent 
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vision a challenge. It had hoped to attract the Southern Baptist Convention and Lutheran 
Church Missouri Synod as members, but failed, and thus has been required to compete with 
these denominations in the broader conservative Christian movement. The National 
Association of Evangelicals has long been concerned about the national debt; for example, it 
released a resolution on fiscal responsibility in 1984. By 2004, its resolution “For the Health 
of the Nation” acknowledged the government’s duty to provide social programs, and in 2011 
it joined the interfaith group Circle of Protection to support the increase in the debt ceiling to 
protect food stamps. It remains socially conservative on issues of abortion, gay marriage, 
and the rights of religious institutions, but it has become progressive on most other issues 
including the environment and immigration. 
US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 
The Catholic Church’s social teachings argue that the protection of human life is the 
most important duty of government and that the beginning of each human life is at 
conception. These teachings are codified in documents released by the Vatican such as the 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, paragraph 8. The Vatican also calls on 
governments to strive for a just economy. It strongly implies advocacy for minimum wage 
laws, as the denial of just wages is described as one of the four sins that cry to Heaven for 
justice. The Catholic Church in each country is allowed to advocate for legislation that leads 
to the Catholic Church’s goals of protecting human life, promoting the traditional family and 
creating a just economy. In the United States, the Catholic Church has supported most 
welfare programs for the last century. It also supports the concept of universal health care, 
but does not always support specific proposals because of conflicts over whether abortion 
and contraception should be considered health care. 
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The National Catholic Welfare Council was founded in 1919 by Father John Ryan 
as an official channel for consultations between Catholic bishops and charity leaders, and for 
official statements by the Bishops. It was nearly suppressed by the Vatican in 1922. After 
the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s, it was split into the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops and the US Catholic Conference, which merged in 2001 to form the 
USCCB. Its public policy priority is abortion, but from the outset it has also supported social 
programs for the poor. 
        The US Conference of Catholic Bishops’ committee on Domestic Justice and 
Human Development is in charge of lobbying on behalf of welfare policy, tax credits, 
social security, and other anti-poverty and economic concerns. While the Bishop chairing 
the committee changes every three years, the committee’s Office of Social Development 
was directed from the 1990s until 2015 by John Carr, a layman. 
Some other Catholic Groups include: 
The National Conference of Catholic Charities was founded in 1910. Now called 
Catholic Charities USA, it undertakes its own lobbying efforts, usually in close association 
with the Catholic Bishops on welfare policy. 
The Catholic Health Association administers and lobbies on behalf of Catholic 
hospitals and other affiliated health care services. All indications point to Catholic 
dominance of religiously affiliated health care. 1 out of 6 hospital beds in the United States 
belong to Catholic hospitals (The Washington Post 12/2/2013). Thus, the Catholic Health 
Association is the primary religious lobbyist which can claim to be a significant player in 
health care administration. 
National Council of Churches 
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     The National Council of Churches was founded in 1908 as the Federal Council of 
Churches. It includes what are known as mainline Protestant denominations, most black 
Protestant denominations, Eastern Orthodox denominations, and a variety of small, mostly 
liberal churches independent of all these traditions. Mainline Protestants are sects 
encompassing the more liberal wings of all of the major traditions of Protestantism. With the 
exception of the Episcopal Church, they formed out of church splits with more conservative 
evangelical and fundamentalist branches between the early and mid-twentieth century, along 
with mergers of theologically similar denominations or, in the Presbyterian and Methodist 
cases, mergers of geographically distinct denominations. The mainline Protestant 
denominations are the United Methodist Church (by far the largest), the Episcopal Church 
USA, the Presbyterian Church USA, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the 
United Church of Christ (Congregationalist), and the Disciples of Christ. Most of these 
denominations have more conservative groups which have remained within, including some 
who identify as evangelical. The UMC has, in fact, gained observer status in the NAE. But 
the leadership of the NCC, its mainline Protestant denominations, and its black Protestant 
denominations have maintained progressive positions on almost all issues, including justice 
for the poor. The National Council of Churches and many of its mainline Protestant 
denominations have offices in Washington DC. The NCC also undertakes research on 
congregational responses to poverty and encourages denominational and ecumenical poverty 
initiatives. 
Lutheran Services 
Lutheranism is the mainline denomination with the most long-standing and extensive 
social services, particularly in regions of the country with substantial Lutheran populations. 
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Lutheran Social Services, however, is run jointly by the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America (an NCC denomination) and the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (a politically 
and theologically conservative denomination), which largely limits its participation in 
politics at least at the federal level. However, Lutheran charity directors have testified before 
Congress in efforts to protect social welfare programs. 
Other Progressives 
A variety of interfaith groups have assisted the National Council of Churches and 
USCCB in their work for the poor, sometimes leading particular lobbying or community 
outreach efforts. 
Founded in 1972, Bread for the World is a non-denominational organization with 
the goal of ending hunger in America by changing public policy. Its members are 
congregations rather than denominations. Lutheran minister David Beckman, its director 
since 1991, has been at the forefront of many religious anti-poverty lobbying efforts. The 
National Council of Churches has often been at the forefront of a complex network of 
interfaith coalitions, beginning with the Washington Inter-Religious Staff Council in 1968, 
many of which included the Catholic Bishops and progressive Catholic organizations. Since 
the collapse of Interfaith Impact, one of the most long-term poverty-focused coalitions in 
1995, David Beckman of Bread for the World and Jim Wallis of the progressive evangelical 
group Sojourners and the Call to Renewal Movement, and the National Council of 
Churches, have long sought to form another permanent interfaith coalition to protect welfare 
programs. Circle of Protection, founded in 2010, has been their most successful long-term 
effort; it gained the full backing of not only the usually sympathetic US Conference of 
Catholic Bishops and Catholic Charities, but also the National Association of Evangelicals 
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and the Salvation Army, which had rarely lobbied in favor of welfare. There are also more 
narrowly topical interfaith groups. For example, Interfaith Worker Justice is a long-term 
organizing effort which helped to form Let Justice Roll, for the 2007 campaign to increase 
the minimum wage. In the area of health care, the Inter-Religious Campaign for Health Care 
Access, founded in the 1970s, later became Faithful Reform in Health Care and the Faith for 
Health Coalition. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When I give food to the poor they call me a saint. When I ask why they are poor they 
call me a communist. 
—Bishop Helder Camara 
Why do many Christian denominational organizations in the United States argue in 
favor of progressive efforts against poverty, while a few conservative Christian 
organizations argue against such efforts? Under what circumstances do organizations on 
either side of this debate become influential on policy outcomes? A theological orientation 
toward social justice and secular interest as charitable agencies combine to motivate 
denominations to engage in lobbying for the poor. These factors have gone a long way 
toward making the Catholic Church the foremost religious advocate for the poor, despite its 
antagonistic relationship with the Democratic Party over the politics of abortion. However, 
with the possible exception of black Protestant denominations, most Christian organizations 
must argue against those within their groups who do not want denominational lobbying on 
behalf of the poor. Conservative Catholic and evangelical critics of a progressive approach 
to poverty usually argue that the only way to truly address the root causes of poverty is to 
promote the spreading of their religious faith. Combined with more secular fears about 
government inefficiency, such conservative viewpoints can form counter-narratives within 
denominations which significantly limit the effectiveness of their lobbying on progressive 
efforts to address poverty, even when the leaders of these denominations entirely support 
progressive economic efforts. 
Although my primary academic interest is the influence of religion on American 
politics, I also seek to place this project within the literature on interest group politics. It is 
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worth beginning, then, by noting an important sense in which religious groups act similarly 
to other interest groups; by acting within the economic interests of their organizations. In the 
upcoming chapters I show how, on the issues of poverty including social welfare and health 
care, religious groups act in what they perceive to be the interests of charitable agencies 
associated with them. It is not surprising that religious groups have come to political beliefs 
for secular reasons. Mark Smith’s new book Secular Faith examines how religious groups 
have hanged their beliefs over time on a variety of issues such as money lending and divorce 
because of changes in culture. 
Yet religious organizations also clearly take into account the doctrinal precepts of 
their denominations, and, perhaps more importantly, moral guidance derived from 
theological interpretations which are acceptable, but not required, by their denomination. 
Christian leaders, from the social gospel movement of the early twentieth century to the 
present day, very often describe their own experiences with the poor as having a great 
influence on them. But the lessons they take from their work with the poor are quite 
different. Some, such as progressive evangelical leader Jim Wallis, the author of God’s 
Politics, who was greatly influenced by the Catholic Worker movement’s leader Dorothy 
Day, come to the conclusion that the Christian command to serve the poor can only be 
fulfilled by using the power of government to mitigate the economic structures which cause 
poverty. Others, like conservative evangelical Marvin Olasky, author of The Tragedy of 
American Compassion, come to the conclusion that many government programs don’t work, 
and that religious charities need to develop the necessary resources to replace government 
programs, because religious anti-poverty initiatives can run more efficiently and teach the 
poor the necessary character traits for success. Many Christian advocates take somewhat of 
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a middle ground, questioning the suitability of some government programs while supporting 
others which they see as offering support to those most in need or incentivizing hard work 
(Walsh 2000). 
Certain denominations or coalitions of denominations develop clear attitudes to 
politics and theology which are rarely challenged. However, scholars of American religion 
learn quite early in their studies that most religious groups do not have internal consensus 
among their membership on most issues. Putnam and Campbell (2010) have shown that the 
attention devoted to the “3 B’s”—belief, belonging and behavior—define what it means to 
be a member of one’s religious denomination and illustrate the divisions within all religious 
groups. Those who claim to belong to a religious group may often fail to attend religious 
services, or differ in beliefs about issues large and small. It should not be surprising, then, 
since no denomination requires support of specific economic policies, that there is not 
internal agreement on how to deal with poverty within most denominations. Even as they 
call for commitment to the poor as a biblical mandate, religious denominations which have 
taken a firm position on poverty and social justice are unwilling to sanction those who 
disagree with it. Even the most liberal denominations have factions which oppose the 
National Council of Church’s position supporting governmental programs, as shown by the 
Pew (2015) Religious Landscape Survey result that nearly half of mainline Protestants 
believe government aid to the poor does more harm than good. The more hierarchical 
Catholic Church has a membership more supportive of government aid to the poor; roughly 
55% in the 2015 Pew Religious Landscape Survey. The 40% opposition figure, which is 
consistent as compared to earlier polling results (Putnam and Campbell 2010), however, is 
enough to undermine denominational unity on the topic, especially given the strength of 
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economically conservative Catholic organizations in politics, as will be described in Chapter 
2. Black Protestant denominations, by contrast, have a much stronger consensus on 
government aid to the poor as a good. 
Evangelical support for government aid to the poor is much weaker than it once was, 
as will be described in Chapter 2. But the 35% support for government aid to the poor 
indicated by the 2015 Pew Survey, and the presence of progressive and centrist evangelical 
think tanks and organizations such as Sojourners, Evangelicals for Social Action, and the 
Center for Public Justice, provide outlets for more progressive ways of thinking about 
poverty in conservative denominations. Thus, while individual evangelical denominations 
have not lobbied on behalf of the poor, umbrella organizations of evangelical denominations 
have shown openness to cooperation with government despite this being controversial in 
evangelical public opinion. Even if they begin by preferring such cooperation to be on their 
own terms such as faith-based partnerships, as described by Schafer (2012), the staunchly 
conservative National Association of Evangelicals later became a full partner in the 
interfaith group Circle of Protection in 2011. 
A difficult question, then, is whether religious leaders primarily take a theological 
view that is influenced by their politics, or take a political view influenced by their theology. 
Future research might inquire into the formation of young seminarians who later become 
Christian leaders. But hypothesizing that theological and political beliefs generally fit 
together, we can generally divide Christian advocates into two approaches. One believes that 
government, while imperfect, has a place in solving economic problems through welfare and 
health care programs and other regulations. Religious institutions should play a 
supplementary but not comprehensive role. Both governmental and religious programs do 
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not necessarily need to focus on instilling faith and personal salvation upon the poor. The 
other approach, while advocating for a strong state on moral and patriotic issues, is skeptical 
of government’s ability to regulate most economic life. This approach also sees personal 
salvation as an integral part of ending the cycle of poverty in families, and thus religious 
institutions should take primary responsibility for care of the poor, particularly in a secular 
age when government cannot be expected to uphold such values. 
The Religious Typology: Christian Left, Center and Right 
In this project I form a typology of religious organizations, extending from the 
Christian Left, to my personally defined category of Christian Center, to the Christian Right. 
In this introduction I provide a section about each of them, focusing on the most significant 
challenge they must contend with in their efforts to address poverty. The Christian Left, 
consisting of most of the mainline and black denominations of the National Council of 
Churches and a few progressive Catholic and evangelical organizations, supports all 
progressive efforts to address poverty. It also supports the rest of the platform of the 
Democratic Party, including at least neutrality, if not active support, of abortion rights and 
same-sex marriage. The Christian Center, including the US Conference of Catholic Bishops 
and more recently the National Association of Evangelicals, supports progressive efforts to 
address poverty and many other progressive causes such as environmental protection, 
immigration reform and the anti-war movement, but is socially conservative on issues of 
abortion and marriage. Both the Left and Center experience great division over whether to 
support compromise legislative proposals which are not as progressive as the proposals 
originally under consideration; for example, during debates over the Family Assistance 
Program in 1970 and the Health Security Act of 1994.  The Christian Right, including the 
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Southern Baptist Convention, opposes many progressive efforts to address poverty and in 
general adheres to most of the platform of the Republican Party. 
The Christian Left 
As Walsh (2000) and many other sources demonstrate, and as I will detail in Chapter 
2, Christian progressives in the early twentieth century began to argue that the state had the 
ability to provide a more systematic solution to poverty than local communities and religious 
charities could manage. There is no doubt that their commitments to supporting social 
welfare programs come from theological training they have received in principles of social 
justice (Tipton 2007; Snarr 2011). For some on the Christian Left, their commitment to 
justice leads them to advocate for goals that are politically unrealistic, or to take on too 
many issues at a time. Hofrening (1995) argues that religious groups tend toward calls for 
legislation based on moral principles, in what he calls “prophetic lobbying.” In prophetic 
lobbying, organizations call on politicians to fix poverty by any means necessary because it 
should be a moral priority. 
Internally, those who are primarily motivated by social justice and those who are 
pragmatically trying to seek any forward movement often disagree about whether to support 
legislation. For example, as will be described in Chapter 3, during the first year of the 
Clinton administration, the leadership of the National Council of Churches and black 
Protestant denominations, including advocates from religious charities, supported 
Democratic health care plans, seeing any possible reform as a benefit to enough people that 
it was clearly worthwhile. Meanwhile various mainline lobbyists and progressive 
evangelical social justice advocates held out for the possibility of a single payer health care 
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system. This undermined the unity of the progressive Christian message, and caused 
personal conflicts which lasted for years to come (Tipton 2007). 
By upholding a more radical vision of social justice, Christian progressives have the 
potential to build an anti-poverty movement distinct from other progressives. Yet with a few 
exceptions, their attempts at mobilizing systematic reforms through social protest and 
education have gained little long-term political traction. Statements released by the National 
Council of Churches have been more accessible through their online presence, but they have 
been described even by their sympathizers as rhetorically vague (Gill 2012). 
There are some advantages to maintaining a focus on more specific, incremental 
reforms, which religious organizations have a greater tendency to do when lobbying in their 
capacity as charitable institutions. Politicians understand that religious groups have genuine 
expertise in their work with the poor, and they are better able to reach those who do not have 
their particular theological commitments. But they risk losing their distinct influence, as 
they become merely another in a long list of partners in liberal coalitions. 
Christian progressives also lobby on behalf of the poor in their capacity as leaders of 
religious charities. Most mainline and black Protestant denominations, along with their 
umbrella organization, the National Council of Churches, have their own national charitable 
organizations, and their local congregations are involved in community development work. 
Given their theological commitment to social justice, they are likely to argue that, whether 
or not government assists their particular charities, that government programs benefit those 
charities by lessening the extent to which they are overburdened with the need to help those 
who may be helped more comprehensively by social programs. Hofrening acknowledges 
that charities have a significant impact on religious social justice work. They do so first by 
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informing politicians about their particular work, with discussion of the types of government 
programs that would or would not be helpful, and second by joining allied organizations in 
presenting statistics about poverty with which to contextualize their theological beliefs about 
poverty and the needs of their charitable agencies. The Christian Left’s connections with the 
Democratic Party provide opportunities for them to easily work with think tanks generally 
allied to the Democrats and which present relevant statistics on poverty, such as the Center 
for Budget and Policy Priorities and the Urban Institute. But as will be described below, it is 
not only the Christian Left as defined in my typology which argues for governmental action 
based on the interests of charitable institutions. 
Aside from the tension between prophetic lobbying for social justice and the more 
pragmatic lobbying of agencies, there are other challenges that are even more exclusive to 
the Left. The problems of maintaining a specific religious identity are compounded when 
adding the Christian Left’s generally non-traditional views from within their religious 
denominations. In their support for socially liberal causes such as abortion rights, along with 
their tacit, sometimes even overt support for Democratic politicians, they become vulnerable 
to wholesale attacks from their opponents inside their denominations. Conservative 
opponents of the Christian Left accuse Christian progressives of seeing their theological 
views of social justice as more important than maintaining the doctrine of their 
denominations. Religious progressives have been accused of supporting governmental 
programs only because they are unwilling to devote the necessary resources to charity. By 
advocating changes in the doctrines of their denominations, they are also accused of causing 
the decline in church attendance by watering down doctrines so that people no longer 
believe they have to attend church to be moral (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Swarts 2012). 
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The Christian Center, although upholding some of the more traditional doctrines of their 
denominations, are still left open to these attacks. 
The Christian Center 
While there appears to be a coherent narrative by which many Christians leaning 
toward social conservatism argue against progressive efforts to address poverty, the Catholic 
Church has long asserted that conservative views on family values and the definition of 
human life should be combined with progressive views on the economy. Cardinal Joseph 
Bernardin, the archbishop of Chicago in the 1980s and 1990s, advocated a “seamless 
garment” approach, which connected protecting life beginning at conception with protecting 
the quality of life of all through social programs (Reese 1992). Other slogans used by people 
advocating this approach include “consistent life ethic,” “life from conception to natural 
death,” and “womb to tomb.” (Massaro 2007).  Yet those with this combination of beliefs 
have found themselves politically homeless in recent decades, and even without a consistent 
label, unlike their general opposites, the libertarians. The Pew Research Center’s survey on 
political typologies, last updated in 2014, uses the term “Faith and Family Left”, but this 
group does not comprise the whole of the Christian Center. Determining support for the 
Christian Center in public opinion is difficult. While one can start by looking at the numbers 
of evangelicals, Catholics, and even mainline Protestants who support welfare policies, most 
studies do not provide a way to determine which Christians in favor of welfare are socially 
conservative (thus in the Christian Center) and which ones are not (and thus in the Christian 
Left). A few studies provide some clues that there remains a constituency for this sort of 
politics. Wuthnow (2004) noted that 36% of religious conservatives support increased 
spending on welfare, while Abramowitz (2010) notes that 20% of Democrats as of the 
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writing of his book are pro-life. It may be assumed that few pro-life Democratic voters 
would remain Democrats if they did not support social welfare spending. Finally, when 
analyzing the 2015 Pew religious landscape survey, at least 30% of Christians in all 
religious traditions who oppose legalized abortion also support government aid to the poor. 
The Christian Center is also aided by the fact that some of its charitable 
organizations are particularly well-organized and respected for their expertise on poverty. 
Catholic Charities and the Catholic Health Association, in particular, are arguably the most 
influential Christian public policy groups in their fields, as I discuss in my chapters on 
health care and welfare. They uphold Catholic teaching on abortion, which sometimes puts 
the Catholic Health Association particularly in a politically difficult bind. But their work 
with the poor motivates them to take Catholic social teaching on poverty seriously. 
Furthermore, they have a history of seeking government help to deal with poverty since the 
nineteenth century, having been over-burdened by the large numbers of Catholic immigrants 
whom they were called to serve. Evangelical charities are much newer to Christian Center 
politics, but they, too, have demonstrated expertise working with the poor, and their work 
with the poor has taught some of them to be realistic about the need for government 
assistance. 
The Christian Center, however, has been beset by political woes. Two journalistic 
accounts in the past decade have lamented the Democratic Party’s treatment of Christian 
voters with conservative social values, focusing on Catholics (Sullivan 2008; Winters 2008). 
On the other side, economic conservatives often associate Christian Center activists with the 
Democratic Party and left-wing politics. There has not been a definitive account in political 
science or related disciplines of Christian Center politics, though such views are prominent 
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in studies of Catholics (Reese 1992; Hayer et al 2008) and non-rightist evangelicals 
(Gassaway 2003; Swartz 2012). 
Some Christian Center activists have responded by seeking an alliance with the 
Republican Party despite their disagreements. Hayer et al (2008) describes how Catholic 
Bishops have preached sermons and presented voter guides tacitly encouraging Catholics to 
vote for the Republican Party by reminding them to focus on abortion as a great intrinsic 
evil of our time, arguably turning the Catholic vote toward the Republican Party after the 
1980 elections. Gassaway describes how Ron Sider, the leader of Evangelicals for Social 
Action and a co-founder of Evangelicals for McGovern three decades earlier, voted for 
George W. Bush in 2000 with the hope that his socially conservative politics and support for 
faith-based partnerships would create the right blend of respect for traditional values and 
social justice. Yet as he and the Catholic Bishops have often been reminded, there are only 
occasional successes in efforts to move the Republican Party on poverty issues, while their 
anti-abortion politics has antagonized Democratic allies on poverty. To compound the 
situation, some adherents of Christian Center politics have remained in the Democratic Party 
as “Democrats for Life,” softened their pro-life principles to varying extents, or declared that 
they would stop voting; thus, Christian center politics is a chaotic set of actors with no 
common strategy. 
The Christian Right 
How could evangelicals vote in such large numbers for Jimmy Carter, an evangelical 
Christian Democrat who supported a relatively large welfare state, and then turn around to 
back the Reagan Administration and Republican Presidents thereafter? Why would 
conservative Catholics and mainline Protestants go against the economic policies of their 
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denominational leaderships? Some observers of the Christian Right present a narrative in 
which the Christian Right cares little about economic issues, voting against their own best 
interests for the sake of the Republican Party’s promises on abortion and a few other cultural 
issues. On the other hand, there is a scholarly consensus that evangelicals, at least, did not 
consider abortion to be a primary issue until the 1970s, after the Roe v Wade decision 
(Wilcox and Robinson 2011). 
The best way to understand the Christian Right’s real preferences and priorities is to 
consider their views on both abortion and economics as a symptom, rather than a cause, of 
their political identity. Right-wing evangelicals, and their allies in other traditions, see both 
legalized abortion and progressive economic programs as fruitless attempts by an inefficient, 
irreligious government to solve problems such as poverty and lack of family formation that 
can only be solved by a revival of religious faith. Scholars who study the farthest corners of 
the Christian Right, such as Christian reconstructionism and dominionism (Walsh 2000) 
(McVickar 2015) may tend to overstate the extent to which the Christian Right desires a 
more theocratic government. But there is no doubt that the mainstream Christian Right 
desires a government which cultivates a Christian culture. 
Further, many evangelicals who have worked with the poor try to argue that their 
brand of Christian faith does a better job than government programs at solving poverty, 
especially Marvin Olasky, who coined the term “compassionate conservatism.” Harding 
(2000), in her anthropological study “The Book of Jerry Falwell”, notes the approach of 
“sacrificial economics” adopted by Falwell and other religious right leaders of the 1980s and 
1990s, which encouraged evangelicals to show their commitment to Christian revival by 
giving as much as possible to Christian ministries. With the understanding that Christian 
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ministries would help the poor achieve religious faith, Christians could do more to solve 
poverty than could the government. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the seeds for evangelical distrust of government 
were planted at least by the early decades of the twentieth century. Some scholars theorize 
that evangelicals opposed progressive movements because they did not want to be on the 
same sides as their theological opponents (Marsden 1995). This would indicate that the type 
of politics that leads pro-life advocates to distrust progressive programs specifically because 
Democrats support them, goes back much earlier than the abortion debate. Other scholars, 
such as Cruce (2015) note the long-standing alliance between religious leaders and business 
interests, as business leaders sought to amplify seeds of distrust between religious leaders 
and government. Finally, there is no doubt that many Christians genuinely believe that 
government programs are inefficient. Even those often perceived to be on the progressive 
side, like the Catholic Worker Movement’s leader Dorothy Day, were surprisingly 
unimpressed by government programs even in the middle of the twentieth century. Although 
she certainly did not work to oppose such programs, Day urged religious groups to focus on 
their own individual efforts to take care of the poor. (Dorrien 2011). 
By uniting Christian cultural goals with the language of fiscal conservatism, the 
terms for an alliance to build a new conservative movement became clear by the 1970s.    
Nash (1976)’s analysis of the conservative movement as an alliance of libertarians, social 
conservatives and foreign policy conservatives set the stage for contemporary scholarship on 
the Republican Party and conservative movement, but Leege et al. (2002) most effectively 
synthesize the cultural narratives which mobilized the Christian Right and allowed them to 
unite with the other branches of conservatism; that threats to the capitalist economic system 
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and family values from social changes starting in the 1960s are threatening to both 
American politics and Christian life. In such readings of the political situation, capitalism is 
threatened from within by the expanding welfare state at home and from communism 
abroad. The anti-war movement weakens American patriotism and thus strengthens 
communism. The women’s liberation movement, and social programs which provide 
support to single mothers undermine the conservative vision of the family, while social 
programs directed at racial minorities provided a talking point for conservatives to reach 
those who had previously supported segregation, while couching it in a message of self-
reliance and hard work (e.g. Gilens 1999). As numerous other studies corroborate, most 
Protestant denominations had only lukewarm opposition to abortion until the late 1970s. The 
early evangelical Right was more interested in the issue of prayer in public schools. They 
took up the abortion issue as a clear example of the decline of Christian values in the United 
States, for which there was already an opposing movement set up by Catholics. 
McGerr (1996) and Dochuk (2012) discuss the core of activists from a variety of 
denominations who began organizations at the community and national level in order to 
propagate this particular approach to conservative ideology, while others such as Martin 
(1996) and Wilcox and Robinson (2011) discuss their continued mobilization into a variety 
of national organizations which bridged denominational gaps. Parallel organizations were 
also used to change politics within denominations. Their special target was the Southern 
Baptist Convention (Hankins 2002), which moved in a much more conservative direction in 
the 1980s as factions in the denomination accused the old leadership of being too 
accommodating to liberal ideas. Schlozman (2015) describes how the Religious Right 
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served as an anchoring movement for the Republican Party, providing it with activists while 
seeking to influence its conservative direction. 
As scholars of conservative politics universally note, tension between the Christian 
Right and the rest of the conservative movement has increased substantially in the past 
decade. However, as Montgomery (2012) and other essays in the 2012 edited volume 
Steeped (concerning the rise of the Tea Party) make clear, this tension is not because the 
Christian Right opposes the fiscal conservatism of the Tea Party. There is a great deal of 
overlap between the memberships of the Tea Party and the Christian Right, and Christian 
Right leaders are primarily concerned that some Tea Party leaders would like to distance the 
movement and the Republican Party from social issues. 
Recent studies indicate that conservative churches continue to perpetuate 
conservative economic views. Beam (2015), citing more recent studies and conducting 
research of her own, argues that conservative churches adopt right-wing politics with the 
assistance of opinion leaders who pass on information about fiscally conservative 
interpretations of theology to other congregants who are already willing to hear them. 
Beam’s extensive interviews with American evangelicals, and the work of previous scholars 
such as Hart (1996) and Putnam and Campbell (2010), mostly consisting of surveys and 
interviews, show that ministers in conservative churches generally pay little attention to 
economics in their sermons, but conservative views on economics are reinforced by social 
conversations among congregants. Thus, their attachment to the Republican Party and its 
policies becomes greater, and their support for welfare cuts and market-based health care 
solutions, far from being a price that must be paid for supporting a pro-life party, instead 
become a further reason to support conservative candidates. 
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As will be discussed below (in Chapter 2), as recently as the 1980s, evangelical 
voters were much more likely to support some progressive economic policies. But recent 
books on voting behavior such as Abramowitz (2010) affirm that church attendance among 
white Christians correlates with Republican voting. Fiorina and Abrahms (2009), along with 
the 2007 and 2015 Pew religious landscape surveys, also indicate that church attendance, 
rather than denominational identity, correlates with conservative views on economic and 
domestic policy issues. This includes not only evangelicals, but also white Catholics, who 
are more likely to support progressive economic policies than white evangelicals but less 
likely than Hispanic Catholics, or white Catholics who do not regularly attend church. The 
correlation also includes mainline Protestants, who belong to denominations which do not 
belong to the Christian Right but which continue to have some doctrinally conservative 
congregations. 
As Fiorina and Abrams (2009) note, economics is a key factor in the voting decisions 
of the right. If Christian Republicans are voting based on their conservative economic views 
rather than their conservative social views, the narrative that the Christian Right is in an 
uncomfortable alliance with economic conservatives must be questioned. Rather, Christian 
values can be grafted onto an already existing secular conservative narrative. Such appears 
to be the case for the Southern Baptist convention, which as Orrin Smith’s 1997 book The 
Rise of Baptist Republicanism argues, shifted toward the Republican Party and toward 
conservative politics on poverty in parallel with the rest of the South, which at the same time 
resulted in the strengthening of theologically conservative organizations within the 
denomination. What we can take from our understanding of this narrative is that even 
though the Christian Right appears to participate in less direct lobbying or social protest 
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against most poverty policies compared to the Left and Center activism in favor of such 
policies, the Christian Right remains a powerful opponent in economic debates. 
     At its best, the Christian Right has the potential to motivate Christians to help the 
poor in their own communities. It can also highlight specific instances of governmental 
inefficiency. However, the Christian Right fails to take into account that getting rid of 
government programs would fail to restore the Christian culture they hope to achieve. They 
fail to develop a realistic plan for avoiding social upheaval from the absence of government 
programs they would hope to cut. 
Scholarly Contribution of the Project 
Several streams of literature within social science disciplines such as political 
science, history, sociology and religious studies have examined the impact of religious 
groups on poverty policy in the United States, either by discussing poverty in the context of 
other work by a specific religious group (e.g. McGreevey 2003 for Catholics; Gassaway 
2003 for progressive evangelicals; Tipton 2007 for Methodists and other mainline 
Protestants) or by examining religious work on poverty in the context of a broader 
discussion of poverty policy (e.g. Katz 1996; Chappel 2010). There is much academic 
literature about the work of faith-based organizations in welfare policy, with a particular 
revival in that field during the decade after the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Act of 1996 (e.g. Cnaan 1999; Bane et al 1999; Dobelstein 1999; Bartkowski 
and Regis 2003; Wuthnow 2004). This work underscores the importance of considering the 
needs of charitable agencies as paramount in religious attitudes to poverty policy. Quite 
reasonably, these books focus on best practices for congregational work with the poor in the 
context of new resources available to them from government partnerships. In addition to 
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presenting up-to-date developments on the themes of these books, my project systematically 
analyzes the involvement of denominational organizations in formulating the poverty 
policies that created and continues to influence the politics around faith-based partnerships.1 
Walsh (2000)’s book Religion, Economics and Policy Priorities is perhaps the 
closest to my project. It examines the theological attitudes of specific leaders and 
organizations on government spending and the plight of the poor as a whole, in addition to 
case study chapters on health care reform and welfare reform (though with no mention of the 
minimum wage). In addition to being outdated, it does not systematically examine the 
interaction between views of social justice, life and family issues, government efficiency, 
and the interests of religious charities. 
The literature on interest groups, within which this project should be placed, 
acknowledges that the poor are underrepresented in lobbying by religious groups (e.g. 
Schlozman, Brady and Verba 2011). These works often acknowledge that religious groups 
have done significant work to represent the poor, but have not discussed such work in detail. 
When interest group literature does focus entirely on religion, it has tended to produce work 
which looks at religious activism on a broad set of issues (e.g. Hertzke 1988, Hofrening 
1995, Smith 2013). The general theoretical literature on interest groups does provide a 
useful framework to describe the ways in which religious organizations might act as interest 
groups; as lobbyists for ideas based on moral principles, as lobbyists for the policy 
preferences of their members, and as organizations which can provide politicians with useful 
information.  These three categories can be used to look at the variety of academic literature 
                                                 
1 For example, chapter 2 describes how the Catholic Church first agreed to partnerships with the 
government in the late 1800s and soon after came to support governmental welfare programs as long as a place 
remained for church charities. Chapter 4 describes how some evangelical organizations have undergone a 
similar evolution. 
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which deals in whole or in part with religious approaches to poverty, and to build the 
argument for the ways in which all of these considerations are important. 
My choices for policy case studies are federal spending on social welfare (in 
particular, the Temporary Aid to Needy Families and SNAP food stamp programs), 
comprehensive health care reform, and minimum wage laws. The Catholic Bishops and 
other Catholic agencies, along with mainline Protestant denominations, have focused 
significant effort lobbying in all of these policy areas. I will argue throughout this project 
that the Catholic Church, because of the clout of Catholic Charities and the Catholic Health 
Association as agencies with expertise, has been most influential. These three case studies 
allow analysis of different types of anti-poverty programs. Welfare is a series of income 
support programs for which progressive lobbyists have had to fight against cuts for the past 
30 years. Health care reform is a massive effort to address one major social program that 
particularly impacts the poor, which did achieve some policy success during the last 
Democratic administration. The minimum wage, which has drawn the most grassroots 
attention from religious progressives and the least opposition from the Religious Right, is an 
economic regulation which benefits workers. 
Methods 
The methodology of this project is to build on the information already available in 
academic sources by examining congressional hearing transcripts and media accounts. 
Although I have and will continue to study the web sites developed and maintained 
officially by each denomination, I have generally found their statements to be lacking in 
detail about follow-up actions. Congressional committee transcripts usually provide a better 
summary of the thinking of denominational leaderships and charitable agencies concerning 
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the topic at hand. Media accounts often highlight important quotes from interviews of 
organizational leaders, provide evidence of lobbying activity or social mobilization, and give 
some indication of the level of attention being received by denominations on their efforts. I 
focus on examinations of three national newspapers; The New York Times, The Washington 
Post and The Los Angeles Times, and two religious periodicals, The Christian Century and 
The National Catholic Reporter. 
One difficult decision I had to make was the extent to which federal-level and state-
level lobbying would be examined. I made the decision to primarily examine federal 
lobbying for welfare and health care reform, and state level lobbying for the minimum wage. 
This does not mean that religious groups have no influence on state governments regarding 
welfare and health care. As Yamane (2005), the most extensive academic study of state 
Catholic conferences explains, Catholic lobbying at the state level intensified after dioceses 
in over 20 states formed Catholic conferences shortly after Vatican II, and especially after 
responsibility for many federal programs devolved to the states starting in the 1970s. The 
Washington Post noted particular Catholic influence on welfare policy in Maryland 
(Muscatine 1982). Yamane, in a survey of state Catholic Conference directors, found that 
the broad category of “economic justice” was the third highest priority among Catholic 
lobbyists of the state level, but far behind the two highest priorities of anti-abortion 
advocacy and lobbying on behalf of Catholic education. While Wuthnow and Evans (2002) 
largely discount mainline lobbying at the state level, Hertzky’s edited volume Representing 
God at the State House finds significant mainline involvement alongside Catholic bishops in 
lobbying for social programs. Minnesota has a particularly substantive history of religious 
lobbying on welfare policy, by the interfaith Joint Religious Legislative Coalition (Knudson 
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2015). However, on the issues of welfare and health care, state governments primarily 
respond to federal regulations. For example, after the 1996 Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act, which cut federal welfare programs, religious groups had to lobby 
states in order to prevent them from cutting their own programs, while also lobbying federal 
regulators and members of Congress in order to save state programs. Regarding the 
minimum wage, on the other hand, the most important religious influence has been at the 
state and local level, with a sustained social movement since the early 1990s to get “living 
wages” through city councils, state legislatures and ballot measures, as the federal minimum 
wage increases became few and far between. 
Outline  
Chapter 2 examines the development of Catholic, mainline and evangelical 
denominational approaches to poverty before the Clinton administration, first by discussing 
scriptural views of poverty and the complexities of denominational politics since the 
Protestant Reformation, and then by discussing the ways in which religious leaders 
responded theologically to crises of immigration, industrialization, economic depression and 
continued poverty despite postwar prosperity. The chapter then discusses religious responses 
to the backlash against the welfare state which intensified during the Reagan administration, 
and the efforts of the Religious Right and associated think tanks to undercut progressive 
religious efforts. It makes a case for focusing on the involvement of religious charities in 
leading the religious response to poverty from the 1930s to the 1980s, by comparing the 
findings of Schafer (2012) with congressional committee hearing transcripts. 
Chapter 3 compares religious responses to the failed Health Security Act of 1994 and 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010; this debate caused a crisis in 
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Catholic politics which nearly prevented the law’s passage, but the Catholic Health 
Association assisted the Obama administration despite opposition from the Bishops because 
of its interests as a health agency and commitment to the more progressive segment of 
Catholic social teaching. 
Chapter 4 compares the responses of religious denominations and charities to the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 and the debt ceiling crisis of 
2011. In the mid-1990s, religious groups tried to adapt to the increasing threats to welfare 
programs and the heightened involvement of the Religious Right in anti-welfare politics in a 
variety of ways. The Catholic Church attempted to link increased welfare with lower 
abortion rates to an extent that it has not done before or since. Religious charities worked to 
persuade lawmakers that they could not make up the difference from government cuts, with 
Catholic Charities working largely independently and the mainline charities in a more 
extensive coalition with secular agencies. By 2011, religious lobbyists from a variety of 
denominations were reviving attempts previously made to develop an ecumenical lobbying 
strategy based on social justice. This chapter notes that religious groups have, in recent 
decades, attempted to respond to conservative talking points that they perceive to be most 
open to a more progressive interpretation; the politics of abortion in the 1990s and the 
politics of fiscal responsibility in the 2010s. 
Chapter 5 examines the politics of the minimum wage, with a focus on state and 
local social movements since 1995, which have benefited from religious involvement. In 
this case as well, there has been resistance to progressive legislation in the federal 
government. Religious groups have responded by advocating for as many states and local 
governments to increase wages, using both appeals to social justice and the needs of 
  
29 
religious charities. The chapters mostly follow the same outline; however, allowing for 
differences in the political paths along which these issues developed, there are some 
organizational differences in the chapters. Most sections in each chapter begin by showing 
how progressive religious groups sought to mobilize support through advocacy of social 
justice, usually by forming interfaith and secular coalitions. I then examine how the left and 
center was usually required to focus on tactics of advocacy through charitable agencies, 
persuading politicians to consider their expertise in the needs of the poor. I then examine the 
ways in which conservatives and progressives alike dealt with issues that became tangled 
with programs for the poor, especially the politics of abortion and views about family 
formation. Finally, where applicable I examine the extent to which religious conservatives 
argued that programs would be inefficient. Thus, their main objection to welfare and health 
care reform followed a narrative by which they were not conducive to the interests of 
churches because they did not instill religious faith. Health care, with its direct application to 
issues of life at its beginning and end, has been more concerning to the religious right; the 
minimum wage, as it is not a government program and arguably allows the poor to cultivate 
values of hard work, is less concerning to them. 
Throughout, I develop three main arguments: First, religious groups are most 
effective when they lobby in their capacity as charitable institutions; however, they have to 
have some sort of belief in social justice in order for charities to pursue goals of social 
justice. Second, the Catholic Church does, as is often claimed, prioritize the issue of 
abortion, but this approach been a hindrance to progressive politics only on the issue of 
health care. It causes political problems for Catholic lobbying, but the political difficulties 
and steep decline in mainline denominations cause almost equal difficulties. Third, the 
  
30 
Christian Right takes an entirely different approach to poverty, with cultivation of faith as 
the long-term goal. However, there are signs that this approach is changing in some 
evangelical organizations, so much so that I include the National Association of 
Evangelicals in the category of the Christian Center. The continued support of some 
evangelicals and the Catholic Church will be vital for any continuation of progressive efforts 
to address poverty, particularly given the conservative victory in the 2016 elections, as I 
discuss in my concluding chapter.   
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Chapter 2: Historical Background 
This chapter traces the history of American denominational efforts to work with 
governmental institutions. It begins by explaining the biblical reasons for so many religious 
progressives and moderates to advocate comprehensive justice for the poor, and some 
critiques from more conservative religious communities also using scriptures. The next 
section argues that no denominational tradition has ever had a monopoly on progressive or 
conservative views of these matters. For example, Calvinism’s impulse to drive the poor 
toward hard work to demonstrate their faith was later transformed into a reinterpretation of 
Calvinist ideas in the social gospel movement of the early twentieth century, in which 
Christians were called to create a better world for the poor despite all obstacles. The trials of 
the immigrant experience in the United States brought Catholic charities into partnership 
with the state, which was a break from the historical European Catholic experience.2 This 
chapter further traces Christian involvement in poverty policy from the Great Depression to 
the Reagan Administration. Overall, mainline Protestants and Catholics sought to expand the 
welfare state and health care programs because of their belief in social justice and their 
growing understanding that religious charities could not provide comprehensive services. 
Conservative evangelicals, meanwhile, remained largely outside this alliance because of 
their focus on the need for the poor to achieve personal religious faith. 
The Bible and Poverty 
The Bible takes a particularly explicit and consistent interest in the issue of fair 
wages. All of the following verses demand that employers pay fair wages primarily because 
                                                 
2 Catholics had been hesitant to bring the state in to care for the poor even in countries where they 
were dominant, not because they failed to care for the poor, but because they saw the work of their religious 
orders as more efficient; given the political realities of such countries, they were likely correct. 
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they are earned through hard work, and it is unjust for people to remain poor because they 
are not given what they have earned. While none of these verses directly call for minimum 
wages to be mandated by law, they strengthen arguments that fair wages are an important 
part of a just society. 
   In the Old Testament, Moses commands the Israelites, “You shall not withhold the 
wages of poor and needy laborers, whether other Israelites or aliens who reside in your land 
in one of your towns” (Deuteronomy 24:14). The book of the Prophet Jeremiah admonishes 
“Woe to him who builds his house by unrighteousness, and his upper rooms by injustice; 
who makes his neighbors work for nothing, and does not give him his wages” (Jeremiah 
22:13). In the New Testament, Jesus implies consistently that good workers should be 
compensated justly, especially in Luke 10:7: “remain in the same house, eating and drinking 
what they provide, for the laborer deserves his wages.” This verse is used both by the 
Compendium on the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church (Pontifical Council for Justice 
and Peace, 2004) and by Bob Edgar of the National Council of Churches in his Middle 
Church (2006). Finally, the Epistle of James 5:4 states that “the Lord hears the cries of those 
who are not given just wages.” 
   Religious advocates for the poor may also interpret numerous biblical passages 
advocating justice for the poor as calls to encourage national priorities of care for the 
disadvantaged, including welfare programs. Matthew 25:45, where Jesus castigates those 
who did not help “the least of these” and Proverbs 31:9, which counsels a wise man to 
champion the poor, are among the most popular passages cited by religious advocates of 
welfare programs. Theologians from throughout Christian history, including the fourth-
century Bishop Ambrose and post-Reformation Catholics and Protestants, have interpreted 
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these passages as applying permanently. The same passages are often cited in both Catholic 
and Protestant contemporary sources (McGreevey 2003; Gassaway 2003). 
   However, some conservatives point out that there is no direct call for the 
government to help the poor. There are passages criticizing authorities for oppressing the 
poor, but there is some difference between actively harming the poor and providing 
programs to help them. Charity is usually mandated for a specific individual, with the 
primary purpose of teaching them proper work ethic, as argued by recent conservative 
Christian authors such as the Catholic writer Michael Novak (1983) and the Presbyterian 
writer Marvin Olasky (1992). Theologians can, however, interpret contemporary conditions 
to argue that poverty is such a systemic problem that individuals need to advocate for 
government programs as part of their charity obligations. For example, while the Bible does 
not have anything directly to say about health care reform, Christian left and center Catholic 
and Protestant theologians have argued that we should take note of Jesus’s care of the sick 
and make sure that health care is provided for all (US Catholic Bishops 1981, Edgar 2006). 
Conservatives also note that the Bible commands personal responsibility for the 
poor, arguing that government programs do not cultivate such personal responsibility 
(Walsh 2000). A favorite passage of conservatives is from the second epistle to the 
Thessalonians, where Paul states that those who do not work should not eat (e.g. Ballure 
2014). Progressives reply that Jesus’s call to love the poor transcends debates over personal 
responsibility (Gassaway 2003). 
The Denominational Roots of Poverty Policy in the United States 
     The sociologist Max Weber and his intellectual descendants argue that the 
Protestant Reformation contributed greatly to a more negative attitude toward the poor by 
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focusing on the works that each individual needed to perform in order to be saved. As Kahl 
(2005) summarized, throughout the middle ages, Catholic beggars were given alms in 
exchange for promises to pray for the souls of their benefactors. Constant prayer and 
receiving of the sacraments were more important than past actions and continued hard work 
to gain material possessions. Protestant reformers such as Martin Luther, and most 
particularly John Calvin (1509-1564) argued that the prayers of the poor for their 
benefactors were useless to the souls of those benefactors, because the salvation of someone 
giving charity was based only on their individual faith in Christ. The salvation of the poor, 
too, for Protestants, was based on their individual faith, which they had to develop through 
their own struggle without recourse to the sacraments or the prayers of others. Luther, and 
especially Calvin, argued for a revival of the notion, which had always been present in 
Christianity, that hard work was an important way of showing one’s fidelity to Christianity. 
Historians have noted that American attitudes toward the poor have been influenced by the 
teachings of John Calvin, a Swiss theologian whose followers founded the Presbyterian 
family of denominations and influenced numerous other Protestant churches (Katz 1996; 
Tratner 1999). This Calvinistic thinking is derived not only from the theology of the Puritan 
settlers in America but was also encoded in British law; Max Weber and Weberian scholar 
Sigrun Kahl classified Britain and the United States as Calvinist countries. 
When examining the history of American poverty policy, the Weberian division 
between Calvinist, Lutheran, and Catholic ideals is a poor way to understand religious 
influence; in fact, making blanket statements about the views of any denomination or family 
denominations on poverty is shockingly unhelpful. The most important reason is that a 
denominational tradition’s core attitude toward the poor does not necessarily translate to a 
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clear program for the state’s provision of poverty relief. This is because, when examining 
denominational traditions carefully, there is plenty of room for adaptation given economic 
and political considerations. Clergy involved in work with the poor certainly draw on 
insights from their theological tradition. However, their own roles (for example, whether as 
the head of a charitable agency or as a pastor priding himself on a strong relationship with 
business leaders), influence the parts of their theology on which they choose to focus. For 
American Catholics, the hierarchical nature of their church and the relationship between the 
Catholic Church in the US and the Vatican have often shaped these debates. For Protestants, 
the frequent shifting of denominational identities have resulted in mixing of influences 
between various older denominational traditions and new denominations identifying with 
the same traditions as but whose priorities in practice are very far apart. It is also rather 
unfair to categorize all non-Lutheran American Protestants as falling within the Calvinist 
tradition, although any attempt to further categorize, for example, a separate Wesleyan 
denominational tradition would be tangential to this project. Thus, it is nearly impossible to 
convincingly define which individuals and groups do or do not belong to a Calvinist 
tradition. 
Calvin called for a significant emphasis on the building of a strong community, 
which influenced early Puritan American documents such as the Mayflower Compact and 
the City on a Hill speech (Morone 2004). Many British and American cities began assistance 
to the poor known as “outdoor relief” in the seventeenth century, which included direct 
provision of money or supplies (Kahl 2005). Part of the reason for this was that the Catholic 
religious orders who had been providing such relief had been suppressed in Britain and were 
rarely present in the American colonies, so the government was more compelled to address 
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the problem. But later, as some clergy interpreted Calvin’s call for charity, community, and 
an uncompromising call to create a world in which Christian faith was lived out entirely, 
they essentially began to advocate for more robust programs of indoor relief. When 
Calvinism is merged with progressive ideology, Calvinists can be among the most 
uncompromising supporters of progressive efforts to address poverty. 
Yet, there is no doubt that Calvin’s emphasis on individual responsibility and hard 
work was and has been used to justify harsh treatment of the poor. Calvinist countries, 
including the United Kingdom and the United States, often encouraged local governments to 
adopt a policy of “indoor relief,” which resulted in many of the poor being institutionalized 
in workhouses. Religious supporters of these policies argued that they successfully balanced 
the needs of the poor, the development of their character, and economic productivity. 
Calvin’s theology of predestination, based on his interpretation of biblical passages 
indicating that God has already decided who will be saved, did not explicitly argue that 
those in poverty would not be saved. However, as believers began looking for tangible signs 
of favor from God, poverty began to be used as evidence of moral failure. Morone (2004), 
writing in the American context, summarized a common set of moral failures deplored by 
the Puritans and their successors: the sins of addiction, sloth, violence and sexual immorality 
among the poor—and he argues that the US government has often feared any policy that 
might encourage them. Morone provides evidence of the origins of public policies from 
Puritan crusades, which could often be socially communitarian but with the primary purpose 
of combatting sin rather than providing material aid for its own sake. Marty (1984) provides 
the example of Henry Ward Beecher, a Congregationalist minister from the second half of 
the nineteenth century, who stated that a man could feed a wife and six children on a very 
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low salary as long as he worked hard and did not drink. Finally, many Calvinist 
denominations had been initially persecuted by governments, and thus retained a suspicion 
of state power. Denominations who maintained such suspicions preached against the risks of 
an overly powerful central government, and argued that in order to prevent governments 
from becoming too powerful, local communities and religious institutions should take care 
of the poor. 
Lutheranism and Catholicism 
     Lutheran and Catholic influence on poverty policy needs to be placed in the 
context of the immigrant experience starting from the middle of the nineteenth century. Both 
groups found it necessary to rely on assistance from local and state governments. At the 
same time, governments had little interest in providing all of the manpower needed to 
directly work with the poor. Thus, religious groups were able to come to an agreement with 
governments to collaborate on taking care of the poor, which included religious instruction. 
     It should not be surprising that Lutherans would be relatively comfortable with 
this system. Because early Lutheran countries in Europe had little separation between church 
and state, they were among the forerunners of early state-run programs for the poor, which 
included assistance from the Church. Yet Lutherans were required to adapt to an entirely 
new environment in the United States, given that governmental institutions had no affiliation 
with Lutheranism. While some Weberian interpretations might have expected them to be at 
the forefront of the progressive movement in the US, they were a divided, smaller and 
relatively backwater constituency, which concentrated their political power in a few states in 
the upper Midwest. While Dorrien (2010) cites Lutheran J. Stuckenberg as a precursor of the 
social gospel movement in the 1880s, Dorrien does not argue that he was influential. 
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Lutherans did, however, follow Catholics in setting up local charitable and health care 
institutions which entered into partnerships with local governments, especially where the 
Lutheran population was high. 
The Catholic Church, by contrast, was used to being the primary caretaker of the 
poor in Europe. After the Reformation, a new mobilization of charitable orders and lay 
organizations took up the task of educating the poor on the doctrines and sacraments. As 
argued by Weber, the Catholic Church seemed less concerned about past actions and work 
ethic; rather, Catholics became most concerned about the relationships between the poor and 
their helpers, who should lead each other toward greater formation in Church teachings and 
practices. When Catholic bishops in the United States argue that mothers should receive 
welfare even if they are not working, they are acting in a long tradition of Catholic advocacy 
for aid to the poor regardless of their status of work. In countries where Catholicism was the 
state religion, governments entrusted poor relief to the Catholic Church, its orders and lay 
organizations. In countries where the Catholic Church was not dominant but was allowed to 
exist with relative freedom, as became the case in the United States, the Catholic Church 
was forced to adapt in order to reach its goals of both helping the poor and catechizing its 
followers; adaptations which later necessitated support for direct governmental programs. 
Catholics in the United States would be suspicious of relationships with a government 
dominated by Protestants, making Catholic support for governmental poverty relief even 
less likely in the United States than in Catholic countries. Indeed, this was at first the case, 
and there were many debates within the Catholic Church about participation in American 
politics (McGreevey 2003). 
  
39 
A revival in Catholic piety which took hold among some immigrants in the mid 
nineteenth century fostered a devotion to hard work and absolute fidelity to doctrine which 
is remarkably similar to that described as central to Calvinism. Proponents of this revival 
often felt that they should be left alone by the US government except to use government 
institutions to defend the rights of Catholic schools. Yet Catholic charities soon felt so 
overwhelmed with the numbers of immigrants needing help; since local governments had no 
wish to provide direct support, Catholic agencies and local governments found mutually 
beneficial arrangements during the late nineteenth century. This was particularly the case in 
places where Catholics were able to establish political machines and become elected to local 
and later state offices (Eerie 1988).  As Catholic politicians gained political power in areas 
dominated by Catholics, especially within the Democratic Party, these arrangements 
eventually grew to the state level. Financial support of Catholic charities, educational 
institutions and health facilities by governmental institutions also signified tangible political 
victories over Protestants opposed to Catholic presence in the United States. Since Catholics 
soon became both the largest denomination in the United States, the group with the greatest 
needs for health care, education and welfare, and the denomination with the most centralized 
method of both obtaining political power and setting up charitable organizations, its 
influence on poverty policy became permanent (Brown and McKeon 1997). 
The following sections will trace the history of Christian approaches to poverty 
throughout the twentieth century. Beginning with the social gospel, the story moves on 
through the Great Depression, civil rights movement and conservative backlash. Progressive 
religious movements, including most mainline and Catholic organizations, went from 
advocating eccentric and unrealistic economic restructuring, to full advocacy of attempts to 
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expand the welfare state, to continued support for these attempts in light of post-war 
prosperity, to a building of defensive strategies when welfare programs became vulnerable 
to cuts. 
The Social Gospel: 1890-1932 
     The Social Gospel movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
was among the most significant periods of religious advocacy for the poor in American 
history. The most socially conscious clergy looked despairingly at the horrors of urban 
poverty created by the Industrial Revolution and the continuing struggles of immigrants to 
achieve a better standard of living. As Katz (1996) explains, the growth of American cities 
presented special problems for poverty relief. While there was certainly deep hardship and 
poverty in rural areas as well, especially during times of natural disaster, the urban poor had 
no ability to produce their own food. Further, the bleak working conditions on factories were 
more likely to capture the imagination of clergy as a symptom of spiritual decay. 
Social gospel advocates developed theological justifications for rights that each 
person should possess, and looked at the increasing federal regulatory state and state and 
local governments as possible mechanisms for achieving such rights.3 Progressive Protestant 
                                                 
3 When using terms to describe camps within Protestantism (mainline, evangelical, fundamentalist) in 
the context of the social gospel, it is important to understand how leaders of the social gospel sought to build a 
new Christian social movement and a theological orientation across denominations, which was generally 
opposed to the theology of the fundamentalists which had some support in most denominations at the time. 
Leaders of the Social Gospel often had influences from several denominations, not only on their views of the 
economy, but also on their views of moral theology. Walter Rauschenbusch, a German Baptist, was the son of 
a former Lutheran minister, and avidly read the Congregationalist theologian Horace Bushnell. 
Congregationalist Washington Gladden started his ministerial career at a congregation that had just split from 
Methodism, and also read Anglican theologians (Dorrien 2010). Even Catholic Father John Ryan, like the 
Protestant social gospel leaders, was significantly influenced by Protestant economist Richard Ely (Dorrien 
2010). While most of these leaders could be described as mainline Protestants because their denominations 
later came to be identified with the mainline and took up some of the social gospel’s commitment to the 
concept of social justice, many of the social gospel’s leaders also used the term evangelical to describe 
themselves. 
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clergy and Catholic clergy tended to use quite different arguments to develop these ideas.4 
Yet they had other ideas for implementing their goals, and were in fact more suspicious of 
large welfare programs than most progressive religious leaders have been in the past several 
decades. While they were, by the standards of today, quite conservative on issues of family 
formation and governmental spending, they still aroused the suspicions of fundamentalist 
factions within Protestantism. 
Intellectual questions surrounding the appropriate role of property were paramount. 
The question of property is even more central to discussions of religion and poverty in this 
period because religious leaders devoted more attention to it than to efforts on behalf of the 
establishment of a welfare state. The welfare state solution, to provide services that the 
working poor cannot afford and to take care of the unemployed poor and their families, was 
largely considered to be a weaker alternative or a supplement to reforms in the distribution 
of land, profit, or both. One of the cornerstones of the 1908 Social Creed of the Churches 
was a call for “the most equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately be 
devised.” Debates about private property intensified around one of the most innovative and 
influential proposals on the course of American religion; Henry George’s idea of the single 
tax on land in the 1870s. George’s view was that productive activity should not be taxed, 
and this would lead to more profitable economic activity for the poor. Pope Leo XIII’s 
encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) was partially a reaction to the single tax ideas, to which 
the Catholic Church was very much opposed because, based on Thomistic theology, it 
prioritized private property. Based on the high level of labor union activity in the United 
                                                 
4 Father John Ryan’s significant individual effort was the primary factor which accelerated the 
development of American Catholic social teaching, which changed the focus of the Catholic Church from 
defending Catholic autonomy in a majority Protestant country toward using a Catholic perspective to improve 
conditions for all Americans (McGreevey 2003; Dorrien 2010). 
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States and Europe, Rerum Novarum argued that the state should lightly regulate the 
relationship between labor unions and capitalists so that workers are paid adequately for 
their productivity. The idea of a state-imposed living wage was interpreted as one of these 
regulations. Rerum Novarum (paragraph 20) states that workers have a right to fair wages, 
while paragraph 47 implies that workers should ideally be able to own property. Rerum 
Novarum focuses most of its secular remedies on the necessity of other protections for 
workers, who deserve a reasonable compensation for their labor. It argues that governments 
should have some right to make sure that workers are allowed to join labor unions, that 
unions and employers should negotiate fairly, and that working conditions should be 
regulated (RN 36). 40 years later, these ideas were reiterated in another papal encyclical, 
Quadregesimo Anno 91-95 (Zeba 2015). 
   Protestant social gospel activists, on the other hand, modified George’s ideas by 
arguing for schemes where capitalists would share ownership of the corporations with their 
workers. They hoped that these ideas would not require much state regulation; businesses 
who refused to share profits would not attract workers, and there would be clear 
improvements beneficial to all because of fairer income distribution. The idea of the 
minimum wage or living wage, then, was a small step in that direction (Dorrien 2010). 
While Catholics and Protestants developed ideas of living wages and regulations of 
working conditions from some different theological directions, both social teaching 
movements bolstered their intellectual claims with the biblical story of the creation, where 
God instructed mankind to work for food, and that since all are made in God’s image, all 
should be able to obtain food if they work. Snarr (2011) describes how Catholic Father John 
Ryan (author of the 1906 book Living Wage) and Northern Baptist theologian Walter 
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Rauschenbusch (author of the 1907 book Christianity and the Social Order), are two of the 
three intellectuals most influential on the contemporary living wage movement, along with 
Martin Luther King. 
In addition to devoting more attention to the question of ownership, social gospel 
advocates were far more socially conservative than most progressive religious advocates of 
recent decades. Protestant social gospel advocates and those Catholics with whom they 
occasionally collaborated on progressive issues prioritized conservative values of sobriety, 
religious faith and family, and they tended to favor limits on governmental solutions. 
Protestant activists almost universally allied with evangelicals in supporting Prohibition and 
other priorities of fundamentalists. Liberal Protestants were so supportive of Prohibition that 
they mostly supported Republicans largely over that issue in 1928 and even 1932 (Dorrien 
2010). One of the few Catholic public figures who leaned toward supporting Prohibition was 
Father John Ryan, the founder of the American Catholic social teaching tradition. 
   Protestant and Catholic social activists also supported women staying at home with 
children, and the primary reason they supported living wage policies was so that men who 
had jobs could raise families without their wives working for pay (Dorrien 2010). The 
Catholic Church most particularly incorporated this view in their official teaching. 
Quadregesimo Anno defines a fair wage as one which allows the support of a family 
(Paragraph 71), and ideally allows for savings (Paragraph 74). However, Quadregesimo 
Anno’s discussion of fair wages implies a conservative model of the family; paragraph 71 
states that women, at least mothers of children, should not work outside the home. Rerum 
Novarum and Quadregesimo Anno repeatedly emphasize the importance of discipline in 
family life. While the family wage concept is particularly emphasized in Catholic thought, it 
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was also a principle of American and European social policy advocated by Protestants and 
secular policy makers until about the 1970s (Chappell 2010). The idea of a family wage is 
now controversial among living wage advocates, many of whom disagree with the 
traditional family as consisting of a male head of household.  The argument that families can 
be supported more easily and possibly even buy property if they receive higher wages, is 
still coherent no matter the structure of the family. However, it is possible to argue that at 
least the encyclicals before Vatican II and some Protestant social gospel thought imply that 
minimum wages are not worth pursuing from a Christian perspective if they are not family 
wages. Additionally, both early Catholic social teaching documents and Protestant social 
gospel documents call on workers, as well as capitalists, to renew their own personal piety; 
workers should remember Jesus’s teachings that poverty is spiritually beneficial and so 
should not envy the rich, while the rich should remember their duty to the poor because of 
Christian principles (RN 21-23; Rauschenbusch 1907). 
   There were also caveats to social gospel and Catholic support of progressive 
policies, even on the issue of just wages. The Federal Council of Churches’ founding 
document, The Social Creed of the Churches (1908), notes that the living wage should be at 
the “amount that each industry can afford.” Catholic support for the minimum wage, 
meanwhile, has been tempered by the principle of subsidiarity, which calls for limits on state 
power. Subsidiarity, while prefigured by theologians since the early church, is first 
articulated in paragraphs 80-82 of Quadregesimo Anno, shortly after the discussion of fair 
wages. Subsidiarity is defined as the principle that no larger organization should solve 
problems that a smaller organization can solve; thus, the federal government should not do 
what a local government can do, the local government should not do what a community 
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organization can do, and a community organization or church charity should not do what a 
family can do. Thus, the primary debate in Catholic social teaching concerns the extent to 
which the federal government is the smallest institution which can solve economic and 
social problems. Abela (2008) argues that subsidiarity’s placement after the discussion of 
wages implies that minimum wage laws are among those regulations which should be very 
limited by the principle of subsidiarity. His case is strengthened by the discussion of wages 
itself; for example, Paragraph 74 mentions that wages that are too low or too high may cause 
unemployment. Thus, industries which cannot be productive with high wage levels should 
not be subject to minimum wage regulations. Direct income support and service programs 
such as welfare and health care must be placed at even greater scrutiny with the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
   Finally, as alluded to at the beginning of this section, religious liberals and leaders 
of denominations were also largely skeptical of governmental income support programs. 
This was especially the case for the Catholic Church. Rerum Novarum and Quadregesimo 
Anno did not argue for widespread welfare. Paragraph 14 of Rerum Novarum states “True, if 
a family finds itself in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of friends, and 
without any prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public 
aid, since each family is a part of the commonwealth.” However, this statement is placed in 
the context of a denunciation of overwhelming involvement of government in the economy. 
Quadregesimo Anno, in the midst of the Great Depression, simply extended support for the 
living wage and called for more cooperation rather than calling for comprehensive welfare. 
However, as the social crisis continued, religious activists began to realize the necessity of 
welfare programs, arguing that it was immoral for so many unemployed workers, the 
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disabled and children to be without food. Meanwhile, The Social Creed of the Churches, 
adopted in 1908 by the newly founded Council of Churches (adapted from a social creed 
passed the year before by Methodists), stopped short of calling for a comprehensive welfare 
system; however, its call for “the abatement of poverty,” while focusing on living wage and 
labor regulations, included calls for the aid of the unemployed, elderly and injured. A decade 
later, The National Catholic Welfare Council (in a program written almost entirely by John 
Ryan), focused on labor issues and warned against bureaucracies which could be inefficient 
and cause a lack of self-sufficiency. It did, however, endorse social insurance for the 
unemployed, elderly, injured and sick in 1919, and a public housing program (Reichley 
1985; Massaro 2007). Mainline Protestants used nearly exactly similar language when 
updating their social creed in 1932 at the height of the Great Depression (Walsh 2000; 
Dorrien 2010). 
It has already been explained that the Catholic Church’s support for the welfare state 
was at first limited by the global hierarchy’s relative conservatism and debates over 
engagement with the American state. What factors limited support for the welfare state 
within Protestantism? Even the relatively hesitant adoption of the welfare state ideal by the 
social gospel was opposed by some evangelical and fundamentalist activists, and they had 
many footholds in some of the same churches as the social gospel advocates. The history of 
evangelical worship and fundamentalist biblical criticism before the mid- to late-twentieth 
century is largely one of conservatives mobilizing support within large denominations, 
rather than leaving en masse to form a new evangelical identity and abandon their 
denominational identities (Marty 1984; Marsden 1994).5 
                                                 
5 Disputes over biblical interpretations did result in the forming of some new denominations, most 
importantly the Assemblies of God and several other large Pentecostal denominations which are now most of 
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     Although by today’s standards many of the social gospel’s leaders held 
conservative views of theology, many sought to promote reforms in the ways in which 
Christians interpreted the Bible given new scholarship, which caused conflicts with 
fundamentalists that extended to views of social witness.  Many modernists also held a 
progressive view of history, arguing that through development of a more accurate theology 
(including a less literal interpretation of the Bible) and economic modernization, social 
problems would be resolved and God’s kingdom would become fully realized on Earth 
(Hutchison 1992). Postmillennialism also became popular among theological modernists; 
this view of theology where Christ would come a thousand years after God’s kingdom was 
realized on Earth. Some, though certainly not all, postmillennials believed that struggling for 
social progress and providing for the poor was a way for people to bring God’s kingdom to 
the Earth.6 
Marsden (1994) argues that the social witness of fundamentalists declined, or at least 
was restricted to preaching and localized charity work, because they were unwilling to be 
seen as promoting social critiques that were being promoted by the modernist-dominated 
social gospel movement. The fundamentalist backlash against the social gospel could be 
compared to the Christian Right’s backlash against Christian progressives in the late 
twentieth century. However, there are some key qualifications. First, it is even less likely 
                                                 
the largest NAE denominations between the 1890s and 1910s. Yet, as literature on the Christian Right reminds 
us, these denominations had limited national political involvement until the 1970s. In fact, there were actually 
more significant denominational splits between northern and southern branches of most denominational 
traditions before and during the Civil War than the splits that occurred in mainline Protestant denominations 
during the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. 
6 Postmillennials were opposed by premillennials, who believed that Jesus’s return was imminent. 
Some, though certainly not all, premillennialists believed that little could be done to solve social problems 
before that. Some fundamentalists, especially Pentecostals, and including premillennials, had a strong social 
witness as well, and thus it is unwise to hypothesize a direct relationship between views on the apocalypse and 
economic policy. 
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that fundamentalists would have been willing to support progressive governmental efforts 
even without the theological controversies over modernism, given that even social gospel 
activists were conflicted. Until fundamentalists could be persuaded that social witness 
involved more systematic efforts to address material needs, rather than community-based 
efforts flanked by gospel preaching, their opposition to progressive politics was likely to 
continue. Fundamentalist backlash also occurred without the sort of partisan polarization 
that has occurred in recent decades. The Democratic Party continued to enjoy the support of 
most southern Protestants of all theological orientations, along with the majority of 
Catholics of all theological orientations. The Republican Party continued to hold the support 
of the majority of northern Protestants, including the supporters of the social gospel. The 
Republicans’ failure to react promptly to the societal problems of the Great Depression 
weakened their support among religious progressives, however. 
The Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower Administrations 
During the Great Depression, Catholic and mainline Protestant religious 
organizations permanently began to demand the welfare state as a matter of social justice. 
But their primary orientation concerned their interests as religious charities, beginning a 
period of significant influence over Congress by Catholic charities. In 1935, the National 
Catholic Welfare Council and Catholic Charities were involved in the legislative process 
around the Social Security Act, as documented by Brown and McKeon (1997) in their 
research on the history of Catholic Charities. As noted earlier, while Pope Pius XI’s 1931 
encyclical Quadregesimo Anno sought to continue a tradition of Catholic social witness, it 
did not necessarily advocate in favor of the welfare state. Yet, it left open the possibility for 
the American hierarchy to do so, as a subsidiarist response to American problems. 
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While Catholic leaders were philosophically in favor of the Social Security Act’s key 
provisions such as benefits for the elderly and the Aid to Dependent Children program, their 
primary concern, especially for Catholic Charities, was protecting the rights of Catholic 
agencies to care for Catholic children without intervention from state social services. The 
Catholic Bishops negotiated with the Roosevelt administration while Catholic Charities 
focused on lobbying Congress. When provisions on these matters were finally negotiated to 
Catholic Charities’ satisfaction, Catholic lobbyists promised to work for passage of the 
Social Security Act as a whole. While there was no Catholic testimony at committee 
hearings on the Social Security Act, Brown and McKeon provide evidence that Catholic 
Charities executive secretary John O’Grady persuaded many reluctant congressmen to vote 
for the legislation, particularly a letter from Edwin E. Witte, Director of the President’s 
Committee on Economic Security. 
    There is little similar available evidence of activism by mainline Protestant 
denominations on behalf of the New Deal, even though most denominations supported it in 
principle (Walsh 2000). Reichley (1985) finds that there were still significant factions in 
mainline Protestantism which opposed the New Deal and had ties to the conservative wing 
of the Republican Party. Anti-Catholic sentiment in mainline Protestantism was also a 
factor. Additionally, Catholic leaders had more significant ties to the Roosevelt 
administration through the adherents of the majority of Catholics to the Democratic Party, 
and Catholics had more incentive to lobby for the interests of their own agencies because of 
their work with poor, Catholic immigrant populations. 
Meanwhile, Allison Green, in recent work for Schulman and Zelizer (2015)’s edited 
volume on politics and religion, examines letters written by rank and file clergy in response 
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to a widely distributed presidential letter seeking religious input on the New Deal in 1935. 
Green argues that the vast majority of clergy were enthusiastically supportive of the Social 
Security Act, in addition to other New Deal programs to bolster employment. She 
particularly emphasizes support of the New Deal by southern clergy, noting that among 
Protestants, there was little difference in the attitudes of ministers based on their 
denominational tradition or their orientation toward fundamentalism. Concerns for the poor 
in their own congregations motivated the writing of many of these letters. Southern support 
for the New Deal and loyalty to the Democratic Party and the Roosevelt’s willingness to 
compromise with southern congressmen on racial policies, encouraged ministers to support 
the New Deal. Yet a practical recognition that religious charity could not sufficiently 
ameliorate poverty, backed by a willingness to consider theologies of social responsibility 
by the state to the poor, were also factors. The Southern Baptist Convention, however, 
turned against the New Deal in the late 1930s. Green presents this change as primarily 
because of concerns about the Church’s administration of educational and retirement 
programs, rather than its theological concerns about government intervention in the 
economy as a whole which became a part of its public policy orientation several decades 
later. 
Congressional committee records demonstrate that John O’Grady of Catholic 
Charities continued to be the most powerful religious lobbyist on poverty policy through the 
Eisenhower Administration, as he testified at numerous hearings (Public Works; Social 
Security Act 1939; Unemployment Compensation 1945; Social Security Act 1946; 1954; 
1955; 1958, Unemployment Compensation 1959). O’Grady certainly supported increased 
funds for the Social Security program, Aid to Dependent Children and unemployment 
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compensation, but a closer look at his testimonies shows the continuing concerns of Catholic 
Charities about its own rights in child welfare as significant motivations for its involvement. 
O’Grady was usually the only religious witness at these hearings, but representatives of the 
National Council of Churches joined him in 1954 and 1955. 
Meanwhile, in the health care arena, the later stages of the New Deal also included 
examination of reforms in the health care system. Representatives of Catholic and Protestant 
hospitals testified before Congress at the same hearings as early as 1939, with the primary 
objective of maintaining the autonomy of religious hospitals, while supporting governmental 
efforts to help pay for the indigent patients in some cases (National health Insurance 1939, 
1945). During the Truman administration’s efforts to pass health care reform, organizations 
representing Catholic and Protestant hospitals were opposed (Altman 2010). However, 
Catholic health agencies benefited greatly from hospital construction and other programs 
initiated by the Hill-Burton Act. Schafer (2012) finds that Catholic hospitals received the 
majority of the funding, followed by mainline Protestant denominations. However, he notes 
that even the hospitals of conservative denominations which were suspicious of state 
assistance to religious organizations such as the Southern Baptists and Adventists, were 
significantly aided by Hill-Burton funds. 
After World War II, economically progressive Christians mobilized to combat 
poverty based on the belief that governments have a duty to take care of the poor. Mainline 
Protestants undertook a series of nationwide conferences and local congregational surveys to 
examine the extent of poverty and the appropriate Christian responses after the founding of 
the National Council of Churches in the 1950s (Wuthnow and Evans 2002). In May 1955, 
George Higgins, Director of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare 
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Council, testified at a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor; Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, regarding studies about the results of minimum wage increases. 
In May 1959, representatives of the National Council of Churches, United Church of Christ, 
and George Higgins of the National Catholic Welfare Council, testified in support of a 
minimum wage increase in a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor regarding 
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
were not passed during that year’s legislative session. 
Conservative Protestants, meanwhile, remained largely quiet on economic issues 
during the 1940s and 1950s. The National Association of Evangelicals, founded in 1943, 
sought to bring evangelical denominations sympathetic to fundamentalist theology into 
broader engagement with American intellectual and political life, but as noted by Schafer 
(2012) and Worthen (2015), most of their official resolutions and lobbying work consisted 
of anti-communist activities and criticisms of moral vices such as gambling. Their resolution 
on the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1958, rather than supporting minimum wage increases, 
sought to provide exemptions for religious organizations. 
     Relations between religious and business leaders appeared to be central to the 
conservatism of evangelicals. Christianity Today, the largest evangelical magazine, was 
owned by J. Howard Pew, who threatened to withdraw financial support if critiques of 
capitalism appeared in the magazine. Indeed, Cruce (2013) argues that the support of 
business leaders even extended to mainline Protestant ministers such as Norman Vincent 
Peale, who allowed his self-help book, The Power of Positive Thinking, to be used as 
justification for conservative views on poverty. While religious conservatives did little to 
directly attack social programs, their lack of support for them during a time of little partisan 
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polarization, indicates that the seeds of the Christian Right were planted well before the 
culture wars of the 1970s. 
Civil Rights, the War on Poverty and the Basic Income Movement: 1963 to 1970 
During the 1960s, all roads were leading toward a vibrant religious anti-poverty 
movement. There were theological responses to the civil rights movement and student 
movements; in the case of Catholicism, there were new directions from the international 
hierarchy. While all this caused strain within denominations, they provided a path by which 
both moderates and the far left within the churches could renew their social consciousness. 
Meanwhile, the Presidency and Congress were interested in not only keeping the New Deal 
programs, but also expanding them, and religious groups were called upon to contribute 
their expertise with the poor. This hospitable environment continued even through the first 
term of the Nixon administration, when the US Congress nearly passed a Family Assistance 
Program. During the debate over the FAP, the Catholic Church and mainline Protestants 
united behind a clear argument: the US can afford to take care of poor families, such 
services should be provided comprehensively through the state, and, far from breaking up 
families as conservatives claimed, income support would foster family formation. 
Catholic responses to poverty shifted with the papacy of John XXIII and the Second 
Vatican Council in the early 1960s. Pope John XXIII declared in his encyclical Pacem in 
Terris in 1963 that health care and social services are human rights. This document, released 
during the early stages of the Second Vatican Council, marks a shift in the Church’s 
teaching on poverty. It boldly states “first We must speak of man's rights. Man has the right 
to live. He has the right to bodily integrity and to the means necessary for the proper 
development of life, particularly food, clothing, shelter, medical care, rest, and, finally, the 
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necessary social services.” The Second Vatican Council’s Apostolic Constitution puts the 
right to be kept out of poverty in similar terms, as did subsequent statements from the 
American Catholic Bishops (Berryman 1989). The NCC agreed with Catholic rights rhetoric 
on poverty, following with a statement in 1968 endorsing the concept of a guaranteed 
income, which stated that such a system “should be available as a matter of right, with need 
as the sole criterion of eligibility” and it should be administered so as to adjust benefits to 
changes in cost of living”, while afterwards noting that it “should be designed to afford 
incentive to productive activity” but argues that society is responsible for programs on 
behalf of those not working because our “socioeconomic system works imperfectly.” This 
statement was used in congressional hearings even a decade later (Administration’s Welfare 
Reform Proposal 1977). 
While the calls of progressive Christians for social justice generally appear to be 
broadly defined, religious groups responded to two major factors which modified their views 
on poverty; the United States’ relative economic prosperity and a call for social change 
based on the Civil Rights Movement. The National Council of Churches particularly 
highlighted a belief that since economic prosperity of the nation as a whole has increased, 
meaning that there are plenty of resources for all, no one should be in poverty. A 1966 NCC 
statement on concern for public assistance stated “our burgeoning productivity makes 
possible, and our Judeo-Christian ethic of justice makes mandatory, the development of 
economic policies and structures under which all people, regardless of employment status, 
are assured an adequate livelihood.” The NCC’s 1969 resolution on hunger asks churches to 
pressure the government to ensure that families should be able to eat with an adequate diet at 
no more than 25% of their income. 
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The National Council of Churches was particularly called to respond to the Civil 
Rights Movement because it included most of the major black Protestant denominations. 
Additionally, some of the mainline denominations had substantial black membership, along 
with white ministers and lay leaders who were involved in the Civil Rights Movement. To 
be sure, there were racial tensions in the NCC, as described in James Farmer’s book Church 
People in the Struggle. However, it is clear that the Civil Rights Movement influenced the 
approach by the NCC and many of its denominations to poverty, both by highlighting 
disproportionate poverty faced by the black community, and by providing a popular, 
religiously infused movement which they could use in order to think about their broad view 
of social justice.7 Tipton (2007) points out that the National Council of Churches first set up 
a permanent legislative office in 1964 to support the Civil Rights Act. NCC leaders had 
testified along with Catholic leaders on poverty before (Social Security Act 1954, 1955; Fair 
Labor Standards Act 1961; Public Assistance 1962), but having a legislative office made the 
NCC more visible at the legislative level, leading to more testimony at committee hearings. 
Tipton (2007) quotes interviews indicating that the National Council of Churches had a 
strong relationship with some congressional Democrats as they lobbied for Great Society 
programs, including those significantly aimed at the black community. Witnesses affiliated 
with the NCC testified at three different sets of hearings in support of the Economic 
Opportunity Act and later amendments during the 1960s, which was largely designed to 
                                                 
7 Disproportionate poverty in the African-American community continued to be a common talking 
point for advocacy especially by progressive Protestants in subsequent debates on welfare and the minimum 
wage, especially when working to ally with black churches. 
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boost African-American employment. One witness was the President of the African 
Methodist Episcopal Church in 1966 (Economic Opportunity Act 1964; 1966; 1967).8 
Throughout the Johnson administration, mainline denominational leaders, mainline 
and Catholic women’s groups, and the Catholic bishop, charitable agency liaison and 
lobbyist Raymond Gallagher testified at committee hearings in support of the War on 
Poverty and the Great Society. To be sure, they called for better treatment for the poor based 
on religious principles, especially on their testimony related to social security and Medicare 
(War on Poverty as it Affects Older Americans 1965) and wide-ranging hearings 
(Examination of the War on Poverty 1967), but even in these they focused on the areas 
where religiously affiliated service organizations and businesses could and could not assist. 
Much of the rest of the testimony supported the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the 
Social Security amendments of 1967, which expanded contracting by the federal 
government by religious organizations, turning this practice from an expedient arrangement 
adopted by some state and local governments to a permanent part of federal policy. 
Meanwhile, scholars are often vague when they briefly mention the NCC’s involvement in 
the War on Poverty, and their discussion often turns out to be a mobilization of community-
based charity and work with the poor. For example, when Chappell (2011) mentions the 
NCC’s participation in what she calls the liberal anti-poverty coalition, it is in the context of 
its participation in the Citizens Crusade against Poverty, a grassroots effort led by Walter 
Reuther of the United Auto Workers. This also included the mainline women’s groups 
                                                 
8 There is also scholarship on the extent to which Catholics and progressive evangelicals were 
impacted by the Civil Rights Movement. Some Catholic activists worked in the Civil Rights movement, and 
there were prominent efforts to address racism within the Church related to its relatively small black 
membership and its large and growing Latino membership, which faced disproportionate poverty (McGreevey 
2003; Massaro 2007). Gassaway (2003) and Swartz (2012) note that the civil rights movement was a primary 
motivation  and source of theological discussion and political action among progressive evangelical leaders 
such  as Jim Wallis of Sojourners, which was intimately connected with their calls for economic justice. 
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Church Women United and the United Methodist Women’s Division, along with the 
National Council of Catholic Women. 
Schafer (2012) notes that evangelical minister Billy Graham, an advisor to several 
presidents, quietly supported the expansion of the Social Security Act. But the National 
Association of Evangelicals, Southern Baptist Convention, and most other evangelical 
organizations are difficult to find in examinations of congressional hearings on poverty from 
this period or afterward. While they had a long history of being wary of entanglements with 
the government and had been particularly opposed to governmental support of the Catholic 
Church, a fundamental shift had occurred by the 1960s. Schafer (2012) notes reports from 
the 1950s from internal proceedings of evangelical organizations and the magazine 
Christianity Today indicating that conservative Protestants were already taking government 
funding for their organizations despite denominational disapproval, particularly in the area 
of health care. In the early 1960s, evangelical leaders held several conferences where there 
was cautious acceptance of evangelical organizations taking governmental funding. Thus, 
evangelical organizations received funding in the expansion of relationships with the federal 
government toward religiously affiliated social services during the Johnson administration. 
If religious groups are notable for their views on justice, charitable expertise and 
family, it is not surprising that the debate over the Family Assistance Program would be a 
high point of their activity. Once limited mostly to widows in many states, participation in 
these programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children was opened up to 
unmarried mothers, especially those who supported children on their own. While rules 
varied by state, usually poor families with a two-parent household did not qualify for 
welfare because one of the parents (usually the father) was expected to work. A father who 
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cannot find a job would ideally be covered by unemployment if he was able-bodied, or 
Social Security if not (Katz 1996). 
However, churches were among the groups concerned about this system. 
Progressives believed that benefits were not substantial enough to get families out of 
poverty. The precursors of what I now call the Christian Center, such as the US Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, agreed with these concerns, but they added a discussion of welfare’s 
effects on families. There was concern that since there was less support for married couples 
with children, marriage became a less attractive option for women, who may still have 
children. While Chappell (2011) argues that the National Council of Churches and other 
progressives went along with the Catholic Bishops in supporting the idea of the two-parent 
family as ideal, and evidence from committee hearing transcripts confirm this, her narrative 
makes clear that Catholics devoted more attention to this issue. Both mainline and Catholic 
hierarchies also saw that single mothers had to make choices between receiving meager 
benefits, and working low wage jobs while also having to pay for childcare. Finally, 
mainline and Catholic organizations also acknowledged the particular challenges of the 
black community and other racial minorities, which had been blocked from receiving many 
welfare programs during the New Deal (Katznelson 2000). 
Groups across the political spectrum saw a Family Assistance Program, or negative 
income tax, as a possible solution to some of these problems. Under the mainstream FAP 
proposals of the time, families would receive an allowance based on the number of children. 
Those families with a working parent would still receive some benefits, until they made 
enough to be in a higher income bracket. Some proposals gave access to this program only 
to married couples, which would have been a complete change in direction from recent 
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poverty policies, or built in other incentives for married couples. All in all, the program was 
designed as an incentive for the poor to work and form stable families. 
Joint testimony by representatives of the Catholic Bishops office of Social 
Development, NCC and Jewish congregations before the Senate Finance Committee 
exemplifies the religious argument. John Cosgrove of the Catholic Conference took the lead, 
while the others answered questions. A senator noted that Finance Committee staff had told 
him of the organizations’ close working relationship in developing the testimony. Cosgrove 
criticized AFDC from a primarily progressive direction, arguing that its benefits were too 
low and that the working poor usually lost benefits when they could still improve their 
circumstances through further benefits, while also noting that it was administratively 
frustrating for local and state governments. Integrating concern for the poor with its 
conservative view of the family, Cosgrove pushed back against the emerging Christian 
Right’s view of the welfare state as an inefficient idea which leads the poor away from self-
sufficiency, faith and family. As Cosgrove argued, it is insufficient to say that family 
breakdown causes poverty; rather, poverty causes family breakdown. In an effort to merge 
moral exhortation and pragmatic solutions, they pointed out to cultural conservatives that 
government assistance and a larger welfare state could bolster family life and conservative 
sexual morality that they desired to uphold. 
For example, they noted that AFDC was inequitable because half of states do not 
have a similar program for unemployed fathers. Just as the Catholic lobbyists promoted 
progressive arguments, the mainline Protestants were willing to promote conservative 
arguments for the common goal. As Chappell (2010) notes in a critique of what she calls the 
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liberal anti-poverty coalition, the National Council of Churches and other liberal Protestants 
went along with Catholic arguments which privileged the two-parent family. 
The religious witnesses were challenged by senators as they argued that mothers 
should not have to work in order to receive benefits, in a discussion which would be quite 
familiar to those studying the 1995-1996 welfare reform battles. The religious witnesses also 
faced questions about the cost of the program. They argued that the long-term social benefits 
of the program would make up temporary costs. Their answers, filled with facts and 
statistics as they were, relied on moral arguments when questioned, noting that churches 
should only provide direction, and rely on legislators to iron out details. When asked 
whether the program should be funded by tax increases, only the Jewish representative 
answered affirmatively, while the Catholic and mainline representatives stated that they 
were not responsible for deciding how the program would be funded. In an example of 
Hofrening (1995)’s concept of prophetic lobbying, they argued that the FAP would improve 
the morality of the country and its government, and thus should be instituted by any means 
necessary. 
An extensive summary by McAndrews (2012) and evidence from congressional 
hearing testimony show evidence of religious lobbying activity by Catholics and mainliners. 
The US Catholic Conference’s statement Life in Our Day (1968) advocated a ‘family 
allowance’ program instead of the current welfare system. When President Nixon’s FAP 
proposal was released in 1969, the NCC was among its immediate supporters, and Nixon, 
encouraged by some of his Catholic advisors such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, actively 
courted the Catholic Bishops’ support. Bishop (later Cardinal) Joseph Bernardin, who would 
soon coined the term “seamless garment” for the Church’s political positions, was among 
  
61 
those directing the Church’s public policies on social action, and he encouraged strong 
support of FAP, along with the lay directors of the Bishops’ Social Action department.  In 
October 1969, the administration specifically invited the Catholic Conference to testify 
before Congress on behalf of the FAP. Representatives of the NCC and Catholic Bishops 
testified together for the Senate Agriculture Committee, primarily to support FAP proposals 
(Food Stamp Program and Commodity Distribution 1969). In April 1970, the Catholic 
Bishops, the National Council of Churches and Jewish congregations presented a joint 
statement to the US House of Representatives as it was debating the bill. It positively noted 
that the FAP required most recipients to register for job training opportunities, a 
compromise proposal between a work mandate and a work incentive. It argued for benefits 
to be increased and for eligibility to be extended to individuals and childless couples 
(McAndrews 2012). The Catholic Conference and Catholic Charities also expressed their 
intentions to ask Catholics to directly lobby for FAP by contacting members of Congress. 
Mainline and Catholic parishes joined a Welfare Reform weekend in June which engaged 
discussion among adult and youth groups in churches (McAndrews 2012). In August 1970, 
the President met with Catholic bishops at the White House, and expressed gratitude for 
religious support of FAP. 
While the religious groups presented a united front in these early hearings, it became 
clear that the Catholic Bishops were more willing to compromise than the NCC. Seeing an 
important ally, the Nixon administration sought to maintain Catholic support, including 
frequent meetings between the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and Catholic 
Charities. Cosgrove supported increased benefits, guarantees of the federal government’s 
role as employer of last resort, and an increase in housing programs beyond what had 
  
62 
already been mandated, yet he made it clear that any bill establishing a FAP was a step in 
the right direction (Family Assistance 1970). However, in early 1971 the National Council 
of Churches withdrew from an agreement to support the program because an amended 
proposal to satisfy Senate conservatives was not generous enough (McAndrews 2012). NCC 
representatives testified at a congressional hearing to this effect in April 1971 (Social 
Security Act 1971). The NCC and Synagogue Council encouraged the Catholic Conference 
to sign a Tri-Faith proposal on welfare reform which promised to advocate for legislation 
which provided benefits up to the poverty line, along with minimum wage, job training and 
work requirement exemptions for mothers of young children. McAndrews argues that 
Cosgrove and other Catholic lobbyists agreed substantively with the statement, but the 
Bishops refused to sign it for tactical reasons. McAndrews (2012) describes, however, the 
eventual shift in Catholic attitudes toward the FAP; Cosgrove eventually testified against an 
even less generous proposal in 1972. Nixon, once complementary about the Catholic 
Bishops, now sought to mobilize Catholics who were to the right of the Bishops on 
economic and racial issues, undercutting the teaching authority of the Bishops on economics 
(McAndrews 2012). The Catholic Conference and the NCC did, however, eventually part 
ways as the National Council of Churches refused to support the more conservative version 
of the FAP. 
False Restarts to the War on Poverty: 1971-1980 
With the defeat of the Family Assistance Program, religious groups realized along 
with other anti-poverty advocates that broad-based, progressive reforms were less likely for 
the time being.    In the 1970s, religious anti-poverty advocacy became increasingly centered 
on questions of domestic health care and food policy. Meanwhile, the politics of culture war 
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issues such as abortion threatened to derail the relationship between Catholic associations 
and liberal politicians, and opened the way for a mobilization of the Right in evangelicalism. 
Religious health care agencies testified prominently at congressional hearings in 
1971. In 1974, representatives from a variety of Catholic and mainline Protestant 
organizations testified at a hearing of the House Ways and Means Committee about national 
health insurance. Organizations testifying included the National Council of Churches, the 
Lutheran Council, the United Church of Christ, the Church of the Brethren (an Anabaptist 
NCC denomination), the Friends Committee on National Legislation (on behalf of a Quaker 
NCC denomination), the United States Catholic Conference, the Catholic Hospital 
Association, and Network Catholic Social Justice Lobby. All of these representatives told of 
their own organizations’ experiences with the current health care system’s inability to 
provide enough care to the poor, and advocated reform.9 
During the Ford administration, an organization called the Inter-Religious Task 
Force on Food Policy frequently mobilized faith-based groups to testify before 
congressional committees and conduct other forms of insider lobbying, with the goal of 
increasing funding for food stamps and other programs to insure that hunger is alleviated 
among children and others in poverty. The most significant accomplishment of this 
initiative, which had the support of mainline and Catholic hierarchies, was their successful 
work which influenced Congress to eliminate the purchase requirement for food stamps in 
1977 (Reichley 1985). Tipton (2007) presents the decision to focus on food policy as a 
                                                 
9 The impact of Protestant health care lobbyists as compared with Catholic health care lobbyists 
during this period is a worthy subject for future research. When examining congressional hearing transcripts 
from ProQuest, representatives of Protestant hospitals often testified without their Catholic counterparts during 
the 1970s, while during the late 1970s and 1980s Catholic and protestant hospital administrators usually 
testified on the same panels; by the mid-1980s Catholics were often testifying on their own. 
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product of the persistence of George Chauncey of the mainline Presbyterians, who founded 
the organization from a committee of the Washington Interreligious Staff Council. 
Meanwhile, the mainline denominations created Interfaith Impact (bolstered by funding and 
lobbying leadership from the Presbyterian Church), the National Council of Churches 
started a Crusade on Hunger, and Bread for the World, a non-denominational coalition of 
congregations with a commitment to charitable giving combined with public policy 
advocacy, expanded its lobbying. Lobbyists interviewed by Tipton (2007) suggest that 
hunger became a defining issue for religious lobbyists because the crises of the Civil Rights 
movement and Vietnam War had ended, hunger was a frequent topic of media discussions, 
and denominations were able to cooperate well because there were gaps in their own 
treatment of the issue, along with little opposition to providing some resources.  On the other 
hand, another advantage was the ease with which charitable agencies could lend their 
expertise and support. Most of these efforts focused at first on world hunger, but the NCC’s 
Crusade on Hunger did attract the backing of progressive Republican senator Mark Hatfield 
for its domestic policies, and its director, Patricia Young, testified at a hearing on food 
stamp reform in 1975, where she discussed data about families lacking food because they 
were not able to apply or were denied in their applications for food stamps. She quoted the 
Catholic Bishops’ statement against food stamp cuts and included their policy resolutions 
along with the NCC’s resolutions, providing evidence of the importance the NCC placed on 
maintaining an interfaith coalition for domestic welfare policy (Food Stamp Reform 1975). 
Patricia Young of the NCC responded to Democratic senator James Allen by praising the 
work of church funds but appealing to the increasing complexity of society. Earlier in her 
testimony, she had asserted that part of the charitable activities of churches in recent years is 
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helping people fill out food stamp applications (Food Stamp Reform 1975).10   Tipton 
(2007) describes the Ford administration as “sympathetic but not particularly responsive” to 
the increasing religious lobbying on hunger, while the Carter administration gave religious 
groups significant access. Carter set the tone during his presidential campaign in 1976 when 
he proposed the idea of a White House Conference on Families, discussed above, in a 
speech for Catholic Charities.  Meanwhile, while the religious food policy lobbyists 
increasingly turned their attention to domestic hunger by lobbying for reforms in the 
administration of food stamps, they also gained opportunities to testify at broader welfare 
reform hearings. 
In the fall of 1977, a joint congressional committee undertook a series of hearings on 
proposals by the Carter administration to reform welfare, which have been described as a 
downsized version of FAP (Chappell 2011). Though Congress was controlled by Democrats 
at the time, progress was still slow, yet religious groups and other lobbyists representing the 
poor were granted significant access. Robert Strommen of the National Council of Churches 
and United Church of Christ Home Ministries was among those testifying, but while he 
represented denominational hierarchies, his interactions with members of Congress show 
that they saw him as a leader of religious charitable agencies who wished to have 
government take on the work for which they themselves are responsible. He told Michigan 
Republican Guy Vander Jagt that church organizations are not able to perform the 
comprehensive services that government can perform. Lawrence Corkeran and Edward Ryle 
                                                 
10 In a House Agriculture committee hearing in 1976 which was unusually packed with clergy 
representatives, religious witnesses included George Chauncey of the Interreligious Task Force on US Food 
Policy and Lawrence Corkeran of Catholic Charities (both on the same panel), a representative of the United 
Church of Christ (mainline Congregationalist) Home Ministries, and several additional Catholic witnesses, 
including Francis Lally of the US Catholic Conference, Catholic Sister Betty Barrett of the Chicago Food 
Stamp Coalition, and a representative from the National Council of Catholic Women (Food Stamp Reform Part 
2 1976). 
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then testified on behalf of the Catholic Charities and Catholic Bishops, making similar 
points. Subsequent hearings included large numbers of administrators from Catholic, 
Lutheran, and other religiously affiliated welfare agencies (Administration’s Welfare 
Proposals 1977, Parts 3-6). Most all religious witnesses argued that government welfare 
programs are necessary for the abatement of poverty, both in direct cash assistance and their 
contracts with religious charities. Similar hearings followed in 1979, which included 
testimony by mainline and Catholic lobbyists (Welfare Reform Legislation 1979). The 
Carter administration, then, was an era where Catholic, mainline and interfaith advocates for 
the poor worked together relatively well and were accepted as experts by the administration 
and Congress members, primarily because of their focus on the ways in which governmental 
efforts could alleviate the burden on charitable agencies. 
The Catholic Church had always opposed any attempts at federal funding of 
contraception and was increasingly concerned as the 1960s came to a close about the 
impending liberalization of abortion laws. However, while evangelicals geared up for the 
mobilization of the Christian Right, the Catholic Church and the National Council of 
Churches were at the height of their co-operative involvement on poverty in the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s, when they tried to help pass Nixon’s family assistance program as 
discussed in the Introduction. 
By the time the White House Conference on Families in 1978 got underway, the 
Catholic Church was prioritizing abortion after the Roe v Wade decision; the conference 
nearly failed because of disagreements about coverage of the abortion issue (Chappell 
2010). Religiously affiliated persons, including Catholic representatives, did testify at 
hearings for the planned conference on families in early 1978. Monsignor Francis Lalley of 
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the Catholic Conference and Presbyterian minister Eileen Lindner of the National Council of 
Churches focused their testimony on the importance of public policy to strengthen families 
by providing a safety net for unemployed parents. While both speakers stressed that those in 
single-parent families should not feel a sense of failure, the Catholic speaker did argue that 
the model of a two-parent family was superior. 
The evangelical denominations became concerned about abortion primarily as a 
symptom of increasing secularization (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). The Christian Right 
developed into a decentralized but largely united movement which prioritized opposition to 
abortion, opposition to gay rights, and support for prayer in schools. While some on the 
Christian Right admitted that governmental programs were necessary, they tended to argue 
that building them was a low priority. Others, by contrast, argued that dependence on 
government programs made people less interested in working hard, developing charitable 
initiative in their congregations, and cultivating religious faith (Martin 1996). Meanwhile, 
the evangelical left fractured during the 1970s even as one of their own, Jimmy Carter, 
became President, largely over responses to cultural issues (Gassaway 2003; Swartz 2012). 
Opposing Cultural Change: The Center and Right Diverge 
The introduction discussed the mobilization of the Christian Right based on 
suspicion of the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the anti-war left and 
secularity. The section below explains how the Catholic hierarchy did not adopt this 
narrative, but it is worth noting that evangelical organizations and activists also expressed 
concerns about unrestrained free market capitalism. Scholars such as Dorrien (2010), 
Schafer (2012) and Worthen (2015) note that Henry disagreed with the notion, advocated by 
the magazine’s financial backers, that politics dominated by corporate interests could mesh 
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with a Christ-centered evangelical politics. Henry and most other writers in Christianity 
Today did not advocate for either the contraction or the expansion of the welfare state; 
rather, they focused their economic writing on how Christians themselves could contribute 
to a just economy. The cautious and ambivalent support of evangelicals for welfare can be 
seen in the Southern Baptist Convention’s 1972 resolution, which is more conservative than 
those of the Catholic and mainline hierarchies, but more progressive than later SBC 
resolutions; it called for welfare reform. There was significant debate in publications such as 
Christianity Today, edited for some time by Carl Henry, who leaned toward economic 
conservatism. While the Catholic hierarchy remained more progressive than most large 
evangelical organizations on poverty policy, the Southern Baptist Convention’s only 
resolution on welfare (passed in 1972) called for continued social programs. It called for 
welfare reform because “the present welfare system is a tangle of bureaucratic regulations 
and often ineffective programs” but called for a system which “may adequately financially 
help the many people in need of: job training for those able to work and the maintenance of 
the dignity of those who are forced because they are very young, very old, very sick, or 
severely incapacitated to depend on welfare for their existence.” The National Association 
of Evangelicals, by contrast, released a resolution supporting tax exempt status for their 
charities, noting that “it would be a tragedy if programs now conducted by Christian 
charities were taken over by welfare.” While it is true that evangelical charities sought 
government contracts by this time, they primarily wished for the government to facilitate, 
but not participate, in their work for the poor. The backlash against welfare supported by 
many evangelical leaders along with conservative cultural positions, combined with 
conservative evangelical theology prioritizing personal salvation as a cure for poverty, can 
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explain why evangelical charitable organizations did not join their mainline and Catholic 
colleagues in supporting expanded welfare. 
The Reagan Administration. 
The inauguration of the Reagan administration marked the beginning of wholesale 
efforts to scale back the social safety net. In its first two years, it blocked most new 
progressive anti-poverty initiatives and cut budgets for existing social welfare programs. 
The welfare system which had been established during the New Deal and War on Poverty 
remained largely intact, though underfunded, but the groundwork was laid for the welfare 
reform legislation of the 1990s, and opportunities to increase comprehensive income support 
have remained few and far between ever since. Religious advocates continued their 
“prophetic lobbying”, arguing for the programs that they believed were ideal, and, indeed, 
seemed possible a short time ago, but in practice, they were required to develop strategies to 
merely defend and lightly reform the welfare system. 
Mainline denominations, progressive evangelical groups such as Sojourners, and 
progressive Catholics increasingly devoted themselves to interfaith advocacy with a clear 
social justice message. Interfaith Action, which focused on lobbying of the legislative and 
executive branches, and Interfaith Impact, which focused on developing materials for 
educating the Christian faithful, were descended from the Food Policy networks of the 
1970s. To be sure, the National Council of Churches and its individual denominations 
continued to advocate on their own; Reichley (1985) notes a “barrage of letters” to Congress 
sent by the NCC to the Reagan administration over welfare. But the rise of the religious 
right, the decline of the mainline Protestant and progressive evangelical movements, and 
internal disorganization of the NCC made interfaith advocacy a more reasonable strategy. 
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Such groups continued to expound on themes that mainline lobbyists had previously used. 
They argued, based on Christian principles, that the government has a duty to take care of 
the poor. They highlighted, using statistical evidence and specific anecdotes, that the 
situation of the poor was unconscionable. Finally, they argued that religious charities could 
not take the place of government, adding that religiously based programs would be among 
those cut in Republican budget proposals. This last point gained significant media attention 
from The New York Times and The Washington Post during the most significant budget cuts 
in 1982 (Briggs 1981; Austin 1982; Hyer 1982). Religious advocates did, however, integrate 
all of these themes into an oft repeated quote “the budget is a moral document.” (Tipton 
2007, 3`9). This statement, used at nearly every committee hearing testimony and 
publication, sought to motivate allies and shame opponents into seeing the connection 
between the complex world of social welfare funding and the Christian faith of each person. 
Though one leader of Interfaith Impact was quoted in Tipton (2007) as arguing that 
lobbying for welfare programs during the Reagan administration was “a litany of 
unachievement”, Tipton argues based on interviews of lobbyists, media reports and 
publications released by interfaith coalitions training local activists and providing economic 
statistics, that the mainline denominations and other religious progressives put forth a 
significant effort to protect the safety net. Jay Lintner, a lobbyist for the United Church of 
Christ, describes how the threats to social programs and complete disinterest in mainline 
lobbying by the Reagan administration caused religious progressives to be just as motivated 
as the open access and nuanced welfare discussions granted by the Carter administration. 
The summary below of committee hearing testimony provides some evidence for this claim. 
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Tipton (2007) describes how Interfaith action, in particular, became respected for their 
expertise on narrowly defined policy goals. 
Meanwhile, the Catholic Bishops and Catholic Charities, while working within 
interfaith advocacy circles, maintained a vigorous independent lobbying effort, also focusing 
on narrowly defined policy areas such as social security cost of living increases (e.g. (Impact 
of Administration’s Social Security Proposals 1981), the availability of the food stamp 
program, and hospital administration (Reese 1992). When religious testimony at committee 
hearings gained media attention, it was usually that of the Catholic bishops. For example, 
Bishop Joseph Sullivan, the Catholic Bishops liaison to Catholic Charities, testified at a 
House Budget Committee hearing in 1982 which received media coverage for his defense of 
the food stamp program (Impact of Omnibus Reconciliation 1982). 
However, mainline lobbyists were also frequent committee hearing witnesses. 
Kenyon Burke of NCC and other mainline lobbyists testified on a committee hearing 
investigating general budget cuts (Administration’s FI 1983 1982). Also in 1982, Ralph 
Watkins, a lobbyist for the small Anabaptist denomination the Church of the Brethren (an 
NCC member), testified on behalf of the newly founded group Interfaith Action in a hearing 
on the food stamp program (Reauthorization of the Food Stamp Program 1982).    A 
representative for Interfaith Action also testified at a congressional hearing in 1984 to 
oppose a proposal which would have turned food stamps into block grant programs for 
states that wished to administer them (Food Stamp Optional Block Grant Program 1984). 
Following the release of the Catholic Bishops’ letter on arms control in 1983, the US 
Catholic Conference focused their full attention on economic matters. They held 
conferences on poverty policy and released drafts of their Economic Justice for All 
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document from 1983 to 1985 before the final version was approved in 1986. These efforts 
gained media attention (e.g. Williams 1983; Goldman 1986). While Catholic bishops held 
local hearings and sought to mobilize a broad cross-section of Catholic lay opinion and 
academic expertise in the development of the pastoral letter, as detailed in the trio of books 
released on the Catholic Bishops in the following decade, the primary goal of the letters was 
to state the Bishops’ public policy objectives, rather than to mobilize Catholic action at the 
parish level (Berryman 1989; Burns 1991; Reese 1992). They also sought, though not 
entirely successfully, to establish consensus by repeatedly hearing presentations from both 
progressive and conservative critics. 
During the middle of the Reagan administration, a new round of congressional 
hearings with religious witnesses took place. As claimed by Tipton’s interviewees, mainline 
lobbyists renewed their efforts to discuss anti-poverty proposals with members of Congress, 
supposedly motivating a new round of congressional hearings on poverty during Reagan’s 
second term. Sources on Catholic politics indicate that Economic Justice for All was most 
responsible for motivating renewed congressional interest in religious advocacy. On 
balance, the evidence leans toward Catholic lobbying as more substantial, but mainline 
advocates often testified alongside or occasionally instead of Catholic bishops.11 Mainline 
and Catholic lobbyists were united in continuing to oppose budget cuts to food stamps, 
                                                 
11 . Testimony at welfare-related subcommittees of both houses of Congress included representatives 
of the Catholic Bishops and the Lutheran Council (Welfare Reform 1987; Welfare: Reform or Replacement 
1987). Continued hearings later in 1987 before the Senate Finance Committee featured Arthur Keys of the 
United Church of Christ, Director of Interfaith Action, who noted the support of the Catholic bishops (Welfare 
Reform Part 2 1987). On October 29, 1987, Father J. Brian Heher, Secretary of the Department of Social 
development and World Peace of the United States Catholic Conference, testified before the House 
Subcommittee on Labor Standards, Committee on Education and Labor. This hearing also included testimony 
from Archie Lehmon, on behalf of Interfaith Action for Economic Justice. Lehmon was also on the Home 
Mission Board of the Progressive National Baptist Convention, a black Protestant NCC denomination which 
was co-founded by Martin Luther King. The content of both of these testimonies is discussed in Chapter 5 
(Fair Standards Act 1987). 
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welfare, social security programs and a wide variety of other programs to the poor, and 
advocating for increased social spending as they provided evidence for increasing rates of 
poverty. Many hearings included Catholic witnesses without Protestant representatives.12 In 
welfare reform debates which led to the passage of the Family Support Act in 1988, the 
Catholic Bishops’ document influenced a bipartisan consensus on encouraging job training 
and avoiding drastic cuts to programs. 
 The Catholic Bishops also appeared to be more influential regarding the minimum 
wage in the late 1980s. In 1987, shortly after the release of the pastoral letter Economic 
Justice for All, Los Angeles Archbishop Roger Mahoney was among the featured speakers 
at a rally with Senator Ted Kennedy in favor of increasing the Minimum Wage. The 
Catholic Bishops and mainline Protestant denominations had been instrumental in 
supporting the social activities of the United Farm Workers and other labor unions 
advocating for living wages for farm workers. However, the Los Angeles rally in 1987 is the 
first example of religious groups using social protest tactics to advocate specifically for a 
comprehensive minimum wage. The refusal of the Reagan administration to allow a 
minimum wage increase resulted in Mahoney stepping forward to confront this issue 
(Weinstein 1987). In 1989, the United States Catholic Conference sent letters to Congress 
advocating an increase in the Minimum Wage (Reese 1992). Senator Kent Conrad cited the 
Bishops’ document Economic Justice for All in defense of the minimum wage, which itself 
had been inspired by Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Laborem Exercens. Having 
demonstrated the Bishops’ interest in lobbying to support their document, it is worth 
                                                 
12 Work, Education and Training of Welfare Recipients (1986) featured Catholic Archbishop Edward 
O’Meara of Indianapolis, while hearings on homelessness and the need for public housing featured Edwin 
Conway of Catholic Charities Chicago (Urgent Relief of the Homeless 1987). 
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discussing the extent to which the statements on economic justice and health care presented 
a uniquely Catholic vision. Economic Justice for All underplayed the denomination’s usual 
concerns about the decline of the traditional family and culture of life. Economic Justice for 
All argued that the Church’s social principles mandate specific policies such as higher 
minimum wages and progressive welfare programs. The Bishops stress that most people 
should be able to get out of poverty through work; thus, it stresses jobs programs and just 
wage regulations as the most critical steps the government can take. Paragraph 69 argues 
that theological concepts of justice demand that workers must be paid fair wages. Paragraph 
76 notes that social problems mentioned in previous paragraphs (including low wages) must 
be addressed collaboratively by business, labor and government, as instructed in Catholic 
social teaching since Rerum Novarum. In Paragraph 197, however, the Bishops directly 
endorse congressional intervention to increase the Minimum Wage in order to adjust for 
inflation. 
   Economic Justice for All discusses suggestions for cultivating self-improvement 
among the poor, especially through local programs operated by both governmental agencies 
and churches.  However, it also advocates comprehensive welfare programs for all those 
who cannot find a job or should not be working for some other reason, especially illness or 
staying home with children (Paragraphs 208-214). The Bishops suggest standardizing 
eligibility standards rather than leaving them to the states, indexing support to cost of living 
and basic needs, establishing more focused initiatives to incentivize work by allowing 
people to receive some benefits while working at low-paying jobs, and allowing two-parent 
families to qualify. The Bishops expressed similar positions in their 1995 document 
Principles and Priorities for Welfare Reform and their 1996 document A Catholic 
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Framework for Economic Life, which critiqued welfare reform agendas. The Bishops 
advocate for a conservative model of the family, and, as will be discussed particularly in the 
next chapter, their advocacy of marriage and the two-parent family and opposition to 
abortion propels, rather than diminishes, their interest in progressive economic policies. As 
during the FAP debates over a decade earlier, the Bishops argue that, while family 
breakdown is a cause of poverty, poverty may also be a cause of family breakdown because 
of the stress it causes on marriages. 
The Bishops’ rhetoric on rights and needs is particularly present in their advocacy of 
health care reform which increased for a time after the election of Reagan, despite their 
acknowledgement of intervening issues such as concerns about the right to life and high 
costs. Health and Health Care (1981) expresses reservations about the dangers of a 
government monopoly and notes that high costs and rationing are concerns. However, the 
passage just before the conclusion states unequivocally that “we call for the development of 
a national health insurance program. It is the responsibility of the federal government to 
establish a comprehensive health care system that will ensure a basic level of health care for 
all Americans. The federal government should also ensure adequate funding for this basic 
level of care through a national health insurance program.” The Catholic Bishops, then, are 
clearly as progressive as mainline Protestant denominations in their goals for health care.       
While the Catholic Bishops’ 1981 document Health and Health Care states that Catholic 
healthcare providers must operate based on Catholic principles, including life from 
conception to natural death, and stated that a national healthcare system must include “basic 
human values” and respect for “conscience”, it does not discuss abortion as a specific 
concern in drafting a comprehensive healthcare system, in the way that later documents have 
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focused at much greater length on abortion. This may be partially explained by the relatively 
recent passage of the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited taxpayer funding of abortions. 
Reese (1992), in his study of the Conference of Catholic Bishops, did document that there 
were already tensions between the pro-life and social development offices over health care 
legislation. For example, the Catholic Bishops only lobbied on behalf of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act if the bill was changed to prevent family leave for the obtaining of an 
abortion. The USCCB’s 1981 letter Health and Health Care argues that private institutions 
cannot take care of all healthcare funding needs, and that government must be involved, but 
also advocates “pluralism”; “in accord with the traditional Catholic principle of subsidiarity, 
we believe voluntary institutions must continue to play an essential role in our society.” The 
principle of subsidiarity, as articulated in Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical Quadregesimo 
Anno, is a warning against overcentralization, arguing that when possible, individuals, the 
private sector or government below the federal level should handle problems. Though 
Quadregesimo Anno does not mention health care, some Catholic theologians, ethicists and 
commentators have used subsidiarity in the context of health care (McDonough 2007). The 
Catholic Bishops in the United States, however, clearly advocate that the federal 
government does need to be involved in health care, but they are wary of a system entirely 
controlled by the federal government. Subsidiarity does, however, give them a theological 
reason to argue for checks on government power, whether in favor of Catholic health 
associations or in more general terms supporting the private sector or conscience protections 
regarding abortion. On the other hand, conservative Catholics could argue that the federal 
government’s contraception mandates demonstrate that a centralized health care system in a 
secular nation will never operate under the principles of Catholic theology. Fiscal and social 
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conservatism, then, can be linked. Overall, however, the moderate rhetoric of the Catholic 
Bishops strikes a balance between the more government-centered focus of most mainline 
resolutions and the approach centered on the private sector in evangelical resolutions. 
The Right Wing Free Market Assault on Social Justice Theology 
Of course, the Christian Right and its secular allies did not think the Catholic 
Bishops paid nearly enough attention to the principle of subsidiarity, and disdained mainline 
Protestant denominational leaderships for their faith in governmental solutions. Right-wing 
think tanks such as the Institute on Religion and Democracy, the Heritage Foundation, the 
American Enterprise Institute, and later the Acton Institute have applied pressure on the 
Catholic Church and the National Council of Churches since the 1980s. The beginning of 
these initiatives came at a difficult financial and ministerial stage for the mainline 
denominations. The think tanks were particularly critical of progressive and Catholic 
attitudes to foreign policy, and sewed discord between religious groups and labor unions, 
weakening anti-poverty efforts (Tipton 2007). IR recruited theologically and politically 
conservative members of the United Methodist Church and other mainline denominations, 
and established networks linking them with members who were more liberal on economic 
and labor issues but opposed the NCC’s support of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and other 
left-wing international movements. Meanwhile, the American Enterprise Institute and 
Heritage Foundation, drawing more significantly from the religious right movement 
centered in evangelicalism while adding representatives from conservative Catholic and 
mainline organizations, also critiqued denominations’ progressive economic views. They 
recruited members of a variety of denominations to use interpretations from their own 
denominations’ older documents; in particular, the Catholic Church’s principle of 
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subsidiarity which had been articulated by Pope Pius XI in 1931 to warn against over-
regulation by the state. This indicated to politicians and Catholics and mainliners interested 
in politics that there were competing theological and political interpretations. Michael 
Novak, a former left-wing journalist who joined AEI, and William Simon, the Reagan 
administration’s treasury secretary, were part of a lay commission of conservative Catholics 
which closely watched the drafting of Economic Justice for All, testified at hearings, and 
wrote its own letter in response to an early draft, gaining media and academic attention 
(Berryman 1989). The letter argued, based on Novak’s 1983 book The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism, that progressive programs not only weaken incentives for the poor to pursue 
hard work, but also prevent businesses from pursuing innovation and hiring based on market 
conditions, which are necessary for the maintenance of healthy Catholic communities. 
Thus, right-wing opposition to the moral visions of the Catholic and mainline 
hierarchy was related to disagreements about economic principles. The Catholic Bishops 
were arguably not as weakened politically as compared to mainline Protestants. Mainline 
denominations, faced with declining numbers and political divisions, cut funding to the 
National Council of Churches (Dunn 1989), while the Bishops continued with the 
publication of their economics document and received attention for it from the media and 
Congress. But the Bishops’ conservative views on abortion, did not shield them from 
critiques by religious conservatives on economic grounds. Because economics was not a 
matter of doctrine, membership groups within denominations successfully undermined 
hierarchical efforts for a moral vision. On the other hand, charitable institutions did their 
best to aid the Catholic hierarchy in its views on poverty, and they, along with Protestant 
colleagues, had largely done so since the New Deal, at least on the issue of welfare. 
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For example, in a 1982 poll cited by Reichley (1985), evangelicals were nearly split 
on the question of increased spending, while black Protestants backed increases by a vast 
majority, Catholics were in favor with 56%, and mainline Protestants were opposed 59-39. 
A 1988 Gallup poll cited by Schafer (2012) found that 52% of Americans favored spending 
increases. Evangelicals were slightly more likely to be in favor (54%), Catholics even more 
likely than evangelicals, and mainline Protestants least likely. 
With little consensus among or within denominations, progressive religious 
denominations did the best they could with the grassroots activist organizations, allied think 
tanks, and charitable agencies. As the next three chapters show, the 1990s and 2000s showed 
little promise for hopes of comprehensive approaches to poverty. Democratic 
administrations did pursue health care reform, and it was passed within the first half of 
President Obama’s first term when the Democratic Party’s power in Congress was at a high 
point. There were also increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit, and advances in specific 
smaller programs. But welfare was severely cut during the Clinton administration, and the 
reform was not reversed under the Obama administration; meanwhile, the federal minimum 
wage has been increased only twice since 1989. In adapting to this reality, religious 
charitable agencies have proved to be the most durable actors in lobbying the federal 
government and mobilizing local advocacy for the living wage. Of course, as this chapter 
has shown, such work by charities is far from new. Charities which do not have some sort of 
theological argument in favor of comprehensive justice for the poor are less likely to be 
involved in these efforts.  
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Chapter 3: Health Care Reform 
Health care is a complex policy issue which has an impact on all economic classes. 
For the poor, however, suffering health crises without good insurance coverage can result in 
exacerbating illness and or financial catastrophe. As discussed in chapter 2, religious groups 
have become a significant part of the debate on health care reform regarding both ethical 
dimensions and the practical politics of hospital administration. This chapter will analyze 
religious action on health care reform since the early 1990s, with a focus on President 
Clinton’s unsuccessful attempt to pass the Health Security Act in 1993, and President 
Obama’s successful attempt to pass the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010. 
It will begin by examining legislative history with a focus on these two contentious battles, 
discussing partisan polarization and interest group behavior, and then discussing public 
opinion data to explain why denominations find it difficult to mobilize membership on 
behalf of their positions. The chapter will continue with sections on the Health Security Act, 
a brief discussion of the period between 1994 and 2008, and a lengthy study of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, concluding with an analysis of the extent to which 
concerns about abortion were significant in the voting decisions of moderate Democrats. It 
will show how conservative evangelicals used religion to argue against health care reform 
for a broad range of reasons, how Catholic theological prioritization of abortion is more 
important in the negative attitude of the Bishops toward health care reform in 2010 than any 
other factors, how organizational weakness limited the efforts of mainline Protestants and 
other progressive religious groups to develop an effective lobbying voice opposed to the 
Catholic Church’s negative position on health care in 2009 and 2010, and how the Catholic 
Health Association’s significant presence in the health care field served as an incentive for it 
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to seek reform in order to address crises in health management, while also giving it the most 
significant lobbying voice amongst religious groups. Books and media accounts provide 
evidence that religious progressives have had significant access to the President and the rest 
of the executive branch regarding health care, especially during the health care reform 
efforts of Presidents Clinton and Obama. In efforts at religious outreach common to the 
opening years of Democratic administrations, the White House in both 1993 and 2009 
sought support from progressive religious denominational associations such as the National 
Council of Churches, but there is little evidence that the President took their 
recommendations into account. The Catholic Health Association, by contrast, was able to 
influence presidential approaches because they were able to bolster their moral 
recommendations with their significant expertise in health care. Religious groups involved 
in health care reform also lobbied members of Congress, especially moderate Democrats. 
Most religious groups engage in some grassroots lobbying in order to mobilize their 
lobbying of Congress. Conservative religious groups achieve more influence through 
grassroots activism, primarily in conjunction with other conservative activists. 
Legislative History: Piecemeal Health Care Safety Net, a Complex Universe of Interest 
Groups, and Increasing Partisan Polarization 
There are many books documenting the legislative history of health care policy, 
including Broder and Blumenthal (1997), Altman (2010), Mcdonough (2011), Skochpol and 
Jacobs (2012), and Morone and Blumenthal (2009). The listed books document that in the 
1930s, President Roosevelt advocated universal health care as part of the New Deal, but 
failed to get it through Congress. After World War II, President Truman had even more 
interest in health reform, but continued to face opposition from southern Democrats and 
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conservative Republicans. In 1946 he was able to persuade Congress to pass the Hill-Burton 
Act, a federal program for hospital construction which was later expanded to provide other 
federal funding for hospitals. 
The following 60 years included several failed attempts at comprehensive reform, 
and a variety of “piecemeal” reforms (Altman 2010). After the victory of the Democrats in 
the presidential and congressional elections in 1964, President Johnson was able to shepherd 
Medicare and Medicaid through Congress in 1965 as amendments to the Social Security 
Act, despite the opposition of the American Medical Association. Though the majority of 
Republicans were opposed to Medicare, which provided care to elderly citizens, partisan 
polarization was much less acute than it would become by the time President Obama’s 
health care reform efforts took place over 40 years later. Conservative Democrats, especially 
from the South, including powerful committee chairmen such as Representative Wilbur 
Mills and Senator Russell Long, were ambivalent about Medicare because of its high cost 
and provision for increased federal powers. Long, in particular, supported an alternative 
which would provide national insurance only for catastrophic cases. Republicans such as 
Representative John Burns and Senator Jacob Javits contributed ideas to Medicare. Burns’s 
ideas, which gave more power to state-run voluntary insurance programs, were included in 
Medicare. This contrasts with failed efforts by Clinton and Obama to negotiate with 
Republicans. When the bill amending the Social Security Act came to the House floor, 59 
Democrats voted against it and 65 Republicans voted for it. When Republicans were able to 
get a vote on substituting the bill for the Burns plan, ten Republicans voted against it, 
supporting the Administration and compensating for dozens of Democratic defectors 
(Zelizer 2015). 
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President Nixon was more supportive of the idea of a national health care system 
than most Republicans, arguably because of his own family’s medical tragedies during his 
childhood (Morone and Blumenthal 2002). Ted Kennedy, Wilbur Mills and Richard Nixon 
attempted to negotiate a compromise. The story of these efforts includes a religious angle, as 
an Episcopal priest agreed to provide the basement of his church as a secret meeting place 
for their aides (Altman 2010). Kennedy was harshly criticized by labor unions for his 
abandonment of his original, more progressive proposal. Nixon’s plan would have included 
employer mandates, with insurance options for low income and unemployed, and has often 
been compared to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. During the Nixon 
administration, only a proposal creating Health Management Organizations (HMOs) was 
enacted. Because of Watergate and a scandal which weakened Mills’s power in 1974, the 
proposal never came to a vote. Republican Presidents after Nixon were not interested in the 
issue of comprehensive health care reform (Altman 2010). In the late 1970s, President 
Carter was unable to craft a comprehensive health plan. In 1988, near the end of the Reagan 
administration, Congress was able to pass a catastrophic health insurance bill, but it was 
repealed the following year because of public pressure, when it was alleged that individuals 
would have less control over their care. 
Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign featured health care reform significantly. The plan 
drawn up by his administration called for managed competition among health insurance 
programs, regulated by the federal government. The resulting proposal, known as the Health 
Security Act, was opposed by many interest groups across the political spectrum, 
particularly small and medium insurance companies and the American Medical Association 
(Broder and Blumenthal 1997). When it became clear that congressional Democrats were 
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unsatisfied, the proposal was dropped before the 1994 elections, without any congressional 
votes. 
Clinton then advocated a continuation of incremental policies. The debate about 
health care was often placed in the context of other battles over the federal budget, which 
had been discussed in the previous chapter on welfare reform. The Children’s Health 
Insurance Program was passed in 1997. During the administration of George W. Bush, after 
long negotiations, Medicare prescription drug programs were passed. However, the crisis in 
health care continued to grow, as documented by all of the books mentioned previously, 
along with others including Morone and Jacobs (2004) and Hacker (2008). Hacker 
documents that 47 million Americans were uninsured by 2007, that the number of uninsured 
had been increasing since the 1980s (even with somewhat successful efforts to provide 
insurance for children), and even many of those who had insurance faced growing medical 
costs. Additionally, hospitals and medical facilities faced the high cost of stabilizing patients 
without insurance, who then faced the prospect of continued recovery with no coverage. 
These are only the most obvious of a long list of problems in the health care industry, which 
appear to have finally incentivized interest groups on the business side of health care policy 
to enter more serious discussions on health care reform. 
Unlike Clinton, Obama involved congressional leaders in every step of the health 
care reform process. He also involved interest groups, including the hospital industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry, insurance companies, device manufacturers, labor unions, and the 
American Medical Association. The open invitation for interest group input was an 
opportunity for religious groups, especially the Catholic Health Association, which also 
operates as a trade group. If the Catholic Health Association had no connection to its 
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religious heritage, it still would have been a key player in the health care process because of 
the large number of hospitals. However, because it had the potential to serve as a pro-reform 
voice in both the medical and religious fields, the Obama administration particularly coveted 
its support. 
One of the most surprisingly significant issues in this legislative process was 
abortion. Some moderate Democrats and most Republicans were opposed to any federal 
funding of abortions, under the precedent of the 1976 Hyde amendment. When the House 
bill came up for a vote in November 2009, Brad Ellsworth, a Catholic, pro-life Democrat, 
introduced a compromise where funds for abortion included in insurance plans would be 
segregated, so no federal money would be funding them. After pressure from pro-life 
groups, Pelosi was forced to drop that compromise and allow a vote on an amendment by 
Democrat Bart Stupak, which would have prohibited insurance plans receiving government 
subsidies to cover abortion. Republicans likely could have derailed health care reform by 
voting against the Stupak amendment, but they risked facing backlash from pro-life groups. 
All Republicans and 64 Democrats voted for the Stupak amendment, which passed. 39 
Democrats voted against the House bill and one Republican voted in favor. After pressure 
from pro-choice Senate Democrats and negotiation with pro-life Democratic senators, the 
Senate adopted a bill with language similar to the Ellsworth compromise on Christmas Eve. 
In March 2010, 34 House Democrats voted against the Senate version of the bill, with no 
Republicans voting in favor. In the Senate, there was concern that 60 votes would be needed 
because the Republicans could organize a filibuster after the special election of Scott Brown, 
but Senate Majority leader Harry Reid was able to use the parliamentary tactic of 
reconciliation, by which budget votes could bypass filibusters with only 51 votes. This 
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process became possible after the Senate parliamentarian ruled that health care reform could 
qualify as a budgetary bill. The Senate approved the final version of the bill with all 
Democrats voting in favor. It was signed by President Obama on March 22, 2010. This 
legislative battle involved little to no collaboration between Democrats and Republicans, 
and significant conflict between Democrats over health care policy, even aside from the 
issue of abortion. Since the Republicans took over the House of Representatives in the 2010 
elections, further progressive reform of health care has not been on the political agenda, as 
Democrats have had to fight in the state governments and in the courts to make sure that the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is allowed to be enacted. 
Public Opinion 
   Although specific proposals for nationalized health care often become unpopular, 
the idea of universal, guaranteed health care was supported by a majority of Americans of 
all religious backgrounds at the time of the 1988 election (Gallup and Costelli 1989) and 
before the 2010 health care reform legislation; 63% according to data cited in Pew’s 2007 
Religious Landscape survey. While not as popular as minimum wage increases (see previous 
chapter), health care has long been perceived by Democrats to be an issue that demands 
action, and they can use polling data as talking points. Even among conservative 
Republicans, support for universal health care was, as of 2007, held by a significant 
minority; 38% as of 2007. 
According to the 2007 Pew Religious Landscape Survey, Majorities of all religious 
groups support universal health care, even if it requires tax increases, at rates above 50% and 
below 80%. White evangelicals are least supportive, at 53%. Somewhat surprisingly, white 
mainline Protestants are only slightly more likely to be supportive, at 58%, even though 
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mainline denominations are very much more likely than evangelical denominations to 
support and lobby on behalf of health care reform. This finding is evidence for the 
contention that there is a political gap between denominational leaders and laity within most 
mainline denominations, as a large minority of mainline Protestants remains quite politically 
conservative, and their form of conservatism is economic as well as cultural. On the other 
hand, mainline Protestants appear to be more supportive of universal health care as 
compared to welfare. About 2/3 of black Protestants (66%), Catholics (67%), and the 
nonaffiliated (68%) supported universal health care. The rate of support among black 
Protestants and the unaffiliated is somewhat lower than expected, given their relative 
liberalism and support for the Democratic Party. There was a racial gap among Catholics, 
with 62% of white Catholics supporting universal health care, compared to 77% of Hispanic 
Catholics. Again, health care was more popular than welfare among Catholics. This 
correlates with the higher likelihood of white Catholics to vote for the Republican Party. 
Thus, when controlling for race, and based on the fact that most mainline Protestants are 
white, it appears that white Catholics and white mainline Protestants are about equally 
supportive of health care reform. The numbers are such that Catholic bishops and mainline 
Protestant denominational leaders can expect to receive significant support, but also 
significant opposition from a minority of their members, when lobbying for health care 
reform. 
However, when health care reform becomes a salient issue, the policy details of 
health care reform obscure attempts to analyze the data provided in the Pew survey. As 
Catholics focus on the abortion issue, and members of all religious groups, but especially 
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evangelicals, become dissatisfied with particular reform efforts, the likelihood of churches 
lobbying for health reform because of support from their members becomes lower. 
It is helpful to try to determine how much opposition to health care reform among 
Christians is related to the possibility that abortion coverage may be included. A good 
starting point is to examine the 2007 Pew Survey data on abortion. Catholics and black 
Protestants were roughly divided in their attitudes toward the legality of abortion. Only a 
quarter of white mainline Protestants were against abortion in most or all cases, though half 
favored legality in most, but not all cases. Over 60% of evangelicals were opposed to legal 
abortion in most or all cases. 
A 2009 Gallup poll, taken just before the beginning of the debate over the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, agreed with Pew data indicating that Catholics were 
almost equally divided regarding their beliefs about the legality of abortion. Both Pew and 
Gallup noted that there was a particularly distinct gap in the attitudes of white Catholics 
based on their frequency of church attendance. In the Pew Survey, 58% of white Catholics 
who attended mass at least once a week opposed legal abortion, nearing the levels of pro-life 
belief among white evangelicals. Hispanic Catholics, by contrast, had higher levels of 
church attendance even while supporting legal abortion. 
A Pew poll (2009) poll, conducted when the issue of abortion in health care policy 
became particularly salient, found that abortion was listed by less than 10% of health care 
reform opponents as their main reason for opposing the bill, though over half, including over 
three quarters of white evangelical and white Catholic opponents, listed opposition to 
abortion coverage as one reason. Economic concerns, such as concerns about declining 
quality and rising cost, and opposition to health care coverage for immigrants, were much 
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more important.  Overall, this poll indicates that economic concerns are particularly 
important for mainline Protestant opponents, but also for opponents across the religious 
spectrum, including Catholics and evangelicals whose denominations are strongly opposed 
to abortion coverage. As will be discussed later in this chapter, evangelical organizations are 
as opposed to health care for economic reasons as they are because of abortion. For 
Catholics, however, those who follow the line of the Bishops should, if they oppose reform, 
list abortion as their primary reason. Later polling analyzed by Boorstein (2010) indicated 
that there was little movement among Catholics in their attitudes about health care reform 
after the Bishops came out against it due to the issue of abortion. Partisan identity was the 
best predictor of Catholics’ attitude to reform, both at the beginning of the process and near 
the time of the bill’s passage. It would appear, then, that the Catholic Bishops’ position of 
opposing health care reform only without abortion coverage, has little public support, and 
may well be held only among an elite group of Catholic and other Christian activists. It also 
indicates that, while majorities of Americans support the idea of universal health care, there 
is less support when a legislative plan I released, and the primary concerns are not related to 
cultural issues. 
Regrettably, polling data regarding Catholic support for the Bishops’ position against 
health care reform in early 2010 is not available. Data on attitudes regarding the legality of 
abortion does not answer this question. Some pro-life Catholics may have taken the Catholic 
Health Association’s position of supporting the law despite their beliefs about abortion, 
while some pro-choice Catholics may oppose any indication of taxpayer funding for 
abortion. A Zogby poll from 2008, often cited by pro-life advocates, indicates that 69% of 
Americans oppose taxpayer funding of abortions, but does not divide the sample by religion. 
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It is unlikely, however, that Catholics were more supportive of taxpayer funding of abortions 
than other groups. There is much polling data from the following years regarding attitudes 
about contraception mandates, which may provide some indication as to the level of support 
for the Bishops’ health care policy. Since contraception is much more accepted by most 
Americans, including Catholics, than abortion, despite the position of the Catholic Church 
and some evangelical denominations against contraception, it would be expected that 
taxpayer funding of abortion would be even less popular than contraception mandates. 38% 
of evangelicals, 61% of the religiously unaffiliated, and roughly half of Catholics and 
mainline Protestants were in support of employer mandates to provide contraception. 
Exemptions for religious institutions were even more popular. 
Meanwhile, the Public Religion Research Institute provided updated data in 2014 
regarding religious attitudes about health care in general. 62% of Catholics still supported 
the principle of national guaranteed health insurance, while roughly 40% of white mainline 
and evangelical Protestants supported such a principle. Half of Catholics, 33% of mainline 
Protestants and 16% of white evangelicals favored the current health care reform law. A 
decline in support of universal health care among evangelicals is particularly noticeable. 
Race and party, however, were still more significant than religion, with minorities regardless 
of religion being in favor of current health care reform efforts by large majorities. Thus, 
white Catholics are likely in favor of universal health care and current health care law at 
roughly equal numbers compared to white mainline Protestants. 
As noted in many contemporary works on American religion, this public opinion 
data indicates that evangelicals support the Catholic bishops on the issues of abortion and 
contraception mandates in higher numbers than Catholics themselves. However, mainline 
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Protestants are also divided, leaning toward opposition, regarding universal health care, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and contraception mandates, even though their 
denominations do not oppose any of these ideas and even though they are not opposed to 
legal abortion in high numbers. Mainline Protestant critics of health care reform, then, 
appear to have primarily secular reasons for their opposition. Catholic organizations are 
gaining sympathy from many rank and file Catholics regarding issues of conscience, but not 
overwhelming support, and there is no evidence that these issues alone are changing minds 
on health care reform in general, although support for reform among all groups has gone 
down. While Catholic bishops do have a constituency for their brand of socially 
conservative, fiscally progressive politics, especially among politically moderate devout 
churchgoers, it appears that they, along with many evangelicals, also have more political 
reasons for their opposition to health care in addition or instead of religious principles or the 
instruction of their religious leaders. Meanwhile, while there are pressure groups within the 
Church advocating for health care reform, the Bishops are likely to listen to them only if 
they are strongly anti-abortion, since it is their theological priority. Meanwhile, pro-life 
pressure groups, such as the USCCB’s own pro-life office, the American Life League, the 
National Right to Life Committee, and primarily online communities such as the National 
Catholic Register, Catholic Online and Catholic Vote, mobilize devout churchgoers, 
encouraging the Bishops’ policy on the centrality of abortion in health care reform. 
The opinion of clergy on health care policy is an instructive comparison along with 
the mass public and denominational leadership. The book Pulpit and Politics, edited by 
Corwin Smidt (2004), is a comparative survey of clergy of over a dozen denominations, 
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which includes a question on their survey about support for national health insurance. The 
following table summarizes results. 
Denomination Tradition % 
African Methodist Episcopal Church Black Protestant 88 
Church of God in Christ Black Protestant 83 
Disciples of Christ Mainline 70 
Evangelical Lutheran Mainline 70 
United Methodist Mainline 62 
Presbyterian Church USA Mainline 59 
Roman Catholic Roman Catholic 59 
Christian Reformed Church Evangelical 41 
Southern Baptist Evangelical 40 
Assemblies of God Evangelical 32 
Church of the Nazarene Evangelical 24 
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod Evangelical 20 
Evangelical Free Church Evangelical 16 
Presbyterian Church in America Evangelical 10 
Table 1: Percentage of Clergy Supporting National Health Care 
While low response rates in some denominations mean that data from this study 
should not be taken as conclusive, the authors usually indicated whether there had been 
changing results compared to previous studies.  Large majorities of those surveyed in most 
of the mainline denominations in the study supported national insurance (70% among 
Disciples of Christ and Evangelical Lutheran Church in America pastors, 62% among 
United Methodist pastors, and 59% among Presbyterian Church USA pastors). This 
indicates slightly higher support of health care reform among clergy than among lay 
mainline Protestants. Support for health care reform was higher than support for the 
Democratic Party and presidential candidate Al Gore in the 2000 presidential elections; 
generally by only a few percentage points, but among United Methodist clergy, by over 
15%. Overall, clergy among mainline Protestant denominations have a slight leaning toward 
support for the Democratic Party, theological liberalism and liberal positions on a variety of 
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political policies including cultural issues, with large conservative minorities in most of the 
denominations. Health care reform appears to be one of the progressive issues with strongest 
support among mainline denominations, but not universal support. The survey also studied 
some large evangelical denominations. Minorities in each supported national health 
insurance. Among those denominations outside of the National Association of Evangelicals, 
this included about 40% of Southern Baptist ministers, 20% of Lutheran Church Missouri 
Synod ministers, and 24% of Churches of Christ ministers. Among NAE denominations in 
the survey, which included most of the largest NAE denominations, only 10% of 
Presbyterian Church in America ministers supported national health insurance, along with 
16% of Evangelical Free Church ministers, 24% of Church of the Nazarene ministers, 32% 
of Assemblies of God ministers, and 41% of Christian Reformed Church ministers. These 
denominations include representation from across the spectrum of evangelicalism, including 
Reformed and other fundamentalist churches, along with Wesleyan Holiness and Pentecostal 
denominations such as the Nazarenes and Assemblies of God. Roughly 2/3 of Roman 
Catholic priests were in support of universal health care, showing generally similar levels of 
support as mainline Protestant clergy. Finally, black Protestant ministers were most likely to 
support universal health care, as shown in studies of 2 of the 3 largest black denominations 
(88% for ministers in the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and 83% of ministers in the 
Church of God in Christ, the most conservative black denomination). Over 80% of ministers 
in these denominations are also Democrats. Catholic priests and black Protestant ministers 
are likely to hold to theologically and culturally conservative positions. However, they 
disagree with evangelical Christians, who also hold theologically and socially conservative 
positions, on health care and other economic issues. 
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Support for national health insurance among Catholic priests, mainline ministers, and 
to a much lesser extent black Protestant ministers was higher than support for the 
Democratic Party and its presidential candidates, in organizations which are politically split 
or lean toward the Democratic Party. Somewhat similarly, support among evangelical 
ministers was also higher than support for the Democratic Party and its candidates, which 
was less than 10% in all of the evangelical denominations in the survey except the Southern 
Baptist Convention. This mirrors the higher level of support for universal health care 
compared to Democratic Party support among the general public. This indicates that some 
Republican ministers, many of whom are likely to be social conservatives, still acknowledge 
the need for health care reform, even if it is not a priority issue. 
Overall, there is a correlation between theological orthodoxy, political conservatism 
and opposition to universal health care in public opinion and clergy, especially among 
mainline and evangelical Protestants. However, this correlation exists much less among 
Catholics and especially black Protestants. Even among mainline and evangelical 
Protestants, the correlation is not absolute, and there are evangelical denominations where 
support for universal health care remains a small minority as a position of absolute 
conservatism dominates. 
Religious Activism on Health Care 
during the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations 
Religious influence on health care necessarily involves significant effort at insider 
lobbying. A more substantive finding of this research, however, is that lobbying of 
Presidents and their administrations is as important to the success of religious organizations 
as lobbying of Congress. The politics of the executive branch and the bureaucracy is not an 
  
95 
easy environment for those lobbying through tactics of social justice. Tactics of moral 
persuasion may, for a moment, gain the President’s attention. But religiously affiliated 
charitable agencies such as the Catholic Health Association were required to present their 
findings on the feasibility of health care plans, and persuade the Presidents that they had the 
ear of moderate congressional Democrats. To be sure, landmark health care legislation is a 
special case given that the Democratic presidents who opened their administrations with 
attempts at health reform sought to engage with religious lobbyists as much as possible, to 
gain support for such difficult and far-reaching anti-poverty legislation. Although 
progressive Catholics and mainline Protestants did not get the health plans they desired 
through Congress, their activism was noted in media and academic sources, although 
mainline Protestants were more influential during the Clinton administration while the 
Catholic Health Association was more influential in the Obama administration, despite 
persistent accusations that the Obama administration is anti-Catholic. The denominational 
affiliations of the Presidents themselves, however, are not significant, as President Clinton 
had poor relations with his own Southern Baptist Convention’s increasingly conservative 
leadership, and President Obama, a member of the mainline United Church of Christ, had 
less extensive relations with the National Council of Churches. Religious progressives did 
certainly lobby Congress as well, especially the United Methodist Church and Catholic 
Health Association in 2009. 
Religious groups in favor of reform also engaged in a moderate level of grassroots 
activity. The Catholic Health Association did not appear to engage in much grassroots 
activity regarding the interests of its hospitals in the legislation, but did engage in some 
grassroots activity in general support of reform. Most importantly, the significant influence 
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of the Catholic Health Association demonstrates that, particularly for the issue of health care 
reform, religious groups lobby most effectively when they demonstrate expertise in the 
practical administration of health care. The Catholic Health Association was able to present 
a nuanced view of ethical dimensions to Democratic administrations, provide valuable 
perspective on the practical politics of hospital administration to governmental agencies, 
members of Congress and secular hospital administrators, and provide an alternative view 
compared to that of the Catholic Bishops while still agreeing with the Bishops’ concerns 
about abortion, which was helpful in gaining support for reform from some reluctant 
Democrats. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Catholic Health Association already had a history 
of consulting with Presidents and testifying at congressional hearings. However, the decline 
of Protestant health care interests and the increasing polarization over abortion increased the 
importance of Catholic health care lobbyists. 
In each of the sections to follow on President Clinton’s Health Security Act and 
President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, I begin by examining the 
work of mainline Protestants to support comprehensive reforms. They experienced tension 
between advocating for reforms which were unlikely to be politically viable, and pragmatic 
pressures to work for the limited reforms on the table. The Catholic Health Association, 
meanwhile, sought to link support for social justice with a conviction that any reforms under 
consideration would be an improvement for the administration of Catholic hospitals. I then 
examine the actions of the Bishops to prevent abortion funding in health care, even as the 
Catholic Health Association took a stance of agreeing with the Bishops’ pro-life position 
while pursuing their own legislative priorities. I then argue that conservative evangelicals, 
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while agreeing with an anti-abortion position, had many other reasons to oppose health care 
reform, which the Bishops did not share. 
Background to the Health Security Act Debate 
   Tipton (2007) notes that denominational efforts by mainline Protestants to express 
concern over the high rate of uninsured Americans during the 1970s and 1980s involve more 
internal investigations than lobbying for legislation. In 1989, the Lutherans and 
Presbyterians led an effort to get mainline Washington offices involved. Meanwhile, former 
President Jimmy Carter, a progressive Southern Baptist whose religious faith encouraged 
him to pursue a failed attempt at health care reform during his presidency, gathered a group 
of religious leaders together to examine the issue of health care (Walsh 2000). In 1991, this 
broad interfaith coalition led by the National Council of Churches, known as the 
Interreligious Health Care Access Campaign developed “a fivefold strategy featuring (1) a 
broad campaign to educate the public at large; (2) direct advocacy to Congress, led by the 
Washington church offices; (3) grassroots education and advocacy within religious 
congregations; (4) coalition-building with nonreligious advocates and public-interest groups 
for health care reform; and (5) use of religious and public media to advance these ends 
(Tipton 2007, 320). The campaign endorsed a single payer health care system, and 
according to Tipton, lobbied members of Congress to support health care bills sponsored by 
Democrats. Early on, IHCAC was open to a variety of proposals including employer 
mandates, tax credits and national insurance (Cornell 1992A). Even by 1993, IHCAC was 
very pleased “that Clinton "has embraced the goal of universal access to health care as the 
core of health care reform." However, Walsh states that President Jimmy Carter distanced 
himself from IHCAC because of its insistence on single payer. Most of the mainline 
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denominations also passed resolutions endorsing universal health care in 1991, some of 
which were discussed earlier in this chapter. IHCAC supporters also wrote letters to Bill 
Clinton upon his election in 1992, advocating publicly financed health care reform as 
opposed to employer mandates. 
Mainline Churches and their Allies: From Broad Support to Discord among 
Progressives (1993-1994) 
Accounts of Clinton’s health care reform effort such as Broder and Blumenthal 
(1997) do not mention the involvement of religious groups in support of reform. However, 
books focusing on religious organizations such as Walsh (2000) and Tipton (2007), secular 
media sources (especially The Washington Post), and religious media sources such as the 
National Catholic Reporter and The Christian Century, provide evidence that religious 
organizations had considerable involvement. A group calling itself the Single Payer 
Coalition, including Network Catholic Social Justice Lobby and the mainline group Church 
Women United, met with the Clinton transition team three times, as it became clear that 
health care reform would become a priority of the Clinton administration. However, IHCAC 
and the National Council of Churches clearly distinguished themselves as the primary 
religious coalitions supporting reform efforts.  They met with Clinton’s policy advisors 
several times (Walsh 2000). According to Tipton (page 321), the IHCAC “conducted press 
conferences and other public-relations activities. It backed a wide range of public advocacy 
and educational activities culminating in two national “lobby days” on Capitol Hill in May 
of 1993 and June of 1994.” 
Church groups held hearings which were attended by White House Health Care task 
force members. The White House considered the IHCAC, mainline churches, Quakers and 
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other religious progressives significant enough that they sought to reassure such groups 
when plans drifted away from single payer (Tipton 322). When Clinton released his plan 
involving “managed competition” in late September 1993, the Catholic Health Association 
and National Council of Churches general secretary Joan Campbell reacted most positively 
(The Christian Century, 10/6/1993). However, Church Women United, the United Church of 
Christ and the United Methodist General Board of Church and Society expressed opposition 
to managed competition, and Anderson (1993) noted that they were already beginning to 
lobby for more progressive legislation. 
While the NCC’s Joan Brown Campbell was perceived as being favorable to Clinton, 
she was quoted in The Washington Post as saying that reforms were not as extensive as 
religious groups would like. The National Council of Churches wrote a letter to the Clinton 
administration in November 1993, applauding the attempt at health care reform while stating 
that progressive religious organizations retained the right to criticize specific plans (Walsh 
2000). In the spring of 1994, National Council of Churches general secretary Joan Brown 
Campbell was contacted by the Clinton administration and agreed to speak on behalf of 
mainline churches in support of compromise proposals. However, Washington offices of 
some mainline denominations were critical of her leadership. They disagreed with attempts 
to take coverage of immigrants out of the proposal and cut guaranteed coverage that would 
have been given to more low income Americans in previous proposals (Tipton). 
By the summer of 1994, the Clintons and some liberal journalists began scolding 
advocates of the more progressive reforms not included in Congress’s compromise plan 
introduced by Senator George Mitchell. Joe Klein, writing in Newsweek in support of the 
plan, specifically criticized “the religious left” as part of the progressive coalition he 
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critiqued. Religious groups, meanwhile, argued that the reform being proposed, primarily 
including employer mandates, was not strong enough to achieve grassroots support, while 
still provoking backlash from conservatives. Eventually, mainline churches came out against 
the proposal, while the African Methodist Episcopal Church supported it as a pragmatic first 
step. The IHCAC publicly released a letter submitted to every senator, attacking the bill on 
three specific issues; no universal coverage, no substantial benefit package, and no private 
sector cost controls. It advocated state-level single payer as a compromise. The night before 
a scheduled IHCAC press conference, Joan Brown Campbell came out in favor of the 
compromise after being called by the White House (Tipton). 
While this account provides evidence of religious lobbying of Congress and 
grassroots activism, the primary narrative centers on the relationship between the Clinton 
administration and progressive religious activists in the leadership of key interest groups. 
Most importantly, Joan Brown Campbell, while attempting to lobby the Clinton 
administration and Congress for more progressive policies, was in turn lobbied by the 
Clinton administration to serve as a go-between, encouraging her supporters to work on 
behalf of compromise legislation. Most mainline lobbyists, however, focused more on 
sending a message about health inequality than getting compromise legislation passed. In 
what Hofrening (1995) calls “prophetic lobbying”, they advocate that government provide 
solutions to the problems of the health system and protect the poor, regardless of financial or 
political costs. Campbell argued that religious progressives did not adequately develop 
grassroots advocacy within denominations. It is clear that religious progressives, particularly 
Catholic associations, mainline Protestants and some black Protestant denominations, were 
involved in lobbying by releasing statements, conducting press conferences, and speaking 
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with administration officials and members of Congress. The IHCAC’s early statements 
indicated much promise of grassroots activism. Yet as Hillary Clinton stated, the number of 
constituent letters and phone calls to Congress from conservatives vastly outnumbered those 
of progressives (Tipton 322). On the other hand, religious progressives were more interested 
in helping to create the plan, and less interested in selling a compromise plan, despite urging 
by NCC leadership. Prophetic lobbying is unlikely to work without either significant insider 
connections or grassroots social movements. Instead of a progressive mobilized movement, 
Christian conservatives and others in the right-wing were the ones better able to organize 
social movements on the issue of reform. It is possible that more grassroots campaigning 
within denominations for single payer health care in the very early stages of negotiation, and 
sustained throughout congressional debate, could have been helpful, but mainline 
denominations appeared not to have the political infrastructure, institutional access to 
legislative architects, and unity in messaging. 
The Catholic Health Association: A Key Player 
     The Catholic Health Association and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops 
worked to craft the health care legislation in their capacity as leaders of one of the largest 
groups of hospitals in the country. Walsh notes that the Bishops and the Catholic Health 
Association, like the General Secretary of the National Council of Churches, but unlike 
some progressive Catholic organizations and mainline denominations, were willing to 
support employer mandates and managed competition, even though they had previously 
expressed a preference for a single payer system. Catholic lobbyists sought to combine 
practical technocratic concerns with a clear call for social justice and assistance to the most 
marginalized.  Bishop John Ricard of the Domestic Justice Committee praised Clinton’s 
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commitment to universal health care (Anderson 1993). On January 26, 1994, a 
representative of the United States Catholic Conference testified before the House 
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment regarding possible gaps in coverage for 
immigrants in the Health Security Act. 
The Catholic Health Association undertook significant efforts independently of the 
Bishops. It sent officials to testify at least three congressional hearings (Health Care Reform 
Parts 2 and 5 1993; Health Security Act 1994), discussing the strengths and weaknesses of 
managed competition in hospital administration and patient care.  The CHA also sought to 
mobilize other religious health care advocates as the bill seemed on the brink of failure. In 
June 1994, Democratic senator Paul Wellstone, while proposing an amendment to a defense 
authorization bill mandating universal health care equivalent to coverage for members of 
Congress, read a letter in the Congressional Record signed by a variety of progressive 
interest groups and health care associations. The letter expressed support for employer 
mandates, with an option at the state level for single payer systems. The groups affiliated 
with religion signing the letter were the American Association of Pastoral Counsellors, 
Church Women United (the women’s mainline Protestant group, with significant charitable 
and political involvement), the executive vice-president of Brooklyn Lutheran Medical 
Center, and the once-powerful Protestant Health Alliance, along with the Unitarian 
Universalist Church, and the National Council of Churches. In July 1994, a report by the 
Catholic Health Association indicating the importance of universal health care for lower and 
middle class families was entered into the Congressional Record. Democrat Robert 
Underwood, the non-voting delegate from Guam, cited the study in a speech on the House 
floor on July 28. Both of these statements were from groups supporting the Clinton 
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administration’s proposals. The Catholic Health Association was listed along with the 
National Council of Churches by The Christian Century as President Clinton’s primary 
religious allies; mainline denominations on the Protestant side and the Bishops on the 
Catholic side, for differing reasons, were more reluctant. The Catholic Health Association 
did not play as prominent of a role as it would in 2009, but it began at this point to establish 
itself as a coalition partner with Democratic politicians, primarily because of its combination 
of ethical and practical belief in reform. 
Concerns over Abortion 
The politics of abortion was not as large of a factor as it would become in 2009. But 
the Catholic Bishops, sometimes backed by evangelicals, used a broad variety of tactics to 
oppose coverage of abortion, which made the CHA’s support for the Clinton administration 
more remarkable and even more valuable. The 1993 USCCB document Comprehensive 
Health Care Reform expresses much stronger opposition to abortion than previous 
documents on health care, along with concerns about care for the dying. One of its 
guidelines is: 
Respect for Human Life and Human Dignity: Real health care reform must protect 
and enhance human life and human dignity…Neither the violence of abortion and 
euthanasia nor the growing advocacy for assisted suicide is consistent with respect 
for human life…we are convinced it would be a moral tragedy, a serious policy 
misjudgment, and a major political mistake to burden health care reform with 
abortion coverage that most Americans oppose and the federal government has not 
funded for the last seventeen years. 
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The section on tactics will describe how the Bishops attempted to influence the 
crafting of Clinton’s health care reform proposal on the issue of abortion. John Ricard, chair 
of the Domestic Justice Committee, had expressed concern about the possibility that some 
proposals contained coverage of abortion. In October 1993, Bishop John Ricard of the 
Domestic Justice Committee expressed concern about the possibility of abortion funding. 
James Smith, of the Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission, also denounced the 
possibility of abortion coverage, personally attacking President Clinton’s lack of allegiance 
to Southern Baptist doctrine on abortion (Anderson 1993). In April 1994, Cardinal 
Bernardin spoke out on the issue of abortion in a national radio address. On January 26, 
1994, a representative of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Pro-
Life Activities testified at a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment, along with a representative of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Christian 
Life Commission, advocating against coverage for abortion and family planning. The 
Conference directed campaigns throughout the country’s dioceses at the parish level asking 
for people to write to their members of Congress demanding that abortion coverage would 
not be included in health care reform. They also funded an advertising campaign, and 
engaged in direct lobbying of members of Congress by bishops (Vidulich 1994). 35 pro-life 
congressional Democrats, including Harold Volkmer, a Catholic, stated that they would not 
support a bill which allowed abortion coverage. Because no health care plan was ever even 
brought to the floor of either House of Congress for a vote, it is impossible to determine 
whether the Catholic Bishops would have hardened their opposition later as they did in 
2009. Hofrening (1995) notes that the Catholic Bishops' prioritization of abortion, despite 
disagreement among Catholics and a significant list of other salient issues, is exceptional, as 
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he finds that most religious lobbyists place a high priority on issues of high salience when 
they have the broad support of their members. As recent attempts of health care reform have 
been backed by a segment of the Democratic Party that views abortion as a form of health 
care to which women should have rights, the Bishops’ interpretation of moral theology 
centering on the dignity of each human life beginning at conception has been tested. 
Conservative Opposition on Grounds of Feasibility and Fear of Rationing 
Outright opposition included non-denominational groups led by conservative 
evangelicals, such as the moderate concern expressed by the National Association of 
Evangelicals and the Southern Baptist Convention (Walsh 2000), along with vociferous 
denunciations by the Family Research Council and Christian Coalition. All of these groups 
joined the Catholic Bishops in expressing concerns about possible abortion coverage and 
other ethical issues. For example, The Southern Baptist Convention’s 1994 resolution listed 
six objections to Clinton’s health care reform plan, of which three were related to abortion, 
contraception, or related issues. However, evangelical organizations also expressed 
reservations based on economics (The Christian Century 10/6/1993; 3/9/1994; Broder and 
Blumenthal 1997; Walsh 2000). They sought to link concerns with the financial feasibility 
of the proposal to their views of human life, primarily by arguing that further government 
involvement in health care would lead to rationing of care for those who needed it most, 
while also providing enough care for those with unhealthy or allegedly immoral lifestyles so 
that people would have less of an incentive to change those lifestyles. The National 
Association of Evangelicals, in its 1994 resolution, indicated that refusing government 
funding for abortion and euthanasia was a morally necessary component of any health care 
reform proposal, but did not promise support for reform proposals without these measures. It 
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ended with the position that interested parties should “enlist the counsel and help of 
governmental institutions, social agencies, insurance companies and churches to establish 
health care provisions which will maximize the creativity of the private sector while 
minimizing governmental control.” This relatively moderate statement still shows a more 
significant emphasis on the private sector in evangelical public policy recommendations.    
The NAE’s 1994 resolution provides evidence that evangelical concerns about universal 
health care are at least partially rooted in a belief that people should take responsibility for 
their own health. It argues that some accountability for bad behavior (including “smoking, 
drug and alcohol abuse, promiscuity and over-eating), and tort reform, should be main 
points of any health reform proposal. The NAE and SBC resolutions blame personal failings 
for the problems of at least some of those lacking adequate health care coverage. They both 
place a great deal of emphasis on tort reform as a possible solution to health care costs, not 
acknowledging that lawsuits against doctors are often a result of malpractice. Mainline and 
Catholic denominational resolutions certainly advocate a healthy lifestyle, but poor 
decisions are a more significant emphasis in evangelical statements. At the same time, 
evangelicals express concern about personal liberties, both financial and medical, that could 
be curtailed by health reform. This theological tendency does not apply to progressive 
evangelicals such as Sojourners, who, like mainline denominations, have been supportive of 
comprehensive health care. Therefore, though evangelicalism itself does not lead to a stance 
against universal health care, but the conservative, often fundamentalist interpretation 
dominating evangelicalism generally does. 
Rationing is, as stated above, a central practical concern of evangelical opponents to 
health care. Discussions of rationing allow evangelicals to appear less tough-minded toward 
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the unhealthy, instead striking a regretful tone that coverage by the state is unworkable and 
provides poor care to even the most currently disadvantaged patients. The Southern Baptist 
Convention’s 1994 resolution expresses concern about ““the rationing of health care on the 
basis of economic decisions rather than the provision of health care on the basis of medical 
need”, and, calling on traditional theological language “the violation of the centuries-old, 
covenantal relationship between physician and patient.” 
The Christian Coalition, near the height of its political influence at this time, 
distinguished itself by spending millions of dollars on an advertising campaign (Walsh 
2000). CC leader Ralph Reed stated in media appearances that the possibility of rationing, 
higher taxes, and too much federal power, were significant enough reasons to oppose 
reform, in addition to concerns about abortion coverage. This motivated moderate and 
conservative members of Congress to harden their opposition to reform. The Christian 
Coalition and related social conservatives were the only religious groups mentioned by 
Broder and Blumenthal (1997), in their large book about Clinton’s health reform efforts. The 
book quotes a Republican lobbyist as saying that the failure of health care reform required a 
completely united coalition between social conservatives, deficit hawks and business 
groups. The NAE and SBC, while agreeing with the concerns of other conservative 
evangelicals, including those involving economics, did not appear to have significant 
influence in the debate. In fact, Walsh classified the Southern Baptist Convention as open to 
reform, though advocating a system with less power given to the federal government. 
Between 1993 and 2009 
Throughout President Clinton’s second term and the Bush administration, the 
National Council of Churches combined variety of incremental strategies for health care 
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reform with an effort to education congregations about the government’s moral duty to 
provide health care. In 1999, the NCC’s board approved a resolution calling on churches to 
renew advocacy for better health care. It states, in part, that the NCC “Endorsed Health 
Concerns Policy Statement” [adopted in 1971, reaffirmed in 1989], including the statement: 
The development of a national health system which will assure quality health care as 
a right to all persons in an accessible, effective and efficient manner. . . . [NCC] now 
commends to its member communions a renewed faith community action campaign 
for comprehensive universal health care with democratic principles to which we have 
been historically committed; a campaign consisting of public education and action 
focused at the congregation and community level in cooperation with a larger 
coalition seeking to put this issue back on the national agenda. Now therefore 
supports a national campaign beginning during the Year 2000 elections in which 
coalitions at the local level, including encouragement of the widest direct 
participation of NCC member communions congregations, call upon candidates, 
particularly in federal elections, commitment to support Congress enacting universal 
health care coverage. 
As part of this effort, a rally was held in October 1999, along with training for grassroots 
activists. A community organizing training was held in Cleveland in November 1999, 
sponsored by NCC. (NCC News). 
In 2004, the NCC and many of its denominations were involved in sending a letter to 
Bush and Kerry about health care and other issues involving poverty (NCC News October 
2004). The letter asked the candidates to discuss ways in which their policies would 
decrease the number of uninsured people. The initiative was part of the Interreligious 
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Working Group on Domestic Human Need, includes two Catholic organizations (Sisters of 
the Good Shepherd and Network) and several Jewish organizations, but the majority of its 
members are advocacy groups associated with NCC denominations, including most of its 
mainline churches; American Baptist Churches, Church of the Brethren, Disciples of Christ, 
Episcopal Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church, United Church of Christ, and United 
Methodist Church. In 2007, NCC completed a survey of 6000 congregations indicating that 
churches spend much effort on health care ministry. In reaction, NCC created a health care 
task force along with AARP and other organizations “in promoting a campaign to urge all 
Americans to seek policies that will better address the unmet needs of the poor and those 
who lack adequate health care coverage.” (NCC News, October 2007). 
It is likely that the renewed effort on behalf of health care reform in 2007 by the 
NCC was the result of a combination of three factors; the completion of the NCC’s 
congregation survey, the battle for reauthorization of CSHIP (to be discussed below), and 
the Democrats regaining control of Congress. This period, in which the term of NCC’s 
politically active general secretary Bob Edgar ended, coincided with a renewed effort on 
other economic issues, especially the Minimum Wage, as discussed elsewhere in this 
project. 
During the Bush administration, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops lobbied Congress in 
favor of specific legislation to address certain healthcare problems, contrasting with the 
NCC’s more systemically based strategy. Though still supporting reform, the pragmatic 
strategy of the Catholic Bishops, and its ability to work within the Republican-dominated 
executive and legislative branches based on their shared opposition to abortion, led it to 
heavily promote small reforms to make the current health care system better for the poor 
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people for which it was trying to advocate.  In 2004 it devoted particular attention to 
lobbying on behalf of environmental protections designed to protect the health of children, 
including funding for a National Children’s Cohort Study. In 2006 and 2007, the USCCB 
sent letters to several members of Congress in both parties thanking them for supporting the 
Medicaid Community-Based Attendant Services and Supports Act and the Community 
Choice Act. These acts provided funding which allowed people with disabilities to move out 
of institutional care. 
While religious denominations did express concern about health care during the long 
period of Republican control over Congress between 1995 and 2007, the Catholic Health 
Association maintained a voice in public policy by testifying at congressional hearings. 
Databases of congressional hearing transcripts show that, just as during the 1970s and 
1980s, the CHA’s key administrators testified at a diverse set of hearings for House and 
Senate committees during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Topics included but were not 
limited to hospital administrations, Medicare and Medicaid, insurance regulations, home 
health regulations, and regulations of state health care. While this chapter will not delve 
deeply into these testimonies in order to focus attention on the larger legislative battles, the 
Catholic Health Association’s actions during these years when reform was slow at best, 
should certainly be acknowledged and is worthy of future research. Their work during this 
period contributes to the argument that health care providers are more influential than 
denominational hierarchies and ecumenical coalitions, particularly on health care reform. 
The fight over reauthorization of the Children’s Health Insurance Program, which 
had been enacted in 1997 following the failure of Clinton’s comprehensive health plan, 
engaged religious lobbyists, particularly as it came up for re-authorization shortly after the 
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Democrats regained control of Congress in 2007. It became a particular priority for 
individual denominations and interfaith coalitions. In July 2007, NCC and the interfaith 
group Pico Network led an interfaith effort to send letters to Congress in favor of a plan to 
insure 9 million children. (NCC News). An NCC statement claimed “PICO National 
Network and the NCC have generated 9,000 letters to key senators over the past week and 
organized SCHIP clergy coalitions in key states such as Indiana, Kansas and Missouri.” 
Leaders from all of NCC’s large denominations and many of the smaller churches also 
signed the primary letter. In September 2007, NCC President Michael Livingston, the 
Executive Director of the International Council of Community churches, wrote to Congress 
asking for the reauthorization of the Children’s Health Insurance Program, which was at that 
time in a conference committee between House and Senate versions of the bill. Using 
Matthew 18:6, Livingston stated that “Failure to reauthorize SCHIP or allowing a 
presidential veto is tantamount to placing stumbling blocks in the path of our children.” 
(NCC News). In January 2009, in the closing days of the Bush administration, Catholic 
Bishop William Murphy on behalf of the USCCB sent a letter to Congress supporting 
increased funding for the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Murphy asked that funding 
be provided for all pregnant women, and legal immigrants who are children. The Southern 
Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, by contrast, opposed the 
reform efforts. Director Richard Land criticized the defeat of an amendment that would have 
mandated care for unborn children. At the same time, Land criticized the significant 
involvement of the federal government in the administration of the program, as a movement 
toward “socialized medicine” (The Christian Century). 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
  
112 
   Progressive religious groups and the Catholic Church argued that lawmakers had a 
moral duty to improve the health care system, and that, by following appropriate parameters, 
they had an opportunity to pursue this duty effectively. In July 2009 a joint statement was 
signed by the National Council of Churches, two of its denominations (Episcopal Church 
USA and Evangelical Lutheran Church in America), Sojourners, Pico Network (an interfaith 
coalition), Union of Reformed Judaism, and notably given its later actions, the US 
Conference of Catholic Bishops. Containing remarkably little religious language even in 
comparison to other interfaith appeals, it provided several suggestions for maintaining 
priorities of providing health care for low income Americans, including exempting those 
less than 200% above the poverty line from premiums, funding comprehensive health 
services and funding safety net clinics. 
The Catholic bishops soon began to chart an independent course. Murphy outlined a 
framework similar to the 1993 guidelines, and some of its policy recommendations were 
quite progressive. While its first criteria was already against coverage of abortion, its other 
two criteria required for supporting a health care bill were adequate coverage for low 
income Americans and immigrants. Regarding the low income, the bishops wrote to 
Congress in the summer of 2009: 
We urge Congress to limit premiums or exempt families earning less than 200 
percent of the Federal Poverty Level from monthly premiums. We also recommend 
limiting co-payments and other costs which could discourage needed care . . . we 
urge Congress to ensure they will not continue to fall through the cracks of a 
reformed system. 
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While the National Council of Churches wrote a letter to Congress by Secretary 
General Michael Kinnemann shortly before the passage of the bill in March 2010 (NCC 
News 3/2010), there is little other evidence of its activity aside from its support for the 
activities of  its closely related interfaith coalitions and its own particular denominations. As 
noted elsewhere in this dissertation, the beginning of the Obama administration coincided 
with a leadership change in the NCC which appeared to be less focused on politics. During 
the leadership of Joan Brown Campbell and Bob Edgar, the NCC revitalized its political 
connections, as Campbell had a personal friendship with the Clintons and Edgar was a 
former Democratic congressman. Edgar, who served during most of the Bush administration 
and retired in 2007, stabilized the NCC financially but also worked on progressive causes 
even during the most difficult political circumstances. Michael Kinnemann’s continued 
financial restructuring, cuts in the staffs of Washington offices, and calls for more inward 
focus, arguably meant that the NCC did not focus as much on lobbying for health care 
reform as it might if Edgar had still been General Secretary. 
Other organizations in favor of reform quickly engaged in more substantive 
grassroots mobilization with the goal of eventually influencing legislation, which also 
involved a lobbying relationship with the presidency. The Faith for Health coalition initiated 
a campaign entitled Forty Days for Health Care Reform. As part of it, the group was joined 
on a conference call by President Obama on August 19 which reportedly had 140,000 
participants (Pew Forum 10/2009; Faith Street 8/2009). Obama and White House policy 
advisors took questions from a diverse group of clergy. This activity indicated that, while 
progressive coalitions and mainline denominations had a weaker relationship with the White 
House than the Catholic Health Association, these groups did lobby the President and the 
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executive branch, and the White House saw religious progressive coalitions as a valuable 
base of support. Clergy held “50 prayer vigils in 18 states with members of Congress” (Pew 
Forum). They also bought radio and television advertisements. 
Some mainline denominations undertook their own efforts in support of the law. In 
the summer of 2009, the Episcopal Church’s Acts of Convention passed a resolution 
directing its lobbyists to work for a single payer health care system, it also mandated support 
for any incremental health care reform legislation. In September 2009, the United Church of 
Christ set a goal of sending 100,000 messages to Congress in support of health care reform 
(Pew 2009). After the successful passage of reform, the General Minister of the UCC, 
Jeffrey Black, expressed his support of the bill (The Christian Century, 4/20/2010). 
The United Methodist Church, though very divided politically, was arguably the 
leading Protestant advocate of health care reform. In contrast to its position in 1993, during 
which it opposed the Health Security Act because it did not provide sufficient universal 
coverage, it took a more pragmatic approach to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act. It is important to note that the denomination itself did not endorse specific proposals 
because its General Conference meets only every four years, but the President of the Council 
of Bishops was a strong supporter. Even more importantly, its General Board of Church and 
Society not only endorsed the bill, but was able to initiate creative strategies for advocacy. 
In remarks shortly before the vote on the final bill, on March 21, 2010, House speaker 
Nancy Pelosi specifically praised the United Methodist Church’s support for the bill (The 
Christian Century, 4/20/2010). One reason for the UMC’s importance is that it had more 
members of Congress than any other mainline denomination. The United Church of Christ, 
for example, had very little representation in Congress. The United Methodist Church also 
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had many moderate Democrats who were vulnerable to electoral defeat and concerned about 
some aspects of the bill. 
In December 2009, the UMC board of Church and Society organized a particularly 
strong campaign to persuade Nebraska Democratic senator Ben Nelson, who is a member of 
the denomination, to vote for the Senate’s version of the bill. This effort also involved clergy 
from other denominations in Nebraska. Nebraska United Methodists received an email 
including a script with which Nelson could be called (Condon 2009). While the United 
Methodist Church was not concerned about federal funding of abortion, Nelson was opposed 
to the Senate bill partially because it was weaker than the House bill on the issue of blocking 
the use of federal subsidies for abortion. Nelson also had financial concerns regarding the 
bill, which, given the position of the progressive religious community, were not necessarily 
shared by the leadership of the Methodist Church. Methodists, then, had to persuade Nelson 
that despite his concerns about both financial issues and the abortion issue, his duty as a 
Methodist and as a responsible politician was to vote for the imperfect bill in order to 
improve health care access. While Methodists put forth a significant effort on lobbying 
Nelson, it is impossible to determine whether pressure from Methodists was the deciding 
factor for Nelson’s Yes vote. Nelson eventually agreed to a compromise which was still less 
acceptable to pro-life interests than the House version, in return for a tax exemption for the 
state of Nebraska (Altman 2010). 
The Episcopal, Lutheran, Disciples of Christ, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches 
also had a substantial number of Republicans and moderate Democrats in Congress who 
opposed the reform bills, as will be discussed later. However, since as stated earlier in this 
chapter, over 60% of mainline clergy expressed support for universal health care (Smidt 
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2004; The Christian Century, 4/7/2010), the vast majority of mainline clergy are likely to be 
behind their denominations. However, even with recognition by the Pew Forum and Speaker 
Pelosi, the efforts of the United Methodist Church and other mainline denominations were 
not considered to be important enough to deserve mention in books about the legislative 
fight over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, such as Landmark (2010), 
McDonough (2010), Altman (2011), and Brill (2015). However, they did engage in lobbying 
of Congress, especially moderate Democrats, as a strategy, with less grassroots lobbying and 
executive branch lobbying. 
The commitment of the Catholic bishops to universal health care even at the late 
stages must be recognized as well. Even after bishops became dissatisfied with the Senate 
bill primarily over the issue of abortion, the Bishops continued to use rhetoric regarding 
poverty. It is possible to interpret these rhetorical statements as confirmation that the 
Bishops genuinely cared about reducing poverty through health care reform as much as 
blocking access to abortion, despite the criticism made of them on the left. On the other 
hand, the Bishops’ subsequent actions to block the bill because of abortion, despite 
significant support for the bill by other Catholic lobbyists, makes such an interpretation 
harder to sustain. Their strategy of decrying both abortion and poverty in pro-life terms was 
made easier by the fact that the Senate bill, though more liberal regarding the issue of 
abortion, was more conservative in its reform proposals, as it did not have a public option; 
therefore, the House bill was preferable to the Bishops in almost all aspects.   On February 
25, 2010, Murphy and other bishops sent a letter to leaders of the Democratic and 
Republican parties in Congress, reiterating the three necessary criteria for the Church to 
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support a health care law; in this letter the order was protection for low income people, 
followed by no funding for abortion, and finally health care for immigrants. 
The Catholic Health Association’s Key Role in Passing Reform 
When the Obama administration solidified plans to work for health care reform in 
the spring of 2009, the Catholic Health Association was among the first to become involved, 
in its capacity as a trade group in the hospital industry. White House logs show that CHA’s 
director, Sister Carol Keehan met with President Obama at least seven times regarding 
health care reform. She also had numerous other meetings with administration officials, 
other hospital lobbyists, and members of Congress, often at the White House or at the 
offices of Democratic Senator Max Baucus (Altman 2010; McDonough 2011). 
The CHA first participated in efforts of hospitals to lobby for a plan that would be 
acceptable to them, before any bills came through House and Senate committees. Unlike the 
much larger American Hospital Association and the more conservative Federal Association 
of Hospitals, the CHA was not against a public option. However, like other hospital 
associations, it was concerned about any proposals which would result in hospitals not being 
paid. For that reason, it was generally in support of individual mandates requiring health 
insurance purchases, since these would cut the numbers of patients whom hospitals would 
need to treat without payment. In the summer of 2009, Keehan was quoted in the National 
Catholic Reporter as saying that the CHA was not attached to any particular reform proposal 
(Popovici 2009). The Catholic Health Association’s Sister Carol Keehan, meanwhile, 
expressed her organization’s position to the Catholic News Service in 2009, asserting the 
rights of the unborn while also emphasizing issues of poverty. Filteau (2009) reproduces the 
statement from Keehan: 
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We need health reform that respects the life and dignity of every person, from 
conception to natural death . . . That means the unborn, it means the patient with 
multiple sclerosis, the patient with cancer, the young mother, the addicted, the 
mentally ill, the dying patient, and the frail, frail, elderly. 
The CHA also engaged in grassroots activism, reportedly at the request of the 
Obama administration (Landmark). In June 2009, the CHA released a YouTube video called 
“We Can’t Wait,” featuring President Obama and arguing for the benefits of reform amidst a 
significant health crisis. On July 28, 2009, the CHA released an Action Alert along with 
Catholic Charities USA and the Saint Vincent de Paul Society, calling upon sympathizers to 
call members of Congress (Popovici 2009B). The American Life League and Life News 
criticized this initiative, arguing that there was a significant danger of abortion funding in 
the health care law. The ALL pointed out that Father Larry Snyder, Director of Catholic 
Charities, belongs to the White House Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships. However, there are no unbiased reports that this motivated Snyder’s 
participation in favor of health care reform. In further grassroots activity, during the summer 
of 2009, the Catholic Health Association was among the sponsors of television 
advertisements featuring Harry and Louise, the couple whose characters criticized Clinton’s 
health reform proposals in 1994. The couple now expressed support for reform (McDonough 
2011). 
The behavior of the Obama administration and key Congressional Democrats toward 
the CHA and other hospital organizations was part of a similar strategy used to persuade 
other interest groups such as the American Medical Association, insurance companies, 
pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers and others. All of the books cited 
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in this chapter describing the making of health care reform state that addressing the concerns 
of interest groups in order to avoid provoking their opposition was an important goal for the 
Obama administration, in order to avoid mistakes of previous Presidents which resulted in 
the failure of reform. While the CHA’s attention to the moral and religious dimensions of 
reform never went away, its negotiations provide a significant example of ways in which 
religious interest groups can act very similarly to other interest groups in financial 
considerations. 
The Catholic Health Association became prominent once again in March 2010 when, 
on March 17, 2010, Sister Carol Keehan announced the organization’s support for the final 
bill. Keehan had met with President Obama before her statement (Thrush 2010). This was 
after it had become clear that the Stupak Amendment would not be part of the final bill. 
While the Catholic Bishops, as discussed above, came to believe that the Senate’s bill 
allowed federal funding of abortions, the Catholic Health Association disagreed. The 
Catholic Health Association continued to assert its anti-abortion stance, and perhaps would 
have refrained from supporting the bill if President Obama had not promised an executive 
order to address the concerns of pro-life advocates. The Washington Post noted that the 
CHA has done nothing to oppose the Bishops in their mandate that hospitals refuse to 
perform abortions. However, with the bishops still lobbying against the bill, the CHA’s 
advocacy appeared to have been a factor in the decision of about a dozen pro-life 
Democrats, led by Bart Stupak, to support the bill. Although no House member specifically 
cited the CHA as a deciding factor, there is other evidence to indicate their influence. After 
the passage of health care reform, in a video prepared for CHA’s June 2010 summit, Senator 
Robert Casey, a Catholic, pro-life Democrat, stated "I can say without any hesitation that if 
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the CHA were not involved in this effort, it's highly likely we wouldn't be able to pass the 
bill." (Allen 2010; Altman 2011; Catholic News Agency 6/5/2010). His argument that the 
CHA was key to the bill’s passage is backed up by the attention given to the CHA’s 
participation in books such as Landmark, Altman and McDonough. Additionally, Cardinal 
Francis George, a critic of the CHA, also believed that the CHA aided the bill’s passage 
(Allen 2010). 
Other Catholic Supporters 
As noted previously, a variety of Catholic associations had supported health care 
reform from the beginning of the process, and many of these remained supportive even after 
the Stupak Amendment was taken out of the Senate bill. These groups provided assistance to 
the Catholic health Association by encouraging their members to support the CHA’s 
position.  Some, such as Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good, expressed their 
agreement with church teaching on abortion, including opposition to its legality. Other 
groups such as Network Catholic Social Justice Lobby attempted to downplay the abortion 
issue, though Sister Simone Campbell did state the opposition of her coalition of Catholic 
nuns to federal funding of abortion, while arguing that the final health care bill does not 
include such funding (Landsberg 2010). Campbell argued that the Church’s support for life 
in all circumstances should, in fact, be a motivation to support health care reform, since 
“tens of thousands of people are dying each year because they don't have access to 
healthcare, so that is a life issue.” The participation of Network intensified in March 2010. 
After the Catholic Health Association came out in support of the bill, Sister Simone 
Campbell mobilized support for a statement signed by the leaders of dozens of orders of 
nuns, represented by Network Social Justice Lobby and the President of the Leadership 
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Conference of Women Religious, which expressed support for the final bill (Filteau 2010C). 
The support of the nuns may have contributed, along with the CHA, to strengthening the 
argument for reform among Catholic politicians. After the passage of the bill, President 
Obama embraced Sister Simone Campbell and thanked her for her leadership (Andersson 
2010). 
Some commentators noted that health care reform was another example of a growing 
gap between Catholic bishops and nuns, including religion scholars Katherine Mooney and 
Clyde Wilcox, as quoted by The Los Angeles Times (Landsberg 2010). The disagreement is 
exemplified by the fact that the leaders of the Catholic Health Association, Network, and the 
Leadership Conference of Women Religious were all nuns and influential supporters of the 
final bill. It is fair to state that bishops were primarily interested in the issue of preventing 
abortions while politically active nuns were primarily interested in taking care of the poor 
and or maintenance of the Catholic medical system. It is unfair to state, however, that the 
Bishops and nuns did not support each other’s core goals. As Campbell told The Los 
Angeles Times, “We agree on the moral principles…It’s just whether the politics of this meet 
our moral principles. So we're not having a fight—I hope.” (Landsberg 2010). 
Problems with Universal Health Care 
The Bishops’ overwhelming concern about abortion was apparent by the early stages 
of the legislative battle. A letter by Bishops Murphy, Regholi and Wester expressed three 
priority criteria, of which the first was related to abortion and conscience rights. The 
wording of their criteria was 
Exclude mandated coverage for abortion, and incorporate longstanding policies 
against abortion funding and in favor of conscience rights. No one should be 
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required to pay for or participate in abortion. It is essential that the legislation clearly 
apply to this new program longstanding and widely supported federal restrictions on 
abortion funding and mandates, and protections for rights of conscience. No current 
bill meets this test. 
After discussing funding for low income citizens and legal immigrants, as quoted in Section 
A, the letter returned to the centrality of the abortion issue: 
We sincerely hope that the legislation will not fall short of our criteria. However, we 
remain apprehensive when amendments protecting freedom of conscience and 
ensuring no taxpayer money for abortion are defeated in committee votes. If 
acceptable language in these areas cannot be found, we will have to oppose the 
health care bill vigorously. Catholic moral tradition teaches that health care is a basic 
human right, essential to protecting human life and dignity. Much-needed reform of 
our health care system must be pursued in ways that serve the life and dignity of all, 
never in ways that undermine or violate these fundamental values. 
Catholic Bishops and the Abortion Problem: Reluctant but Fervent Opposition 
This section shows how most of the insider and outsider lobbying by the Catholic 
Bishops centered on the issue of abortion. The Washington Post’s landmark book discusses 
the efforts of the Bishops to lobby for strong provisions against funding of abortion in the 
House’s health care reform bill, and opposition to the bill without such language. These 
activities are far more extensive than the letters to Congress sent in previous sections, and 
display a broad range of tactics including insider lobbying, propagation of their views to the 
media, and mobilization of the Catholic laity through parishes. It appears that while the 
Bishops used rhetoric in favor of reform as a way to alleviate poverty, most of their lobbying 
  
123 
was related to abortion and related issues.   At the funeral of Senator Ted Kennedy in 
August 2009, Cardinal Sean O’Malley discussed the issue of abortion in health care with 
President Obama. This conversation was also mentioned in Brill (2015), a book about health 
care reform which does not give much coverage to religious groups. This lobbying effort 
was likely a case of opportunity rather than a strategy, but it had significant symbolic value, 
since Obama and O’Malley were both mourning Kennedy, a major player in the health care 
debate. 
From this point forward, the Bishops engaged in a mix of congressional and 
grassroots lobbying. The New York Times described the tone of the Bishops’ letters 
regarding abortion throughout the fall of 2009 as “increasingly stern.” In November, as the 
vote grew closer, the Bishops asked parishes to include material in parish bulletins, with a 
picture of a pregnant woman, and bishops began lobbying lawmakers. The Bishops met with 
pro-life Democrats to encourage them to hold firm on what would become the Stupak 
Amendment. Former Vatican ambassador Raymond Flynn was tasked by the Bishops with 
recording a phone message to lawmakers. Finally, shortly before the vote, Speaker Pelosi 
met with pro-life Democrats, and representatives of the Bishops, including the pro-life 
lobbyist Richard Dorflinger (Landmark 2010). This meeting finally persuaded her to allow 
the Stupak Amendment to come to a vote. After the Stupak amendment’s passage, the 
Bishops did not oppose the passage of the House bill. 
In one of the first Senate floor debates about health care after the passage of the 
House bill, Republican Mitch McConnell quoted an anonymous representative from the US 
Conference of Catholic Bishops as stating that the Senate bill was “the worst bill we’ve 
seen” regarding the issue of abortion, as recorded in the Congressional Record on November 
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20. McConnell himself is a Southern Baptist. Bishops Murphy, DiNardo and Wester wrote a 
second letter to the Senate in December 2009, expressing support for the Stupak 
Amendment which had been passed by the House in its version of the bill to address 
concerns about abortion, and asking the Senate to pass a similar amendment. However, the 
Senate, after the acquiescence of pro-life Democrats Ben Nelson and Bob Casey, passed a 
less acceptable compromise, as discussed earlier. 
In January 2010, the USCCB released recommended pulpit announcements for 
priests and inserts for parish bulletins. The bulletin insert expressed support for the House 
version of the health care bill and displeasure with Senate amendments which included the 
possibility of funding for abortion in health plans (even though these funds for abortion 
would be segregated from federal money), and lack of conscience protections. It also 
continued to state that the bill did not go far enough in protecting immigrants and low 
income families. After discussing the abortion issue, the bulletin insert states “And the 
affordability credits for very low income families purchasing private plans in a Health 
Insurance Exchange are inadequate and would leave families financially vulnerable.” The 
pulpit announcements and bulletin inserts asked people to write to their representatives. 
Since millions of Catholics attending church received these messages, they had the potential 
to have a significant impact if most of those attending Catholic churches expressed the 
Church’s position to their representatives. However, as noted in the public opinion section, 
there was little change in Catholic attitudes on health care, and as will be discussed later in 
the section of Democratic opposition to health care, there is no evidence of Democratic 
lawmakers being motivated to vote against health care specifically by this campaign. 
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In early March, the USCCB released two documents arguing that Congress’s 
compromise on abortion funding was not good enough (National Catholic Reporter). In a 
document entitled “The Cost is Too High” by Cardinal Francis George, released on March 
15, 2010, the USCCB expressed disappointment that the Senate version of the bill would be 
considered. George announced the Bishops’ strong opposition to the bill, despite a continued 
wish for health care reform, solely because of the prospect of government funding of 
abortions through most of the health care plans, and lack of conscience protection. Cardinal 
George also expressed disappointment with the Catholic Health Association’s support of the 
bill. That same week, Bishops Murphy, DiNardo and Wester contributed an op-ed to The 
Washington Post, again criticizing the bill for similar reasons as George. 
On March 20, Bishops Murphy, DiNardo and Wester sent a letter to the House of 
Representatives, urging them to fix flaws in the bill or oppose it. They began by reiterating a 
sentiment which begins almost every document by the Bishops on this topic: “For decades, 
the United States Catholic bishops have supported universal health care.” This letter also 
expressed opposition to the bill primarily because of abortion, though it also added a 
reference to a lack of health care protection for immigrants. This letter also contained a 
significant reflection on the USCCB’s role in politics: “We are bishops, not politicians, 
policy experts or legislative tacticians. We are also pastors, teachers, and citizens. At this 
point of decision, we cannot compromise on basic moral principles. We can only urge—and 
hope and pray—that the House of Representatives will still find the will and the means to 
adopt health care reform that protects the life, dignity, conscience and health of all. The 
legislation the House adopted, while not perfect, came closer to meeting these criteria. The 
Senate legislation simply does not meet them.” On March 23, Cardinal George released a 
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statement following the passage of the Bill, again stating that universal health care is 
necessary, but the inclusion of abortion in health plans, conscience protections, and the 
inability of immigrants to purchase health plans, forces the Bishops to continue to oppose 
the bill. This statement also began the line of the Bishops that an executive order will not fix 
the Abortion funding issue. 
How much of opposition by Protestants to health care was based on abortion? The 
Methodist Thinker noted in January 2010 that Lifewatch, an anti-abortion Methodist 
organization, sent a letter to Senator Ben Nelson, asking him to change his mind about the 
health care bill. In 2009, the NAE and SBC also released statements advocating against 
abortion coverage in health care reform. The NAE’s November 2009 letter to Congress 
focused on opposition to any bill without specific amendments against abortion coverage. 
Aside from the Christian Reformed Church, which actually supported the legislation, the 
NAE’s large denominations such as the Assemblies of God only expressed concerns 
regarding abortion and freedom of conscience for religious organizations, without other 
activity on the legislation.  As will be discussed in the next section, while the NAE did 
express some other objections to the law, the SBC expressed much more substantial 
objections to more significant government involvement in health care, at least based on the 
plans being proposed, so that they likely would not have supported health care reform even 
if abortion coverage were not a politicized issue. The same is true of the Freedom Federation 
and its most involved members such as the Family Research Council. They, too, however, 
cited abortion funding as a critical problem with health care reform in their publications, and 
FRC’s director Tony Perkins wrote a column in Politico in July 2009 entirely on the topic of 
abortion funding, written so that if a reader knew nothing else about him, they might think 
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he would support reform without abortion coverage. However, abortion coverage was one 
topic among many in their arguments, compared to the centrality of the topic in the Bishops’ 
argument. 
James Dobson, leader of Focus on the Family, a member of the Church of the 
Nazarene (a NAE denomination), expressed his opposition to health care reform in an online 
prayer broadcast in December 2009, focusing his remarks on the possibility that health care 
reform could lead to more access to abortion. The prayer broadcast was hosted by 
independent evangelical pastor Lew Engel, Senator Jim DeMint (Presbyterian Church in 
America) and Senator Sam Brownback (a recent convert to Catholicism) (Altman 2010). 
Other Life Concerns 
For some religious conservatives, opposition to abortion was only one example of 
what they saw as a slippery slope toward immoral actions that could be taken by the 
government in a public health care system that might change norms about the definition of 
human life. Conservatives expressed concern about a provision in the House health care bill 
introduced by Lois Capps in the summer of 2009 which would have provided counseling 
about end-of-life care for senior citizens every five years. They not only criticized this 
provision, but argued that even if the particular proposal was defeated, any public health 
care law could include such provisions later. While the Catholic Bishops opposed 
euthanasia, they did not mention the Capps proposal in their concerns. Some evangelicals 
did, however, in their part of the conservative coalition opposed to the bill. These included 
Kenyn Cureton of the Family Research Council, whose sermon was published on the FRC 
website as part of anti-reform materials to be distributed widely. Although such ideas 
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particularly highlighted fears that rationing could cause deaths, concerns about rationing 
went far beyond fears of life-threatening illnesses not being treated. 
The Problem of Limited Government 
Some argued that practical fears about rationing and philosophical views about 
government are difficult to separate. Jonathan Chait, in a 2014 article for New York 
Magazine, makes a distinction in conservative opposition to health care between practical 
and philosophical principles. Chait notes that conservatives object to universal health care 
based on fears of inefficiency such as lower quality of care (including rationing), and higher 
costs, including on the poor, whom the law was supposed to help. However, he argues that 
many conservative critics have a philosophical objection to the poor being covered by 
federal health care, regardless of whether the law will, in fact, cover them. Mainline and 
Catholic arguments for government involvement begin with scriptural calls to help the sick 
and poor, while arguing that governmental action is necessary to complete this task. 
Conservative arguments must use less directly relevant scripture; an unusual example is 
Kenyn Cureton’s use of Daniel chapter 1, where Daniel must violate his conscience because 
a Babylonian king ordered everyone to change their diet for health reasons. 
Evangelicals largely argued that government could not run health care because it 
would lead to a combination of bad outcomes including individual irresponsibility, high 
costs, and immoral practices such as abortion coverage and end-of-life care. The Christian 
Right, then, argues that the task of administering a large health care system is too big for a 
government, and that, given their theological view of the world, it should not be surprising 
that it would be inefficient. In fact, if it were to somehow work efficiently in the short term, 
it would inevitably be at the cost of individual right to make health care decisions, and 
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crippling taxes that would lead to bad outcomes. While the focus on efficiency may appear 
more related to ideology than theology, their theological belief that the government will 
inevitably subvert Christian principles if it is not bound by them contributes to their 
ideological framework. 
Progressive religious groups and the Catholic Church tended to argue that most 
health care problems could be solved by funding, and, perhaps, the payment of higher 
premiums by those with higher income, while Catholic and some other religious hospitals 
argued that governmental programs could increase efficiency. The network of conservative 
Christian organizations including the Southern Baptist Convention, Family Research 
Council, Freedom Federation, Traditional Values Coalition and Concerned Women for 
America (Wilcox and Robinson 2011) categorically denied that this would be possible, 
while alluding to their philosophical view that it in fact should not be possible. The Freedom 
Federation’s statement from September 2009 also implies that some laws may provide an 
easier environment for lower health costs, but opposes direct government involvement to 
create a comprehensive health system. The FFs’s statement, as reproduced by the Pew 
Forum, argues that ““Individual liberties trump government-imposed obligations. We 
believe that individuals, communities, and doctors in the free market make better health 
decisions than government mandates. We believe in incentives, not coercion.” 
The Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission also 
worked to oppose health care reform. In September 2009, Richard Land led a group of 
several dozen Christian radio hosts in a broadcast opposing the bill in September 2009. In 
March 2010, the ERLC called on its supporters to contact moderate Democrats and urge 
them to oppose the final bill, on the basis not only of concerns about abortion, but also the 
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possibility of rationing, and high costs. After the passage of the bill, Baptist Press covered 
the complete opposition to the bill by four of five Southern Baptist Democrats in the House 
(Strode 2010). 
This evidence indicates that conservatives did engage in some lobbying of Congress, 
but focused their efforts on grassroots lobbying, mobilizing both their Christian 
constituencies and skeptics in the general public. Christian media appearances, along with 
ad campaigns, sought to add to the general effort of the conservative movement to spread 
concern in the general public about a variety of provisions in health reform. It was hoped 
that these efforts would mobilize opposition in the general public, leading to continued 
opposition by Republicans and the defections of moderate Democrats. 
The Family Research Council’s critiques of health care reform in 2009 largely center 
on high costs which will lead to rationing. Kenyn Cureton’s sermon on health care reform 
focuses largely on the possibility of rationing, as does another FRC publication called “Ten 
Reasons why Rationing is in the Affordable Care Act.” Cureton’s statement notes that 
rationing could lead to inadequate treatments for a variety of medical conditions which are 
expensive. 
The FRC and Freedom Federation also bought radio advertisements in several states 
during the summer and fall of 2009 (Pew). US News and World Report noted in October 
2009 that the FRC’s major ad campaign did not mention abortion, focusing primarily on 
high health care costs. 
Thus, it is clear that opponents of health care did consider the issue of abortion, but 
only as part of a long series of complaints about the inability of government to initiate a just 
and efficient health care system. The next step in the analysis is to determine the extent to 
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which congressional Democrats who opposed the bill did so because of abortion, or because 
of other concerns. In that way we can determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
mainline lobbyists like the United Methodist Church, the seamless garment advocates in the 
Catholic Church, and the evangelical conservatives, all of whom were fighting to influence 
these moderate Democrats. 
Moderate House Democrats, Religion and Health Care 
While a few Senate Republicans were involved in early negotiations to develop a 
compromise on health care reform, it eventually became clear that health care reform would 
not pass with bipartisan support, particularly in the House. Although some liberal Democrats 
threatened to oppose reform that was not progressive enough, most were unwilling to derail 
the chance for reform. Therefore, moderate Democrats were generally the members who 
received the most lobbying. The reasons for Democratic opposition among moderates could 
be divided between concerns about funding for abortion, economic concerns, and concerns 
about reelection. These three considerations overlapped significantly, but not entirely. While 
in the Senate, the final bill was more liberal on the issue of abortion but less progressive in 
much of the rest of the bill, the House bill was more conservative on the issue of abortion 
but more progressive in that it had a public option.  In order to determine the influence of 
religious belief and religious lobbying on health care reform, it is worth taking a closer look 
at Democrats who opposed Speaker Pelosi’s leadership, either by voting for the Stupak 
amendment, voting against the House bill in November 2009, or voting against the final bill 
in March 2010, which lacked the full Stupak amendment. Although there are many 
summaries of the legislative battle, and the deals which were made to change the votes of 
key moderate Democrats, there appears to be no comprehensive analysis of the voting 
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patterns of this group of congressmen on the bill, particularly focusing on the issue of 
religion. 
There are some complications which must be addressed in this analysis. First, 
Democrats had differing reasons for voting in favor of the Stupak Amendment. Some were 
staunchly anti-abortion, while others were pro-choice but opposed federal funding. 
Additionally, some Democrats reluctantly agreed to support the November 2009 or March 
2010 bill passage votes after pressure from Speaker Pelosi, while others were allowed to 
vote against it in order to protect their re-election chances, regardless of their abortion 
positions. Finally, two Democrats, Dennis Kucinich and Eric Masa, both Catholics, voted 
against the November 2009 bill because it was not progressive enough. They also voted 
against the Stupak Amendment. In March 2010, Massa resigned and Kucinich reluctantly 
voted for the March 2010 bill. They will be dropped from this analysis. I will also drop 
Parker Griffith, an Episcopalian Democrat from Alabama first elected to Congress in 2008, 
who switched to the Republican Party in December 2009 after voting for the Stupak 
Amendment and against the House bill. 
The tables included in the appendix list all the other Democrats who either voted yes 
on the Stupak Amendment, no to the House version of the health care bill, or no to the 
Senate version of the bill. They also include their state and tenure in Congress, as a way to 
compare the extent to which they were in danger of losing their seat, and their religion, in 
order to determine the extent to which they might be under pressure from their 
denominations. Religious affiliations are mostly taken from Pew Research Center’s Faith on 
the Hill publication, released at the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009. Table 3 shows 
the voting positions of Democrats who voted for the Stupak Amendment. Table 4 shows the 
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voting positions of Democrats who voted against the Stupak Amendment but also voted 
against either Reform bill. 
The Stupak Amendment 
36 of 98 Catholic Democrats in the House voted for the Stupak Amendment. This is 
a similar percentage as United Methodist Democrats; 7 out of 23 voted for the Stupak 
Amendment. However, most of the United Methodist Democrats who voted for the Stupak 
Amendment were in tight re-election campaigns, as evidenced by the fact that many were 
defeated in 2010. While the majority of Catholic Democrats who voted for the Stupak 
amendment were also in particularly difficult re-election campaigns, especially in 2010 
which was already looking to be a difficult midterm election, about a dozen appeared to be 
relatively safe. Meanwhile, four out of five Southern Baptist Democrats voted for the Stupak 
Amendment (Strode 2010). They were all relatively junior members with tough re-election 
campaigns. The fifth Southern Baptist, Al Green, is African-American and from a safely 
Democratic district. He would go on to be the only Southern Baptist Democrat to vote in 
favor of both versions of the health care bill as well. Only two black Protestants voted for 
the Stupak Amendment (Artur Davis is African-American but in a mainline denomination). 
House Health Care Bill 
Only 8 of 98 Catholic Democrats voted against the House’s version of the health 
care bill, right after the vote on the Stupak Amendment. This included all three southern 
Catholic Democrats in Congress. Of these, 6 had voted for the Stupak Amendment. All 
except Tim Holden of Pennsylvania were in vulnerable districts, as evidenced by the fact 
that most were defeated or retired in the next election cycles. They all cited concerns about 
cost, the workability of the system, Cadillac taxes, or the concerns of their constituencies as 
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causes, with none citing abortion. Some Catholic Democrats needed persuasion to vote for 
both this bill and the March 2010 bill, especially Dennis Cardoza and Henry Cuellar 
(O’Connor 2010). 8 of 23 United Methodist Democrats opposed the bill, 4 of whom voted 
for the Stupak Amendment. They also expressed concerns about constituent reaction, as well 
as cost and other economic factors. Four of five Southern Baptist Democrats voted against 
the bill. Protestant denominations besides the Methodists and Southern Baptists do not keep 
track of their members of Congress internally, and have fewer members in Congress, so they 
will be left out of this research. 
When comparing Catholics and Methodists, the higher level of Catholic support for 
the bill, with inclusion of anti-abortion provisions, is quite significant. Since all but one 
Catholic Republican was unwilling to support health care reform, these findings are not 
conclusive regarding a higher likelihood of Catholic elites in general to support health care 
reform, but it does display significant agreement among Catholic Democratic politicians. 
United Methodist Democrats, by contrast, contained a faction which voted against the 
progressive wishes of its denominational Washington office. 
Senate Health Care Reform 
One of the most specific interventions by Christian clergy was done to attempt to 
sway the vote of John Adler, the only Jewish Democrat to vote against health care. Local 
clergy met with him, but Adler stated that he was concerned about the impact of the law on 
small business, and refused to change his vote (Jewish Exponent). There are indications that 
Roman Catholic, Methodist and Baptist clergy lobbied congressional Democrats, but little to 
no specific information about the lobbying of each representative. 
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When comparing the November 2009 vote on the House bill and the March 2010 
vote on the final bill, the four anti-reform Southern Baptist Democrats again voted as a 
block against the bill. Two of them mentioned the issue of abortion, but all cited economic 
concerns as primary reasons (Strode 2010). Among Catholic Democrats, two representatives 
changed their votes from No to Yes, while four representatives, including Republican Anh 
Cao, changed their vote from Yes to No. Cao stated that he was a strong supporter of the 
Stupak Amendment (The Hill). Among the new No votes, Mike Arcuri did not vote for the 
Stupak Amendment, so abortion was not a factor for him. Lipinski and Lynch are interesting 
cases for analysis, as they are from relatively uncompetitive districts, and in fact still remain 
in Congress. They both state that they are pro-life, but Lynch did not mention abortion in his 
statements against the Senate bill, focusing on financial concerns (Moskowitz 2013). 
Lipinski highlighted his opposition based on the exclusion of the Stupak Amendment, but 
also expressed other concerns (Kass 2010). John Kass, interviewing Lipinski for an Opinion 
column in the Chicago Tribune, quoted Lipinski as stating that he liked some aspects of the 
bill, such as providing insurance coverage, but also asserted that the bill was “financially 
unsustainable” and would result in coverage being taken from senior citizens. Lipinski 
certainly did express that the Church’s teaching on abortion played a part in his vote, and 
Kass notes that Lipinski’s district is predominantly Catholic. Thus, Stephen Lynch and Dan 
Lipinski are closest to what the Bishops would consider model legislators, but even they 
acted for other reasons besides support for the Catholic Church’s position. It is difficult to 
disentangle whether they would have agreed to reluctantly support the bill if stricter abortion 
language was added, or if some of their financial concerns were addressed without stricter 
abortion language. 
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The Hill’s Whip Count mentioned about a dozen other Democrats who were 
considering voting against the bill because of their strong support of the Stupak 
Amendment; all were Catholic except Nick Rahall, a Presbyterian who voted Yes, and 
Marion Berry, a Methodist who switched his vote from Yes to No. 
Among Catholics who switched their votes from No to Yes, Markey did not vote for 
the Stupak Amendment, but Boccieri did. President Obama and Speaker Pelosi worked hard 
to lobby Boccieri and Jason Altmire, another junior pro-life Catholic Democrat. When 
expressing his opposition to the bill, Altmire primarily expressed concerns about his 
constituents and financial flaws rather than highlighting his anti-abortion stance. 
Among United Methodists, Marion Berry was the only switch from Yes to No. On 
the other hand, Bart Gordon from Tennessee (who announced his retirement), Alan Boyd of 
Florida and Suzanne Kosmas of Florida, all changed their votes from No to Yes. This shows 
some correlation, if not evidence, indicating that the United Methodist Church may have 
engaged in successful lobbying. 
Aftermath 
  The Jesuit magazine America produced an editorial disagreeing with the Bishops’ 
position, to which the Bishops responded. In May 2010, Bishops Murphy, DiNardo and 
Wester released a statement entitled “Bishops Note Way Forward with Health Care, Clarify 
Misconceptions.” The Bishops declared that they have teaching authority over the Church, 
and expressed disappointment with those who did not understand Catholic moral theology 
enough to take the Bishops’ concerns about abortion seriously. They also reiterated that they 
had a deliberate strategy to keep issues of abortion, conscience and immigration together. 
They stated that they would not support repeal of the health care law, but instead would 
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work for passage in Congress of new laws amending the objectionable parts of the law. 
Father Thomas Reese, a political scientist and Jesuit magazine editor, disagreed, saying that 
the Bishops “do not have the charism of interpreting legislative language” (National 
Catholic Reporter). 
Since 2010, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops has remained somewhat 
involved in health care policy after the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, even aside from the abortion issue. Since 2011, there have been fewer updates to 
the USCCB website in the section on health care, almost all of which have been related to 
discussion of abortion and contraception mandates. Nearly all of the statements of the 
Catholic Bishops on their website since 2011 have been related to their fight with the Obama 
administration over mandated contraception coverage. Representatives of the Catholic 
Bishops and evangelical organizations have testified at numerous congressional hearings on 
this topic. In May 2011, however, Bishop Stephen Blair, the new chair of the Domestic 
Justice Committee, released a letter to the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
opposing the State Flexibility Act, which could allow states to cut Medicaid and CSHIP 
funding, depriving many elderly, pregnant women, disabled people and children of 
healthcare. Additionally, in February 2013, the USCCB released a backgrounder advocating 
that all states should expand Medicaid coverage. This document contained a “What You Can 
Do” section, indicating that all those wishing to become involved should work with their 
state conference of bishops on this matter. Mainline denominations, meanwhile, have been 
less outspoken on the issue of health care. 
There is a potential opening for religious lobbying at the state level, as governors and 
legislators can decide whether to take Medicaid expansions which are available through the 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Ohio governor John Kasich, a Republican, has 
repeatedly used religious rhetoric to justify his decision to approve the expansions (Los 
Angeles Times 7/21/2015). However, there is little evidence of religious engagement in 
lobbying regarding these issues, at least through research of news media and religious 
advocacy websites. More research is needed to confirm this, however. 
Conclusion 
Evidence from books, magazines, Congressional records, and other primary and 
secondary sources has indicated that theological considerations have dictated the positions 
of denominations on health care reform. An unwillingness to compromise, also largely 
based on ethical concerns, a lack of sufficiently strong public opinion in favor of reform, and 
a lack of viable partnerships at the elite level, all played a part in limiting the ability of 
mainline Protestant and Catholic organizations to lobby in favor of health reform. 
The Catholic Health Association has clearly been the most influential religious 
organization on health care policy, and its influence arguably became critical to the passage 
of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, in a debate involving a high level of 
salience and a wide-ranging universe of interest groups. The Catholic Health Association 
conducted itself in ways that would be expected to yield success according to interest group 
literature cited in Hofrening (1995). It maintains a narrow focus on hospital administration 
and health care coverage. It uses insider tactics such as meetings with policy makers, while 
also using outside lobbying tactics such as communication with the media, its constituents 
and its coalition partners. It represents a trade group (Catholic health care facilities), and 
thus may appear to be more suited to the details of lobbying than the “prophetic lobbyists” 
representing religious organizations. At the same time, by most accounts it remained true to 
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the theological goals of its denomination. Finally, it established itself as a negotiating 
partner with moderate Catholic Democrats whose votes were critical to passing the bill. 
The US Conference of Catholic Bishops devoted more effort to insider tactics in 
2010 than other religious organizations, in addition to more peripheral tactics used by the 
Protestant denominations such as writing form letters to Congress and public rallies. They 
worked to lobby particular members of Congress, including the Speaker of the House. At the 
same time, the Catholic Church worked to consolidate support within the Church itself. The 
United Methodist Church also attempted to do this, with mixed success. Additionally, the 
Catholic Bishops narrowed their focus, a task which they have often found hard. By 
focusing completely on removing funding from the health care bill, they shifted debate 
toward the abortion issue, which is theologically most important for them, and though they 
did not consider their efforts successful, they became a significant player in the outcome of 
the legislation. On the other hand, their focus on the abortion issue arguably detracted from 
their efforts to pursue more progressive health care policy, which they, and some but not all 
of their Democratic supporters in Congress, truly did want. This case is an exception to the 
rule that Catholic Charities successfully moves their denomination toward a progressive 
policy. While unlike evangelicals, Catholic bishops did not have a theological commitment 
opposing health care reform, their prioritization of abortion was strong enough to overcome 
the preferences of a majority of members, their theological commitments, and the general 
interests of their charitable agencies on issues not related to reproductive health. 
Meanwhile, mainline Protestant denominations had more influence on the health care 
debate in 1994, when the White House actively worked to gain their support, than in 2009. 
Though mainline Protestants were able to mobilize their network of supporters toward a 
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more united position in 2009, the Obama administration and congressional Democrats 
generally focused more on their relationship with the CHA. In neither year was it 
demonstrated that lobbying by mainline denominations, or efforts by mainline 
denominations to mobilize their congregations, contributed to changes in the content of the 
health care bill, or in changing congressional votes. Meanwhile, evangelical opposition to 
reform was somewhat less influential in 2009 because of the decline of the Christian 
Coalition, but conservative theological interpretations of government contributed 
significantly to the debate. Overall, religious groups appear to have had more involvement in 
the debate on federal health care than on minimum wage policy at the federal level, but less 
than their involvement on welfare policy, with the exception of the debate on abortion 
coverage. 
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Chapter 4: Welfare Reform 
Protecting the Shrinking Welfare State 
Other policy chapters in this project will examine government regulations on 
employers designed to protect the working poor (minimum wage policy), or one particularly 
difficult expense for many poor people (health care). This chapter examines religious efforts 
to support a safety net of direct payments by the government to specific poor individuals and 
families. Chapter 2 described how religious groups largely came to support welfare 
programs by developing theological responses to economic and social crises and seeking 
solutions to the problem of over-burdened religious charitable agencies; meanwhile, 
mobilization of theological conservatives, an overall backlash against the welfare state, and 
opportunities for direct aid to faith-based organizations fostered skepticism of welfare policy 
in many conservative Christian circles. 
This chapter will focus on the substantial efforts of progressive Protestant 
organizations, the Catholic bishops and Catholic Charities to protect welfare and especially 
food stamps. Their positions are based on the premise that there should be a minimum 
standard of living for all (particularly children), that full employment is impossible to 
achieve (especially without significant government investment), that religious charities 
cannot deal with the needs of the poor without government assistance, and that welfare 
encourages family stability. The Catholic Bishops are particularly concerned about the 
impact of welfare cuts on abortion rates. The strategies of religious progressives have shifted 
several times in the past two decades. During the Clinton administration, the Catholic 
Bishops cultivated a unique alliance with pro-choice advocates to highlight the possibility 
that cuts in welfare could lead to higher abortion rates. Meanwhile, mainline Protestants 
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cultivated a close alliance with the Children’s Defense Fund, and Catholic Charities was at 
the forefront of efforts by religious charitable organizations to oppose welfare reform. These 
efforts were meant to persuade lawmakers that religious charities could not replace 
governmental programs, and that thus the government must uphold its duty to the poor. 
During the Bush administration, religious charities, along with mainline and Catholic 
denominational organizations, argued for re-authorization of welfare programs, based on the 
understanding that Bush’s proposal for faith-based partnerships could not replace 
government programs. Eventually, as the promise of faith-based partnerships foundered, 
some moderate conservatives began engaging with more progressive religious charities on 
the issue of poverty. 
By the first term of the Obama administration and the Republican recapture of 
Congress in 2010, when cuts to welfare were threatened again, the National Association of 
Evangelicals was ready to cooperate with mainline Protestants and Catholics. This time, the 
arguments were less centered on the issues of charitable needs, even though religious 
charities were still quite involved. Nor did the arguments focus on the abortion issue, even 
though abortion remained politically salient. Rather, the new coalition, the Circle of 
Protection, returned to more traditional moral arguments combined with economic claims 
that there were better ways to deal with the national debt than cutting programs for the poor 
in order to decrease it in the short-term. The Circle of Protection took this approach because 
arguing based on the debt issue was the best way to capture the attention of both their new 
evangelical allies and their Republican opponents. Nevertheless, many religious 
conservatives, especially but not exclusively evangelicals, have continued to maintain their 
argument that welfare does not provide incentives for work and family formation, while 
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putting the government deeper into debt. These concerns of religious conservatives about 
hard work and family values have set the tone for Republican rhetoric and led to the 
implementation of some of the Christian Coalition’s welfare reform recommendations. 
However, conservative religious groups on their own have lobbied less than religious 
progressives on the specific issue of welfare. All in all, though theological interpretations 
motivate political positioning on welfare, the interests of religious charities and relationships 
with coalition partners usually determine the extent of lobbying efforts. 
This chapter will show how these dynamics have continued since the beginning of 
the Clinton administration, with a focus on the battles over the 1996 Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act, and the raising of the debt ceiling between 2011 and 2013. It 
will focus on two federal programs which are designed for the most disadvantaged; 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF, previously AFDC, and also sometimes known as 
welfare) which provides payments to families, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP, previously and sometimes still colloquially known as food stamps) which 
provides vouchers for food to individuals and families. The 1996 Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act strictly curtailed the use of these programs and devolved the 
administration of TANF to the states, but also provided limited funding to develop 
mechanisms for people on welfare to find jobs. The chapter will consider the primary 
questions of religious involvement in welfare and food stamp protection first by examining 
the legislative history and recent public opinion polling, and then by analyzing religious 
lobbying during the battle over the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, the 
following decade’s reauthorization battles, and efforts to increase the debt ceiling during the 
Obama administration. 
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Legislative History 
The Aid to Dependent Children Program was created in 1935 as part of the Social 
Security Act, primarily to provide benefits for widows with children (Katz 1996). It was 
expanded in the 1960s as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, by which 
time single mothers also became eligible. It was among programs which faced budget cuts in 
the 1980s. In the 1996 welfare reform legislation, it was abolished and was replaced by 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). (Katz 1996; Trattner 1999). Food stamps were 
first created during the New Deal. After two decades without them, they were reinstated as a 
pilot program in 1961 and passed as a permanent program in 1964 as part of the War on 
Poverty. They were reformed as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act in 1996 (including time limits and spending cuts), and again in 2008 when the name of 
the program was changed to SNAP. 
Guaranteed Income and other Pre-Reagan Reform Efforts 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1969 the Nixon administration was interested in 
creating a Family Assistance Program, which was supported by the United States Catholic 
Conference and the National Council of Churches (McAndrews 2012). Also known as a 
negative income tax, such a program would insure that all families earned a minimum 
annual income proportionate to its size. Those who were able to work but whose jobs did not 
provide wages higher than the minimum income could receive welfare benefits up to the 
minimal income level. These efforts failed as some liberals refused to support the bill unless 
it provided higher benefits and many conservatives turned against it for fiscal cost reasons. 
The FAP debates finally resulted in the passage of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 1975. 
EITC was expanded in 1986, 1990, 1993, 2001 and 2009, usually with bipartisan support, 
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but with significant haggling on details, with Republicans often opposing attempts to give 
poor families higher refunds than the income they earned  (Faler 2015). The issues of 
income tax credits and welfare programs such as food stamps have lately become 
intertwined as they often are under threat from the same budget cutting proposals. 
Welfare Reform 
Bill Clinton promised to “end welfare as we know it” in his 1992 election campaign, 
and Republicans had welfare reform as a priority after the 1994 elections. The Republicans’ 
Contract with America, its policy platform for the 1994 election campaign, included 
promises to cut welfare programs and mandate that all those receiving government 
assistance should work. In 1995, Congress passed the Work Opportunity Act (HR 4), which 
was vetoed by the President. After Clinton vetoed welfare reform a second time, Congress 
passed a modified version, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (HR 
3734) in August 1996, which Clinton signed. The most significant provisions included the 
end of AFDC, to be replaced by TANF. TANF became a block grant, to be distributed to 
states which could develop their own programs. Generally speaking, most Democrats 
wanted to keep more programs administered at the federal level and add more mandates for 
people whom states had to cover or provide alternative support such as job training to 
replace federal programs that had been cut. Republicans generally wanted to move more 
federal programs to the states, while adding some categories of people which states did not 
have to, or in a few cases, could not cover. However, there was negotiation between 
moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans about some of the details of federal 
mandates. In a major concession to Democrats, food stamps were kept under federal 
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administration; this was a key demand of religious interest groups generally opposed to 
reform. However, funding for the food stamp program was cut (Perr 1996C). 
In a victory for conservatives, a strict time limit of five years was introduced as a 
federal mandate to all states for a person to be covered by TANF. States were also 
incentivized to implement work requirements as soon as possible, along with job training 
programs, into their welfare programs; the job training programs had general bipartisan 
support. States gained significant power to remove eligibility before time limits. 
Among the most significant disputes within Congress, and within the religious 
community, regarded the issue of family caps. In the final outcome, states were given the 
power to refuse increases to mothers who have more children while on welfare, but these 
“family caps” were not mandated federally as some conservatives had wanted.  In a 
compromise, mothers under 18 were required by federal rules to live with their parents and 
stay in school to receive benefits, while states had the discretion to set family caps or not. 
Funds for immigrants were cut. Additional child support enforcement was also added as an 
effort to generate income for single mothers. (Pear 1996C). 
The House’s welfare bills were always more conservative than the Senate’s. Largely 
for this reason, many Senate Democrats supported welfare reform in all Senate votes. In the 
House, small numbers of House Democrats voted for welfare reform bills until the final 
conference report for HR 3734, when exactly half of House Democrats supported it. 
Welfare Reform Bill # of Democrats voting yes 
House Version of HR 4 9 
House Conference Report of HR 4 17 
House Version of HR 3734 30 
Conference Report of HR 3734 98 (And 98 voted no.) 
Table 2: Number of Democrats voting in favor of welfare reform bills. 
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While some Republicans were also divided on specific proposals, as will be discussed 
below, the party was almost entirely united on all floor votes. 
In 2002, TANF came up for reauthorization. Senate Democrats blocked passage of 
Republican proposals which would have further cut the program, and Congress continued to 
fund the program through temporary measures until 2005. TANF was eventually included in 
the budget reconciliation bill for 2006 (Massaro 2007). In 2010, it was quietly reauthorized 
by President Obama and the Democratic Congress as part of budget reconciliation. Since 
2010, TANF has again been funded by temporary measures (The Washington Post Editorial 
Board 2015). 
Clinton’s Welfare Reform 
Was Religious Lobbying Effective? 
The Clinton administration began on a note of promise for collaboration with 
religious progressives. This period was a time of flux and reorganization for interfaith 
advocacy groups, as Interfaith Impact, profiled in Chapter 2, was on the brink of collapse. 
During the 1992 election campaign, the National Council of Churches and the Catholic 
Bishops had begun a joint initiative with Jewish groups to discuss poverty (Cornell 1992B). 
The result of these efforts was a conference in June 1993. The coalition, known as the 
Common Ground for the Common Good, was planned to be the most significant 
collaboration between mainline Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and other religious groups since 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Following the 1993 conference, it released a 
statement calling for strong efforts on behalf of the poor (Episcopal Archives 1993, The 
Christian Century 2/1994). 
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As was discussed in the chapter on health care, religious progressives initially had 
significant access to Clinton administration officials; religious lobbyists described to Tipton 
(2007) how a variety of policy makers repeatedly asked religious leaders for ideas, including 
on the issue of poverty. The fallout of the health care reform debate and the 1994 elections 
limited this access by the time of the welfare reform debate (Tipton 2007). The new promise 
of interfaith coalitions also foundered. NCC secretary Joan Brown Campbell continued to 
tout the significance of the Common Ground group, although their statements received little 
media attention. Many of the same groups eventually founded other organizations, such as 
Interfaith Alliance (The Christian Century 4/26/1994), and the Cry for Renewal (later the 
long-term viable organization Call to Renewal, to be discussed below). These groups were 
founded with the specific intention of protecting social welfare programs from threatened 
cuts, and urging more governmental aid to the poor. On the ecumenical side, dominated this 
time by progressive mainline clergy and evangelical progressive Jim Wallis, the newly 
established Cry for Renewal had meetings with congressional leaders in June 1995 (The 
Christian Century 6/7/1995). 
Yet when the Republican Party threatened the welfare system which mainline and 
Catholic organizations were determined to preserve, religious organizations working on 
behalf of the poor appear to have lost much of their access, and could mobilize little support 
from their rank and file that might have helped them maintain it. Religious lobbyists 
themselves, media accounts, and some Democratic politicians, argued that lobbying by 
progressive organizations, implicitly including religious groups, was ineffective. In May 
1995, Sharon Daley, a lobbyist for Catholic Charities, told The Washington Post that 
Catholic Charities and other advocates for the poor were largely excluded from the process, 
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stating regarding committee hearings, “we had to fight to testify, and when we did it was at 
8 o’clock at night after almost all the members and all the press had gone, despite the fact 
that Catholic Charities is the largest provider of services in the country and one in four 
Americans is Roman Catholic.” Daley also pointed out that Catholic Charities was even 
largely ignored by Republicans on the issue of abortion (Vobejda and Havemann 1995). 
Gring-Pemble (2003), who conducted a scholarly study of committee hearings on 
welfare reform in 1995-1996, verifies that Republicans exerted significant control over the 
invitation and placement of hearing witnesses. While the Contract with America hearings in 
early 1995 included a panel entirely of religious witnesses, many of whom were against 
welfare reform proposals, the influence of religious progressives declined after this point. In 
fact, the hearings on welfare reform were among the first applications of new congressional 
procedures implemented by the Republican Congress. As Sinclair (2006), Mann and 
Ornstein (2006) and other literature on Congress describes, the new procedures 
disadvantaged minority interests by limiting opportunities for the Democrats to invite and 
select the most appropriate times for sympathetic hearing witnesses to testify. It is possible, 
then, that some of the weakness of religious group was more a failure to immediately adapt 
their lobbying techniques than a lack of organization and commitment. 
In October 1995, as welfare reform negotiations between the two houses of Congress 
and the President coincided with budget negotiations and a government shutdown,  Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan gained wide media attention as he lamented the silence of 
“flaunted, vaunted advocacy groups” (Havemann 1995; Lewan 1995B). A Democratic 
Senate aid stated that religious and other welfare reform opponents had generated “very little 
mail, very few phone calls, and only muted lobbying on behalf of their position” (Havemann 
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1995). In November, The New York Times still perceived liberal groups to be largely absent, 
quoting religious lobbyists as being overwhelmed by the wholesale attack on long-standing 
social programs and a lack of public support (Lewan 1995B). On December 9, a protest by 
Sojourners and other religious progressives, in which they were voluntarily arrested at the 
Capitol, received coverage in The New York Times, but “made barely a ripple”; it was not 
seen by any lawmakers and did not distinguish itself from other protests on the Capitol 
grounds that day (Clines 1995). NCC general secretary Joan Brown Campbell claimed after 
the passage of welfare reform that the lobbying effort by religious groups was poor, as she 
had done when health care reform failed. In interviews provided by Tipton from 1997, she 
asked “did he [Clinton] get hundreds of phone calls? No” and “If he had been more highly 
praised for vetoing the first bill, he may not have signed it later.” 
On the other hand, religious groups, especially Catholics, maintained influence 
through their private charities, which dominated congressional hearing testimony by 
denominational organizations. They argued that it would be unjust to deprive the poor of 
these necessary programs. But rather than focusing on morality based on religious 
perspectives, they focused on rebutting the arguments of some conservatives who believed 
that religious groups themselves should take over from government programs, by proving 
that religious charities would be unable to take up all of the work done by government 
programs, lacking both financial resources and trained social workers. Religious groups, 
especially mainline denominations and private charities, worked in coalition with the 
Children’s Defense Fund to make this case and to achieve some of the concessions to 
Democrats which were included in the final welfare reform bill, most notably the continued 
federal administration of the food stamp program. The other significant work by religious 
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organizations was the work of the Catholic Church, as a very important part of a coalition 
with pro-life organizations, on the specific issue of family caps in welfare, resulting in some 
concessions that can be attributed largely to their efforts. Catholic emphasis on the family 
cap issue was the result of Catholic prioritization of the abortion issue, a desire to follow up 
on the progressive economic rhetoric in their recent documents, and a desire to counter the 
narrative put forward by evangelicals and some conservative Catholics that welfare is 
harmful to family values. However, it is clear that mainline and Catholic groups largely 
failed in their efforts to increase food stamp benefits, include more lenient provisions for 
work requirements of mothers and time limits for benefits, and increase funding for job 
training programs. The expertise of charitable agencies, and the emphasis of the Catholic 
Church on family cap provisions, show how ineffectively religious organizations were in 
framing welfare as a social justice issue. 
The Strategies and Impact of Charitable Institutions 
Religious charities, as usual, sought to link moral concern for the plight of the poor 
with information about the limited capacity of religious groups to help the poor. An August 
1995 letter to Congress from an interfaith coalition of Catholic, mainline Protestant and 
black Protestant religious denominations and charitable institutions exemplifies this effort, 
stating: “We are gravely concerned that some current proposals rely on the idea that the 
religious community can provide for those who will ‘fall through the cracks’ of the safety 
net, cracks created by proposed reforms now before Congress. In fact, over the last decade, 
our social service providers have experienced a marked increase in the demand for our 
services, which are now operating at full capacity. Many of these services, in fact, are 
currently a partnership between government and religious bodies, dependent upon 
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government funding. A recent study on the effect of the proposed budgetary reforms by 
Independent Sector reveals that charitable contributions would have to double over the next 
seven years in order to compensate for the massive cuts proposed by the House. Since the 
present system severely challenges the religious community’s ability to meet the needs of 
the country's poor, we fear that the current proposals would completely overwhelm our 
resources for serving the needy.” 
Committee hearing testimony and letters to Congress provided lawmakers and their 
staff with specific, practical information; that religious charities cannot compensate for 
decreased government programs, and that job training programs as proposed in legislation 
would not lead to full employment, and thus would lead to many still needing some sort of 
comprehensive assistance through little to no fault of their own. 
Media accounts regarding opposition to welfare reform frequently quoted religious 
charities warning that they would be unable to provide programs to serve those whom 
government would not cover. Freudenheim (1996) profiled concerns by a variety of 
religious charities about upcoming budget cuts to poverty programs, which motivated 
actions by the NCC and Catholic organizations. In 1995, Catholic Charities president Fred 
Kammer told The Washington Post that religious charities provide a “tattered patchwork” of 
services, usually limited to supplementary items and resolving emergencies. “What none of 
us do is to provide regular income to poor families. I speak here for everybody—Catholic, 
Protestant, Salvation Army, Jews, evangelicals. Nobody has that kind of money.” 
(Goodstein 1995B). 
Catholic Charities distinguished itself as the most organized promoter of this point of 
view in the halls of Congress. Rosenfeld (1995), in a profile of Catholic Charities lobbyist 
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Sharon Daley, describes how, by the summer of 1995,  Daley was undertaking congressional 
lobbying efforts on the issue of welfare reform daily, including informal and formal 
meetings with congressional lobbyists and their staffs, testifying at hearings, and compiling 
statistics about welfare. There are examples of Catholic Charities serving as the only 
religious witnesses at hearings on welfare reform in early 1995. Fred Kammer, the director 
of Catholic Charities testified again in February before the House Subcommittee on 
Department Operations of the Agriculture Committee (Reforming the Present Welfare 
System, 1995). 
Lobbying on behalf of the poor by religious charities was certainly not limited to the 
heads of the national Catholic charitable agency. Particularly during the early stages of the 
legislative consideration, when opportunities to testify at hearings were somewhat more 
open, a variety of Catholic and Protestant organizations shared with congressional 
committees the difficulties that welfare reform would cause. Although the influence of this 
testimony appears to have ben limited, as it received few media mentions or citations in later 
books, it is worth noting as a clear attempt at lobbying. Religious leaders, primarily 
associated with charities, were included as nearly an entire panel in one of the first 
congressional hearings on the topic of welfare reform after the beginning of the 1995 
Congressional sessions; before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, regarding the Republican Contract with America plan. Though 
Catholic Father Robert Cirico of the Acton Institute was in favor of reform, the rest of the 
witnesses (representatives of Catholic Charities, Lutheran Welfare Services and a non-
denominational charity called Feed the Children) expressed concerns about reform proposals 
(Contract with America and Welfare Reform 1995). 
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Protestant Reverend Donald Roberts of Goodwill Industries, Catholic Sister Mary 
McGeady of Covenant House (a charity for troubled youth), and John Carr, director of the 
Catholic Bishops office of Social Development, testified before the Senate Finance 
Committee in March 1995 (Welfare Reform and Interested Organizations, 1995). While 
these testimonies included exhortations for the federal government to set a moral priority of 
taking care of the poor, they were dominated by observations from those working directly 
with the poor on personal responsibility, and ways in which welfare is required to meet basic 
needs. The prevalence of charity directors, above bishops, denominational heads and other 
administrative clergy, indicated that members of Congress were primarily interested in 
receiving information about direct work by religious organizations with the poor, rather than 
moral statements. 
As the legislative process moved on, progressive religious organizations worked with 
secular allies in the charitable field.  These included think tanks such as the Center for 
Budget and Policy Priorities and the Urban Institute, which produced statistics on poverty 
shared by religious groups (Tipton 2007). But it was the Children’s Defense Fund which 
appears based on media reports to be the most important partner. In early October, Religious 
groups were represented along with civil rights and other advocacy groups at a press 
conference organized by the Children’s Defense Fund, calling for President Clinton to veto 
the reform bill passed by Congress (Havemann 1995). The religious call for a veto was 
again publicized at a second press conference with the Children’s Defense Fund (Steinfels 
1995B), whose director, Marian Wright Edelman, wrote an open letter to President Clinton 
stating that welfare reform violated God’s command to protect children. The National 
Council of Churches’ primary contribution to the coalition was a letter signed by the leaders 
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from a cross-section of many of its denominations urging him to veto any bill, whether 
welfare reform or budget balancing legislation, which cut services to the poor. Earned 
Income Tax Credits and food stamps were among those specifically mentioned (The 
Christian Century 10/6/1995). In early November, The National Council of Churches, now 
joined by the national Congress of Black Churches and Catholic bishop Joseph Sullivan (the 
Bishops’ liaison to Catholic Charities) again asked President Clinton to veto even the more 
moderate, Senate version of the welfare bill (Shogren 1995B). In mid-November, the 
National Council of Church’s administrative board met and passed resolutions criticizing 
budget cuts. Joan Brown Campbell was among a dozen NCC leaders, including mainline 
Protestant, black Protestant and Orthodox clergy, who also met with Clinton to discuss 
budget and welfare reform proposals (The Christian Century 12/6/1995). Unlike a similar 
meeting with Catholic bishops to be discussed below, the meeting with NCC leaders on 
November 18, did not generate national media attention from The New York Times, The 
Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times, but still represented efforts by the White 
House to communicate with religious progressives. But The New York Times claimed that it 
was specifically Children’s Defense Fund director Edelman’s letter which inspired Clinton’s 
veto (Pear 1996A).  Thus, while mainline Protestant groups by themselves were not a 
significant lobbying voice, they played a supporting role in a coalition which fought off, 
though temporarily, a serious attack on the welfare system. Tipton (2007) notes that the 
coalition between mainline and black Protestants and the Children’s Defense Fund was a 
loose, temporary one. Tipton quotes mainline lobbyists as being generally positive towards 
the CDF, but also frustrated with the CDF’s tendency to side with Catholic agencies over 
mainline Protestant denominations on issues such as regulations of adoption agencies. 
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Religious charitable organizations had less influence at committee hearings in early 
1996 than they had the previous year, but Catholics associated with charitable agencies still 
made some appearances. In February 1996, Father Fred Kammer, director of Catholic 
Charities, testified at a Senate Finance committee hearing opposing a proposal by the 
National Governor’s Association which was designed to give states control of welfare. In 
March 1996, Sister Mary McGeady testified at a hearing of the House Subcommittee on 
Human Resources on the relationship between poverty and illegitimacy. 
In May 1996, Sharon Daley of Catholic Charities noted that President Clinton was 
more favorable to entitlement reform than Catholic Charities would like, but, incorrectly, 
doubted that he would sign welfare reform into law. The Bishops and Catholic Charities 
continued to lobby against the proposal of turning federal programs into block grants for the 
states, arguing that federal guaranteed entitlements were necessary to protect the welfare of 
children (Jones 1996B). It was Bread for the World, the ecumenical food policy 
organization, which put forth the most significant grassroots lobbying efforts. It mobilized 
44000 calls to the White House urging a veto of the welfare reform bill (Vobejda 1996A). 
Evangelical conservatives, with a few conservative allies in other religious traditions, 
were conspicuous by their unwillingness to join such coalitions. While some groups such as 
the NAE and SBC tried to avoid taking a position, Organizations such as the Christian 
Coalition lent religious backing to conservative portrayals of welfare recipients. As will be 
discussed below, they argued that the failure of the poor to keep and form stable families is a 
primary reason for the cycles of generational poverty, and that governmental programs 
perpetuate such cycles. Evangelical support of conservative welfare reform proposals, as 
noted above, included arguments that welfare discourages work and family values among 
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the poor, and that churches can handle much of the work done by public aid. The Christian 
Coalition supported welfare reform in its Contract with the American Family and even made 
detailed suggestions about work requirements and time limits which were largely 
implemented. It advocated for the replacement of welfare with a system of “faith-based 
compassion.” 
Catholics Advocate beyond Charitable Interests 
   At least in terms of federal welfare policy, the most substantial activity not directly 
connected to charitable institutions and secular coalition partners was dominated by the 
Catholic Bishops’ concern about welfare leading to increased abortion rates. To be sure, 
however, there were some efforts by the Bishops to oppose welfare reform as a whole, based 
on overall concerns about social justice. Catholic bishops were also at the forefront of 
opposition to welfare reform at the state level, which was often tied to the federal welfare 
reform project. The Catholic Bishops released its Policy Priorities for welfare reform in 
March 1995, and a shorter statement following the US Catholic Conference’s spring 
administrative board meeting, declaring its support for ‘genuine’ welfare reform, but 
opposition to current legislative proposals. It called for state and local block grants only with 
significant planning and resources, and argued for child enforcement, marriage incentives, 
and Earned Income and child tax credits to be increased (O’Brien 1995). Senator Moynihan 
and Catholic Conference social development director John Carr discussed this statement at 
the March 1995 Senate Finance Committee hearing. 
The United States Catholic Conference, represented by Cardinal William Keeler, 
clarified the following day that it was not yet calling for a veto; instead it wished to wait 
until the outcome of conference negotiations. However, the Fall 1995 meeting of the 
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Conference of Catholic Bishops, as described by Anderson (1995), took place from 
November 13 to 18, shortly after Pope John Paul II’s visit to the United States and amidst a 
continuing political crisis over budget negotiations between Congress and the President. 
These factors served as opportunities for Cardinal Roger Mahoney and other more 
progressive bishops to successfully change the meeting agenda to address welfare reform, in 
order to maximize the Bishops’ political influence.  The Bishops passed a letter encouraging 
the President to veto a Republican plan to balance the budget within seven years that 
included cuts to welfare and no tax relief for the working poor. Cardinal Keeler released a 
statement calling on both parties to support services for the poor, and the new President of 
the Conference, Bishop Anthony Pilla, visited the White House specifically to discuss 
welfare with President Clinton. During Senate debate over the final bill on August 4, 1996, 
Senator Moynihan read a letter from Anthony Pilla of the Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
in a speech which was reproduced in The Washington Post (Moynihan 1996). In a message 
expressing disappointment after President Clinton signed the bill in August 1996, Cardinal 
Bernard Law expressed concern that the law would result in increased poverty for “children 
born and unborn, their families, and those new to our shores” (The Christian Century 
8/14/1996).” These events indicate that the Catholic Church mobilized more activity, but it 
was primarily influential during the initial stages of introducing the bill, during a brief 
period coinciding with a government shutdown and a papal visit, and the passage of the bill. 
There were two fights at the state level which exemplified the Bishops’ broad 
approach to opposing welfare reform. In Pennsylvania, Catholic bishops opposed Governor 
Robert Casey’s plans to cut welfare in 1994. The disagreement between the Bishops and 
Casey is particularly interesting given that Casey was one of the few high-profile Democrats 
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to oppose abortion. In March 1995, Pennsylvania’s Catholic bishops, including Cardinal 
Anthony Bevelaqua of Philadelphia, backed the efforts of the Church at the federal level 
with grassroots action to protest both state and federal welfare cuts (Rosenberg and Macklin 
1995). In the summer of 1996, Catholic bishops unsuccessfully opposed Wisconsin’s 
welfare reform program, both at the legislative level and at the federal level when a 
regulatory board was faced with the decision to approve it. The Wisconsin episode gained 
media attention because the state’s welfare plan mirrored Republican proposals at the 
federal level, especially strict time limits for working mothers. Milwaukee’s Archbishop 
Rembert Weekland held a press conference in the center of Milwaukee, wrote an op-ed in 
The Washington Post, and made personal appeals to Wisconsin’s conservative Catholic 
governor, Tommy Thompson (Schaefer 1996; Weekland 1996; Yamane 2005). Thompson 
responded by declaring Weekland unfit to speak on economic policy, needling the 
archbishop for his academic work on early Christian chant (Yamane 2005). Most of the 
attention of religious groups was taken up by welfare reform at the federal level, but these 
state-level examples, which are difficult to find regarding mainline and evangelical 
organizations, indicate significant activism by the Catholic Bishops beyond the particular 
legislative battle over welfare reform. Yet, when examining The New York Times, The 
Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times, along with The National Catholic Reporter, 
there are few more examples of activity by state Catholic conferences during this period. 
The Problem of Abortion 
While the Catholic Bishops Conference, as mentioned above, certainly wished to 
incentivize marriage, along with providing a framework of social justice, its primary priority 
was finding ways to cut abortion rates, regardless of the familial structure of resulting 
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children. They were rarely more active on these efforts than during the period from 1995 to 
1996. The Catholic bishops also released statements opposing family cap proposals 
(Claiborne 1994), in a foreshadowing of one of the key debates of the 1995-1996 welfare 
reform battle. Early in 1995, when debate intensified about family cap provisions as 
legislative discussion on welfare reform began, The collaboration between pro-life groups 
(especially Catholic organizations) and pro-choice groups gained significant media attention 
(Goodstein 1995A; Shogren 1995A; Steinfels 1995A; Perr 1995A; Lewan 1995A). In late 
January, there were significant debates from within the pro-life movement at the March for 
Life in Washington DC.  On January 31, a joint statement was released by the US Catholic 
Bishops, Catholic Charities, Feminists for Life, and the National Right to Life Committee 
(Goodstein 1995A). Opposition to family caps was a primary topic in testimony by Catholic 
Charities at a Human Resources Subcommittee hearing (Contract with America 1995). In 
early March, Cardinal John O’Connor expressed concern about family caps and benefit cuts 
leading to increased abortion rates in a column for Catholic New York, which received New 
York Times coverage (Steinfels 1995A). He also expressed opposition to the Christian 
Coalition’s Contract with the American Family based on concerns about abortion rates 
(Walsh 2000). Lobbying intensified in subsequent days as the US Catholic Conference 
officially called for family caps to be taken out of legislation in official statements (Pear 
1995A; Lewan 1995A). 
One way that we can determine the high degree of influence by the Catholic Church 
on family cap policy as compared to other areas of welfare policy is that there was 
significant response by congressional Republicans, who were sharply divided in their 
approaches. House Human Resources subcommittee chair E. Clay Shaw responded 
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skeptically to the arguments of the Bishops (Shogren 1995A). However, at least three 
Republican congressmen (Christopher Smith, Henry Hyde and Jim Bunn) expressed support 
for the position of the Bishops (Steinfels 1995A; Pear 1995A).13 On March 20, House Rules 
committee chair Gerald Solomon moved, based on concerns about abortion rates, to ease 
restrictions on benefits for teen mothers and mothers of additional children in welfare reform 
proposals (Havemann and Devroy 1995). Months later, Senate Majority leader Bob Dole 
was persuaded by the efforts of Catholic Charities to avoid reducing or eliminating aid for 
mothers who have out-of-wedlock children while on welfare (Rosenfeld 1995, Vobejda 
1995) Congressional Democrats also provided some support to the Bishops’ efforts in 
opposition to family caps. On April 6, 1995, Senator Moynihan entered a statement in the 
Congressional Record by Albany Catholic bishop Howard Hubbard, who described his 
experiences working with pregnant teenage girls. Hubbard argued that single mothers often 
faced difficult circumstances before their pregnancies and rely on government aid to 
improve their own and their children’s lives. 
Following Clinton’s veto, the issue of abortion, especially concerning family caps, 
returned to prominence. In late January 1996, a variety of Catholic advocates both against 
abortion and for the poor testified before the House Human Resources Subcommittee, and 
also at a hearing for about 20 staffers of anti-abortion members of Congress (Jones 1996A). 
Representatives for the Catholic Bishops’ pro-life and Peace and Justice offices joined Fred 
Kammer and Sharon Daley of Catholic Charities and the executive of the National Right to 
Life Committee. They were again supported by Republican congressman Christopher Smith 
                                                 
13 Hyde and Smith were both Roman Catholics with long careers in Congress and were among the 
most frequent sponsors of anti-abortion legislation. Bunn, a freshman, was the only Republican not to sign the 
Contract with America, specifically because of concerns about welfare cuts leading to increased abortion rates. 
Smith introduced an amendment which would have provided funding to vouchers for needs specific to babies. 
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and Jim Bunn. They worked in a coalition with pro-choice advocates who testified at a 
hearing for House Democrats, putting forward recommendations against provisions in the 
Personal Responsibility Act which would have taken benefits from mothers who had more 
children while on welfare, mothers under 18, and mothers of children of unknown paternity. 
In the end, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act did not mandate 
that states include family caps in all states, as many conservatives would have preferred, but 
did allow states to implement them. While only a partial victory, this compromise is an 
example of influence by the Catholic Bishops and Catholic Charities. Mainline Protestants 
and other religious progressives also opposed family caps in their statements and letters to 
Congress, but Catholic opposition to family caps took most of the media attention and 
positive reactions from Congress. Arguments regarding these provisions were among few 
examples of congressional Republicans citing arguments of the Catholic bishops to 
moderate welfare reform. 
Evangelicals, while claiming to prioritize opposition to abortion, were far more 
interested in the formation of Christian families as a solution to poverty. Marvin Olasky’s 
1992 book The Tragedy of American Compassion states “Today's poor in the United States 
are the victims and perpetrators of illegitimacy and abandonment, family non-formation and 
malformation, alienation and loneliness and much else—but they are not suffering thirst, 
hunger, or nakedness, except by choice, insanity, or parental abuse” (as quoted in Walsh 
2000). 
Conservative Christians struggled to respond to the claims of Catholic and 
progressive activists, who argued that, because welfare provided a way for struggling single 
mothers to take care of children, it results in decreased abortion rates. At the beginning of 
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the battle over welfare reform in 1995, James Smith, director of government relations of the 
Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission, told The Washington Post that “You have 
competing social policy desires here: discouraging illegitimacy and at the same time not 
encouraging abortion” (Goodstein 1995C). Richard Land of the SBC’s Ethics and Religious 
Liberty Commission told The New York Times in 1995 that “we are going to do our best to 
have our cake and eat it too” referring to supporting welfare cuts which discourage 
illegitimacy without encouraging abortion (Lewan 1995A). Yet the Southern Baptist 
Convention, though a pillar of the conservative evangelical establishment, did not take a 
position on welfare reform. Father Robert Cirico, a Catholic priest who testified before 
Congress on behalf of the Acton Institute, by contrast, disputed statistics used by Catholic 
and progressive activists. Cirico argued that welfare does not cause abortion rates to go 
down because few women make the decision to have abortions based on whether they 
receive welfare benefits, and cutting welfare may in fact cause abortion rates to go down 
because those who would then be forced to find work may behave in ways that do not result 
in pregnancies that they do not wish to bring to term (Contract with America and Welfare 
Reform 1995, Contract with the American Family 1995). 
The Christian Coalition also supported the relatively bipartisan Earned Income Tax 
Credit, but displayed its economically very conservative ideology by supporting the family 
cap plan which was criticized even by many conservative and pro-life activists. Whereas the 
Christian Coalition provided significant arguments based on cost controls to justify 
opposition to health care reform, much of the work of the religious right in support of 
welfare reform was based on opposing out-of-wedlock pregnancies, along with highlighting 
other allegedly bad effects on the poor themselves. Other scholarship has noted the 
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narrowness of Christian conservative lobbying in support of reform, as compared to 
progressive lobbying against reform. While its relationship with some politicians in the 
Republican Party was strong, Hayes (2001) notes that the Christian Coalition and other 
proponents of reform lobbied Congress less than did the opponents of reform proposals.  
Rosenfeld (1995) profiled Andrea Sheldon of the Traditional Values Coalition as the 
counterpart of Sharon Daley on the pro-reform religious side. Heidi Stirrip of the Christian 
Coalition testified at a February 1996 hearing of the Senate Finance committee on the 
Governors’ Association welfare proposal. Sheldon and Stirrip both testified at the March 
1996 House Human Resources hearing on poverty and illegitimacy, arguing that there is a 
positive correlation between welfare benefits and illegitimacy. 
After Welfare Reform 
Mainline, Catholic and evangelical politics surrounding welfare continued to be 
informed largely by their networks of charitable agencies. To be sure, the goals of these 
charities were driven partially by theological considerations. While mainline and Catholic 
charities continued to advocate for increased welfare, evangelical charities advocated for 
faith-based partnerships. 
The National Council of Churches, as a body of denominations interested in social 
justice, put forward a significant effort to take control of interfaith and mainline public 
policy priorities after the 1996 elections. Joan Brown Campbell spearheaded a National 
Religious Leaders summit, including Catholics, which set fighting poverty, including 
challenges to welfare reform, as the first priority (Tipton 2007). 
The National Council of Churches and Evangelical Lutheran Church released 
surveys about congregational attitudes to welfare reform, but the results were released too 
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late to be usable in policy debates over legislation (Walsh 2000). But broad denominational 
lobbying soon gave way to the efforts of charitable agencies. The Clinton administration 
sought to encourage churches to help poor people newly off welfare to find jobs, though 
mainline denominations largely rebuffed them. In the late 1990s, a broad coalition of 
religious groups came together at the federal level but with the primary task of coordinating 
activity on state and local poverty policy. The group included not only representatives of the 
Catholic hierarchy, the National Council of Churches and Sojourners, but also the National 
Association of Evangelicals, Salvation Army and Family Research Council. This group 
finally began working together at the federal level in 2009, and later (though without the 
Family Research Council) formed the Circle of Protection. The group agreed to ask the 
governors of all 50 states for information about state implementation of welfare reform 
(Murphy 1997). The Christian Coalition was invited but did not attend. Meanwhile, the 
Interfaith Alliance, a group set up to counteract the Christian Coalition in 1997 and 
prioritized welfare policy as an issue, developed chapters in most states by 2004 (Tipton 
2007). This local activism, as summarized by Tipton, appeared to be focused on mobilizing 
congregations in each state to fight state level welfare cuts, while also providing networks 
for religious charitable institutions which could support both private charitable efforts and 
governmental lobbying. 
Catholic Charities, especially its lobbyist Sharon Daly, took the lead in congressional 
hearing testimony on the effects of welfare reform, especially shortly after the 1996 
presidential elections (President’s Fiscal Year 1998 1997; Child Welfare 1997) and in 2001, 
when Daly presented data about the mixed results of welfare reform as Congress began to 
consider reauthorization (Making Ends Meet 2001; Strengthening Working Families Act 
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2001). For the most part, during the 2000 election and the beginning of the Bush 
administration, debate on welfare turned to ways in which religious organizations could 
enter into stronger partnerships with government because of the Charitable Choice 
provision. Mainline leaders always took the  opportunity to express concerns both about cuts 
to welfare programs and separation of church and state, but leaders of the black Protestant 
churches were more supportive of Bush’s campaign for faith-based initiatives (Bartkowski 
and Regis 2003; Wuthnow 2004; Tipton 2007). 
Denominational lobbying returned to the forefront, however, as the Temporary Aid 
to Needy Families program came up for revision; mainline and Catholic administrative 
bodies sought a place for themselves as interest groups with information and expertise. 
Congress was expected to reauthorize TANF in 2002, but worked with emergency 
extensions until 2005. The NCC began working on the reauthorization campaign over a year 
before the original 2002 deadline. In February 2001 it released a survey to examine whether 
welfare reform reduced poverty. It found that the lifetime limits created more poverty, 
especially for children (Tipton 2007). A congressional hearing of the Human Resources 
Subcommittee of the House ways and Means Committee on April 11, 2002, provides a good 
comparison of both the beliefs and actions of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and 
the National Council of Churches. Kathleen Curran, spokeswoman for the USCCB, was 
followed by Brenda Gurton Mitchell, policy advisor for the National Council of Churches. 
The panel also included a representative from Network Catholic Social Justice Lobby, the 
public policy director of the progressive evangelical group Call to Renewal, and 
representatives of the Unitarian and Reformed Jewish denominations. All of these groups 
advocated expansion of TANF, based on their social teachings and hands-on experience 
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working with the poor. The USCCB and National Council of Churches reiterated their 
stances from the 1995/96 welfare reform debate, arguing that more needed to be done to 
help the working poor and those who were still not able to work, a situation which left them 
even more destitute when their benefits expired. 
Both the USCCB and NCC advocated that poverty reduction rather than welfare 
reduction should be the goal. Both advocated for expanded child care grants, so that working 
parents would not have to spend most of their salaries on child care, leaving them poorer. 
They also stated that some caregivers should be able to receive benefits even while not 
working, that states should be able to expand the flexibility of the timing of work 
requirements, and that education and vocational training should be incentivized. The 
Catholic Bishops provided more detailed proposals and emphasized the prioritization of 
marriage and family, which the NCC again avoided. The Catholic Bishops again stated that 
single-parent families should not be discriminated against, but that two-parent families 
should be incentivized. 
Throughout the long reauthorization fight, the NCC continued to take action by 
sponsoring conferences, rallies, meeting with legislatures and letter writing campaigns. 
(NCC News, 2004). Mainline Protestants and Bread for the World (Eckstrom 2002) and the 
Catholic bishops and Network Catholic Social Justice Lobby (Feuerherd 2002) were 
particularly active in lobbying when TANF’s funding expired in October 2002; the program 
was kept funded by emergency spending. Religious lobbyists supported Senate versions of 
reauthorization which provided more funding for day care and job training, while opposing 
House proposals which would make work requirements more stringent while cutting 
funding. 
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The Republican victory in the 2002 elections and the beginning of the Iraq War in 
2003 limited the attention of Congress and lobbyists on TANF, but did not deter religious 
lobbying on the issue. In June 2003, Maryland representative Ben Cardin (Democrat) read a 
letter from religious leaders calling for TANF reauthorization and expansion on the House 
floor. The National Council of Churches also sent letters and lobbied Congress to protect 
Earned Income Tax Credits from budget cuts (Firestone 2003). Most notably, a letter by the 
NCC’s Bob Edgar on the feast of Pentecost in 2003 linked spending on the Iraq War, tax 
cuts for the rich, and an over-reliance on faith-based charities to argue that the government 
can certainly afford stronger and more just welfare programs (Tipton 2007). Progressive 
religious activists had long sought to frame the failure to take care of the poor as a choice to 
benefit the military and the rich, but this rhetorical attempt to use the Iraq War and recent 
tax cuts did not lead to a significant long-term re-mobilization of progressive anti-poverty 
action, nor was any congressional action taken. In April 2004, when Catholic, mainline 
Protestant and black Protestant clergy held a joint meeting at the White House which 
focused on international poverty, there was also discussion of domestic poverty (Feuerherd 
2004). Kathleen Curran of the USCCB testified before a congressional hearing again on 
February 10, 2005. 
TANF reauthorization finally passed in 2005. Republicans, now at the height of their 
power in Congress and with Bush beginning his second term, sought to privatize social 
security and pass budget cuts to social programs. While there is little evidence of religious 
lobbying on social security since the 1980s, the Catholic Bishops released a “social security 
backgrounder,” a document discussing the importance of the program. Twice during 2005, 
Connecticut congresswoman Rosa DeLauro (Democrat, Catholic) read letters from religious 
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leaders opposing budget cuts to welfare programs. In March, she read a letter from the 
leaders of the Episcopal, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregationalist mainline 
denominations. In December 2005 she read a letter from the Catholic bishops. This letter 
coincided with an effort by Sojourners and other religious groups, protested at the Cannon 
house office building during budget negotiations (Weissman and Cooperman 2005). In July 
2006, the five largest mainline denominations again sent letters to Congress and held press 
conferences (Johnson 2006). 
There is less evidence of religious lobbying on welfare policy during the period of 
Democratic control of Congress between 2007 and 2011. The efforts to pass a federal 
minimum wage, followed by the NCC’s decision to scale back its general lobbying efforts, 
limited movement on welfare policy during the election campaign, the fast-moving 
legislative processes of the financial crisis and the first days of the Obama administration, 
and the prioritization of religious and most other lobbyists on health care reform until the 
middle of 2010, arguably provided little room for such efforts. The reauthorization of TANF 
during budget negotiations in 2010 did not lend itself to the tactics of congressional hearing 
testimony, letter writing and social protest which largely sustains mainline lobbying, and the 
Catholic approach of more focused lobbying on the issues of highest priority also did not 
make lobbying on welfare likely during these years. 
The Evangelical Reevaluation of Welfare 
Meanwhile, between the first years of the Bush administration and the first years of 
the Obama administration, the National Association of Evangelicals and a few other 
moderately conservative evangelical organizations became more open to supporting and 
even lobbying for welfare programs. The NAE’s 2004 document For the Health of the 
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Nation noted that while the Bible does not mandate economic equality, it condemns 
“disparities in opportunity and outcome that cause suffering and perpetuate the cycle of 
poverty.” While the document is most interested in promoting action by evangelical 
churches, it also noted that government has a role in addressing all of the problems listed in 
the document. 
It is surprising that this change in attitude occurred near the height of the relationship 
between the Christian Right and the Republican Party. Public opinion does not appear to be 
a factor. To be sure, not all religious conservatives maintained strict economic conservatism.  
Putnam and Campbell (2010)’s analysis of the General Social Survey over time since 1976 
argued that religious identity is not an important factor in people’s views of welfare. 
Wuthnow (2004) notes that nearly a majority of self-described religious conservatives 
support welfare spending, although the category of religious conservatism is distinct from 
evangelicalism. 
However, when examining the General Social Survey data provided by Putnam and 
Campbell, there is a gradual shift during the 1990s and early 2000s of evangelicals moving 
toward opposition of welfare policy and a more modest movement of mainline Protestants in 
favor of welfare policy, so that mainline Protestants became virtually split on the question, 
while somewhere between 35% and 40% of evangelicals continued to support increased 
social welfare. A question beyond the scope of this research is whether this change occurred 
because of conservative mainliners moving increasingly toward identifying as evangelicals, 
or because of changes in attitudes of those who remained in the same group. 
Significant dissatisfaction with the Bush administration and the Republican Party 
regarding the politics of faith-based organizations may have been a factor (DiIulio 2003), 
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enough so that by 2004, the NAE was willing to promote a document as moderate as For the 
Health of the Nation. David Kuo’s 2006 book Tempting Faith describes how some fiscal 
conservatives in the Bush administration marginalized the office of faith-based and 
neighborhood partnerships, repeatedly disparaging its religious constituency. This, 
combined with opposition from some liberals, limited the number and type of grants given 
to faith-based organizations compared to what was initially promised. Kuo reluctantly 
included that the government’s ability to direct funds to churches was questionable, and that 
programs to assist the poor regardless of their participation in church-related program were 
quite necessary. 
Another significant factor appears to be little-known precursors to the Circle of 
Protection, which began as early as 1998 to involve conservative evangelical associations 
with discussions on poverty with more liberal groups, as discussed above. As analyzed by 
Schafer (2012) and discussed in Chapter 2 of this project, as evangelical charities continued 
to expand partnerships with government officials, moderate evangelicals who had previously 
identified with the Christian Right began to gain an appreciation for governmental efforts to 
solve poverty. To be sure, other conservative Christians continued to be suspicious of state 
power over economic and welfare matters, and argued that government at all levels should 
largely limit itself to supporting local charitable partnerships and pursue cutting taxes. 
However, even some of the most conservative evangelical leaders proved willing to dialogue 
with other religious leaders. The issue of Earned Income Tax Credits, which religious 
leaders across the political spectrum agreed on for differing reasons, was a worthy starting 
point. Because involvement in charitable work was common to liberal, moderate and 
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conservative religious leaders, the political result of their meetings was largely to form 
arguments based on the interests of religious charities. 
In February 2009, the Poverty Forum, co-chaired by progressive evangelical Jim 
Wallis and conservative evangelical Michael Gerson, agreed on a set of anti-poverty policies 
which did not discuss welfare or food stamp programs but did discuss expanded income tax 
credits (Popovici 2009). The forum included representatives of the US Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, the National Council of Churches, Wallis ally Ronald Cyder of 
Evangelicals for Social Action, an even the right-wing Family Research Council. The 
National Catholic Reporter stated that the Obama administration planned to meet with 
Forum participants. From the perspective of religious progressives and moderates, as with 
efforts to raise the minimum wage discussed in the previous chapters, the new efforts to 
form a coalition on tax credits (reminiscent of the FAP debates in the 1970s) signified 
efforts to continue the anti-poverty fight despite the lack of progress on rolling back welfare 
reform. 
Why did some right-wing groups like the Southern Baptist Convention and Family 
Research Council either avoid such dialogue entirely, ore end cooperation when the Circle 
of Protection formed to bring out broad-based religious support for anti-poverty programs? 
Given the limited support of progressive economic policies among evangelical clergy and 
members of the public, the theological and practical consensus established by progressives 
such as Jim Wallis and moderate Republicans such as Michael Gerson and the leadership of 
the National Association of Evangelicals failed to transfer to evangelical organizations with 
a more significant commitment to conservative economics. The Southern Baptist 
Convention, with its takeover by a conservative faction and long-standing concern about 
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government overreach in what may appear to them to be the Church’s responsibility to 
conduct charity, could be expected to be one of the organizations that refused to go along 
with the change in evangelical thinking. Yet its previous moderate stance on welfare from 
the middle of the twentieth century remained influential enough on the organization that it 
did not outright oppose the Circle of Protection. 
The Circle of Protection: Protecting SNAP and TANF in the Debt Ceiling Debate 
The Circle of Protection formed in 2011 in reaction to the Republican takeover of the 
House of Representatives and their threats to cut social programs, including reductions to 
TANF, SNAP, affordable housing and Head Start (early childhood education) but also the 
widely popular Earned Income and child Tax Credit programs. In addition to being 
consolidated by a broad-based religious coalition, the fight to protect remaining welfare 
programs from cuts in 2011 differed from the fight against welfare reform in its rhetoric and 
its lobbying tactics.  In terms of rhetoric, as during welfare reform there was still an 
emphasis on moral exhortations, and reminders that charitable institutions could not replace 
government programs. However, there was more focus on defending the Earned Income Tax 
Credit and on finding other ways to decrease the national debt can be explained both by the 
political situation more broadly, and because such rhetoric would be more acceptable to 
conservative evangelicals. The defense of religious progressives and moderates regarding 
the Earned Income Tax Credit was unprecedented, but their activity in favor of EITC was 
primarily in conjunction with their support of other programs for the poor. References to the 
national debt appear in the Circle of Protection’s founding statement, when they rarely 
appear in statements by the National Council of Churches or US Conference of Catholic 
Bishops. More surprising, perhaps, is that despite the presence of pro-life evangelicals in the 
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coalition, there was little attempt to highlight issues of family stability and the likelihood 
that low-income mothers might be more likely to have abortions without governmental 
programs; a concern that had been promoted by Catholic bishops during the Clinton 
administration. This can, perhaps, be explained by the fact that Republicans were not 
attempting to strengthen family caps in welfare programs; thus, this was not a basis to 
persuade moderate Republicans. 
In terms of lobbying tactics, there were fewer efforts to highlight the work of 
religious groups as charitable institutions, or to work in coalition with secular charities and 
advocacy groups. This is despite the fact that religious charity leaders such as the directors 
of Catholic Charities and Bread for the World, or those closely associated with charitable 
work such as Sojourners, had been instrumental in putting the Circle of Protection together. 
Part of the explanation is that the Circle of Protection’s most significant work came at a time 
of legislative crisis over a matter of weeks, rather than a sustained period of committee 
hearings over nearly an entire Congress as had been in the case during welfare reform. There 
were acts of social protests over the proceeding months before the early August 2011 deal 
which temporarily resolved the crisis, but according to the Circle of Protection’s own press 
releases, and media accounts from the time period, the group’s interventions were most 
critical during meetings with congressional leaders during the height of the crisis. Just as 
importantly, though, the Circle of Protection’s image as a coalition of denominations and 
religious charities tested the ability of progressive religious groups to look at opportunities 
for influence. It became clear that, in the political context of 2011, progressive groups like 
the National Council of Churches could be more influential alongside moderate evangelicals 
than alongside the Children’s Defense Fund. 
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The Catholic Church began its independent lobbying as soon as it became clear that 
Republicans would likely gain control of at least one House of Congress. The Bishops’ 
Committee on Domestic Justice sent two letters to Congress urging protections for earned 
income and child tax credits, one before the midterm elections in September 2010 and one 
after the elections in December 2010. In February 2011, John Carr, still serving as Director 
of the Bishops’ Committee on Domestic Justice, led the annual Catholic social ministry 
gathering in Washington DC. It included a keynote address by Cardinal Peter Turkson of 
Ghana, President of the Pontifical Council on Justice and Peace, who discussed Rerum 
Novarum and Catholic social teaching. While the gathering usually included visits to 
Congress to lobby for social programs, Carr noted that this year’s gathering was particularly 
important because of the likelihood that Republicans would push for budget cuts. However, 
he also accused Democrats of failing to protect the poor, positioning the church as being 
more progressive on funding for social programs than President Obama. He noted that social 
programs were a disproportionately large share of government spending cuts in budget 
proposals of both parties. Meanwhile, those visiting members of Congress were instructed to 
lobby both for social programs and against abortion coverage in health care (Filteau and 
Stangler 2011). 
Evangelicals, meanwhile, worked to develop a proposal to deal with the national 
debt. The moderate think tank Center for Public Justice worked with several evangelical 
college administrators and pastors to draft a “Call for Intergenerational Justice” which 
received coverage from the Christian Post in March 2011 (Samuel 2011). The proposal 
called for cuts in corporate welfare, agricultural subsidies and defense spending. These ideas 
were not new, even to evangelicals; Tipton (2007) describes how Jim Wallis and Sojourners 
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had supported most of them as a part of Interfaith Impact in the 1980s. The Call for 
Intergenerational Justice, however, highlighted interest in dealing with poverty and the 
national debt at the same time among a broader segment of evangelical. 
The first ecumenical actions after the beginning of the new Congress took advantage 
of the symbolism of the season of Lent, and involved tactics of social protest. In March 
2011, about 4000 activists undertook a fast to protest congressional proposals to cut welfare 
spending, with a symbolic ending on Easter Sunday. 28 congressional Democrats joined the 
fast, as did contributors to The New York Times and The Washington Post, who interviewed 
David Beckman and Tony Hall, respectively (Bittman 2011; Marshall 2011). No immediate 
action was taken by Congress on proposed budget cuts. 
Of more substantial importance, in July 2011, members of the Circle of Protection, 
including Jim Wallis of the progressive evangelical group Sojourners, met with President 
Obama for 40 minutes. They also met with congressional leaders including Senate  majority 
leader Harry Reid, House Budget committee chair Paul Ryan, and top aides to the Speaker 
of the House. The Washington Post reported that they specifically called on Obama and 
congressional leaders to protect food stamps and aid to mothers with newborn children. 
They also ran ads in the districts of congressional leaders, including local pastors from those 
districts (Wallsten 2011). Galen Carey of the National Association of Evangelicals claimed 
that most of the meetings ended with acknowledgement of the group’s points, though with 
no explicit commitment (Kamen 2011). Boorstein (2011), profiling prayer meetings held 
daily by religious progressives at the United Methodist Building, noted statements from 
lobbyists implying that advocacy on behalf of programs for the poor was at a significantly 
higher level than any recent time. 
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Lobbyists for the Catholic bishops and Bread for the World argued that their 
activism was essential to the successful efforts which exempted many programs to protect 
the poor from cuts when a compromise was reached to increase the debt limit (Carr 2011; 
Ryan 2012). John Carr of the Conference of Catholic Bishops called the Circle of 
Protection’s access to the President and congressional leaders of both parties 
“unprecedented.” He noted that protection of programs for the poor was among the last 
items agreed to by the President and Congress. Carr stated that the diversity of the Circle of 
Protection, particular efforts of the Catholic Bishops to write additional letters, send 
lobbyists and distribute action alerts, and the scale of the crisis, contributed to their ability to 
be effective. 
Having successfully played a part in the effort to hold off the most severe cuts to 
welfare programs, the Circle of Protection could not maintain the same level of commitment 
from activists during the succeeding presidential election cycle. The US Conference of 
Catholic Bishops and Bread for the World, both instrumental in the Circle of Protection, 
took the lead in criticizing Republican arguments on the federal budget as related to social 
programs. The USCCB was able to gain media attention because of its conflict with 
practicing Catholic Paul Ryan and the efforts of a group of nuns, while Bread for the World 
was able to use its network of congregations already interested in progressive economic 
issues to provide assistance to such efforts. 
In early March 2012, the Catholic Bishops wrote a letter to the President and 
Congress addressing President Obama’s budget proposal.  It criticized a proposal to increase 
rent for those receiving federal housing assistance. Bread for the World urged its 
congregations to write letters on four different poverty programs; the two domestic poverty 
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programs assigned to some congregations were nutrition assistance and Earned Income Tax 
Credits (Ryan 2012). 
The National Catholic Reporter quoted religious activists as saying that they were 
gearing up for a difficult year, and their predictions soon came true as Congressman Paul 
Ryan’s budget proposal, presented as a long-term solution for deficits, passed the House. It 
included tax cuts across the board (though some tax credits for the poor were endangered), 
spending cuts for social programs, and increases for military spending. It generated religious 
opposition by the Circle of Protection, and, independently, from the US Conference of 
Catholic Bishops. Most media accounts focused on Ryan’s Catholicism in these discussions 
(e.g. Kim 2012). Speaker John Boehner, also a Catholic, responded to the Bishops by urging 
them to take a “new look,” alleging that “if we don’t make these decisions, these programs 
won’t exist, and then they’ll really have something to worry about” (Weissman 2012). In an 
interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network, Ryan stated that his Catholic faith 
motivated his politics, arguing that Catholic social teaching’s most important goal is to keep 
people out of poverty by motivating them to be better citizens and harder workers, and that 
government programs defeat these goals by creating dependency and increasing the national 
debt. Progressive Catholics and the Catholic bishops made appeals to Ryan based on 
Christian moral criteria to protect the least of these, and specifically Catholic social doctrine. 
The US Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote a series of letters to Congress and specific 
congressional committees in March and April, criticizing proposed budget cuts to SNAP, tax 
credits and housing assistance. The letters generated coverage from The New York Times 
and The Hill, which noted that the Bishops criticized Republican proposals on poverty even 
as they clashed with the Obama administration on contraception mandates in health care 
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(Firestone 2012; Easley 2012). Easley (2012) noted that the Bishops suggested cutting 
subsidies to large agribusinesses as a possible place for spending cuts, as had been suggested 
by the evangelical Center for Public Justice as part of their proposal for dealing with the 
debt the previous year. 
As the presidential election campaign continued, a group of nuns led by Simone 
Campbell of Network Catholic Social Justice Lobby traveled the country in a “nuns on the 
bus” tour, with a message focusing on protecting programs for the poor. The tour ended with 
a rally at the US Capitol (Lisee 2012). The Catholic bishops and Protestant denominations, 
including Sojourners and Bread for the World, focused on protecting the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. In late July, they sent letters to Congress attacking a Republican tax bill which would 
cut the EITC and retain tax cuts for the wealthy (Lisee 2012B). After Paul Ryan became the 
Republican vice-presidential candidate in August, interest in the conflict between Ryan and 
his Catholic critics over the budget increased (e.g. Hennessey and Muscatine 2012; Blow 
2012), and Sister Simone Campbell gave a speech to the Democratic convention criticizing 
the Ryan budget. The Bishops’ 2012 Labor Day statement focused particularly on the 
necessity of programs to support the poor. 
After the election, the Catholic bishops and Circle of Protection sent letters to 
Congress in December expressing similar principles as usual, regarding negotiations over 
the fiscal cliff, and in February 2013, the Circle of Protection sent more letters to the 
President and Congress arguing for a “thoughtful approach” to deficit reduction (Shear 
2013). Jim Wallis told The New York Times that “the unity of the faith community is clear.” 
In the spring of 2013, after spending cuts caused by sequestration following fiscal 
cliff negotiations, Ryan’s next budget proposal was criticized by the Catholic Bishops. 
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Bishop Stephen Blair of the Domestic Justice Committee was joined by Bishop Richard 
Pates of the International Justice Committee in a letter to Congress. Among Ryan’s 
suggestions was turning SNAP into block grants for the states, as had nearly been done in 
1996. Continuing to use the “Circle of Protection” slogan, The Bishops called on Congress 
to protect SNAP, also mentioning TANF, tax credits, and Supplemental Security Income as 
essential programs. It also expressed concerns that Democratic Senate budget proposals 
were not detailed enough (Sadowski 2013; Easley 2013). 
The Circle of Protection continued to be a durable lobbying group as debt ceiling 
battles caused a government shutdown in October 2013, but this time, there appeared to be 
fewer high-profile meetings with congressional leaders. Its members led a “faithful 
filibuster”, protesting at the Capitol and reading scriptures which have a social justice 
message. One event, which received coverage from The Washington Post, included speeches 
by Beckman, Wallis, and representatives of the Catholic Bishops Office of Social 
Development and the NAE’s political director. This strategy marked a return to tactics of 
social protest which leaders had admitted previously were limited in their effectiveness 
(Burgiss 2013). The protests continued for days, as spokespeople read thousands of bible 
verses, but they appeared to have little influence on the crisis’s resolution. However, the 
effort showed that the Catholic Bishops and NAE as institutions were as committed as the 
mainline Protestants and other progressive leaders to participation and, more importantly 
leadership, in the Circle of Protection. In December 2013, David Beckman of Bread for the 
World and Larry Snyder of Catholic Charities co-authored an op-ed for The Washington 
Post, reiterating the necessity of governmental programs given that religious charities cannot 
provide comprehensive assistance. They argued against food stamp cuts, stating “These 
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recent cuts to SNAP eliminate more meals than what Catholic Charities, churches, food 
pantries, and all other charities combined are able to provide with our already stretched 
resources. Churches and food pantries would need to more than double what they raise to fill 
the gap left by Congress’ cuts to SNAP” (Beckman and Snyder 2013). 
The Republican victory in the 2014 elections has resulted in little movement on 
legislation related to programs for the poor (The Washington Post Editorial Board 2015). 
While Republicans now control both houses of Congress, and have blocked increased 
funding for social programs, they have not launched a wholesale attack on the remains of the 
federal welfare system. The Circle of Protection has continued to operate through the 
Washington offices of its organizations. Its most high-profile activity in 2015, however, has 
been soliciting videos from presidential candidates in the Democratic and Republican 
primaries (Rotandaro 2015). With the notable exception of Donald Trump, most candidates 
have made submissions, although many of them are lacking in policy details. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described how Catholic and mainline lobbyists have devoted 
significant attention to lobbying against cuts to welfare programs, and have generally 
advocated for social spending to protect the social safety net to increase. They have also 
supported programs to stimulate employment. They have been required to respond to 
concerns about welfare diminishing incentives for work and family formation. The Catholic 
Church has particularly advocated for welfare to be equally available to two-parent families, 
but the primary response of both Catholic and mainline churches has been to argue that the 
government has a moral duty to provide basic necessities, and to explain why churches 
cannot provide these services alone. While religious advocates for the poor have sought to 
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build an interfaith coalition advocating for a moral budget, especially when welfare 
programs are under threat, their most significant influence has usually been based on 
churches’ practical expertise on narrowly defined legislative battles. Two key examples are 
the interfaith battle to protect the food stamp program, and the efforts of the Catholic 
Bishops to mitigate family cap mandates during welfare reform in the 1990s. These efforts 
were part of widespread religious advocacy on economic justice. Members of Congress, 
however, appeared attentive to religious arguments primarily because of their 
demonstrations of expertise on poverty, and, in the case of Catholic bishops, their 
integration of opposition to abortion and economic justice. Religious organizations which 
argue for an economically conservative agenda, meanwhile, have often avoided lobbying in 
favor of welfare cuts at the denominational level, and some organizations in the evangelical 
establishment, such as the National Association of Evangelicals, have recently broken from 
the Christian Right to support protections for the social safety net. Religious groups are most 
likely to unite on the issue of the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is primarily protection 
for the working poor and, unlike the minimum wage, does not include regulations of 
businesses. Religious groups have devoted more substantial attention to income tax credits 
in recent years because it has been under threat in Republican budgets. 
While religious lobbying on welfare policy continues to be supported by mainline, 
black Protestant, Catholic, and more recently some evangelical groups, its strength and 
effectiveness has been limited by their difficulty in achieving sustained public support from 
within denominations. While some grassroots efforts have been tried, they are usually short-
lived. The parish level activism on federal welfare issues by Catholics is minor compared to 
Catholic support of the grassroots pro-life movement. Mainline Protestant denominations, 
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meanwhile, are still afflicted by the gap between liberal leaderships and moderate and 
conservative factions in the laity, which are apathetic or opposed to their lobbying on 
welfare. Politicians, having little interest in moral exhortations by churches, and little 
indication that church lobbying is supported by broad sectors within voters belonging to 
most of the denominations, still do acknowledge the expertise of religious groups who work 
with the poor. To the extent that evangelical charities begin to join their mainline and 
Catholic counterparts in arguing not only for government partnerships, but also expansions 
in the government-run social safety net, it is possible that religious lobbying in favor of 
welfare will increase. 
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Chapter 5: Minimum Wage 
Minimum wage laws in the United States prohibit employers from paying their 
workers below a certain amount. Since the adoption of a federal minimum wage of 25 cents 
in 1938, it has been increased periodically because of inflation, cost of living increases, and 
as an effort at poverty reduction which does not require direct government assistance to the 
poor. These considerations have, at least until recently, made the minimum wage a less 
polarized issue as compared to welfare reform and health care reform. This chapter will 
begin by summarizing the legislative history of the minimum wage, and public opinion. I 
explain the arguments religious supporters of the minimum wage make, combining morality, 
economics and expertise. I then explain how the movement for local and state minimum 
wages has resulted in state minimum wages that are above the federal. 
The analysis of this chapter will, in some ways, be less complex than that of other 
chapters because there is little religious opposition to the minimum wage. The major reasons 
for religious conservatives to oppose other initiatives are barely applicable to the minimum 
wage. Social issues such as abortion are hardly a factor; Snarr (2011) describes a few 
examples of Catholic congregations hesitating to work with local coalitions involving 
Planned Parenthood, but she does not argue that this is widespread. More importantly, the 
minimum wage is a regulation rather than a large government program, and is a program 
only directly benefiting those who are employed. Thus, there is less ability for the Religious 
Right to accuse it of failing to incentivize hard work or of costing too much. To be sure, 
there has been a growing reluctance by Republicans in Congress to index federal programs 
such as the minimum wage to inflation for cost of living increases, and to update programs 
such as the minimum wage which are not indexed, particularly beginning with the Reagan 
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Administration (McCarty 2007). However, whereas the Christian Right contributed to 
Republican welfare efforts, and right-wing efforts to oppose health care reform, there is little 
to no evidence that the Christian Right contributed to the Republicans’ rightward drift on the 
particular issue of the minimum wage. 
There are some obstacles for religious advocates of the minimum wage to overcome, 
however. Religious leaders are open to questions about why they have expertise in wage 
policy. I show how charitable agencies can make a case for the minimum wage based on 
their interactions with the working poor, who must still go to them for support because of 
low wages. But unlike welfare and health care, the message of social justice is paramount in 
minimum wage debates, with the expertise of charitable agencies clearly supplementary in 
advocacy work. 
By examining the impact of national coalitions like Let Justice Roll and Interfaith 
Worker Justice, this chapter describes how religious living wage advocates working in local 
communities must build bridges between faiths and with secular groups. At the national 
level, there was some distrust between religious groups and unions which may have limited 
their participation in living wage movements in previous decades. Two articles from the late 
1990s suggest that the National Council of Churches antagonized the AFLCIO and other 
labor unions from the left as the NCC supported socialist rebels in Latin America during the 
1980s. The end of the Cold War and new leadership in the AFLCIO had eased these 
tensions. Additionally, religious groups had previously focused on other issues; civil rights 
and the anti-war movement in the case of the National Council of Churches, relying on labor 
unions to take the lead on advocacy for economic issues. With the organized labor 
movement struggling against decline, churches might see the need to take up the slack, and 
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their common interests became instrumental in the development of local living wage 
movements (Greenhouse 1996). Part of the renewed religious activism can be attributed to 
outreach by AFLCIO director John Sweeney, a devout Catholic who was elected in 1995 on 
a reform slate (Kazin 1999). Snarr and others point out that as union representation 
continues to fall, unions have even more incentive to seek coalition partners with whom they 
had not previously worked or had not worked with recently in order to maintain their 
political clout, and religious groups are among these partners. Religious groups can 
particularly open doors for community groups in regions such as the South where unions are 
not as powerful. 
Local communities have been able to maintain relationships with unions, but they 
must do so by volunteering their time to establish connections, without the training and tools 
of professional lobbyists. When such arrangements work, however, they can lead to the most 
impactful social movements described in this projects. In Arkansas, for example, a mainline 
pastor has led a coalition of religious groups and labor unions which has successfully helped 
get minimum wage increases twice, in 2006 and 2014. 
Legislative History 
The national minimum wage in the United States was implemented in the late stages 
of the New Deal, as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The minimum wage is not 
indexed to inflation. Therefore, until the 1980s, legislation often provided for minimum 
wage increases in multi-year stages so that increases happened quite often. Minimum wage 
increases have been passed in 1949, 1955, 1966, 1974, 1977, 1989, 1996 and 2007. Many of 
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the earlier minimum wage increases made a more significant effort to insure that minimum 
wage increases were in line with inflation (Waltman 2011).14 
Following the increase of the Minimum Wage to $5.15 as passed by Congress in 
1996, which took effect in 1997, the Federal Minimum Wage went through its longest 
period without an increase, until Congress passed an increase to $7.25 after the Democrats 
took control in 2007 (Bartels 2008, Chapter 8). 
Some economists have argued that raising the minimum wage is likely to increase 
unemployment, and these arguments are often accepted by corporate interest groups, who 
work to strengthen the Republican Party’s opposition to minimum wage increases. A few 
conservative Catholic and Calvinist commentators have gone along with this movement, 
arguing that religious business owners may be affected (Archbold 2014; Balure 2014). 
Opposition, however, is limited by the significant economic evidence that minimum wage 
increases do not cause unemployment increases, especially the research of Card and Krueger 
(1995), comparing state minimum wages and employment in fast food restaurants (Bartels 
2008).15 In general, for the last several decades the Democratic Party has endorsed 
significant increases in the Minimum Wage, while Republicans “go along infrequently and 
reluctantly.” (Bartels 2008, 188). Republicans are generally more willing to support smaller 
increases in the Minimum Wage. Republicans and some Democrats argue that the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, which will be discussed further in the chapter on welfare reform, is a 
                                                 
14 The history of the federal minimum wage is documented in several books, including Nordlund 
(1997), Bartels (2008), and Waltman (2011). 
15 Card and Krueger have conducted follow-up studies since their landmark 1995 publication. Bartels 
(2008) summarizes the economic argument that small minimum wage increases do not cause increased 
unemployment. 
  
188 
more economically efficient way to insure that the working poor have higher incomes 
(Bartels 2008). 
The fight to raise the Minimum Wage is an instructive case study for analysis of the 
partisan landscape. In 1977, the Carter administration and a Democratic congress passed 
minimum wage increases which would continue through 1981. Congress almost succeeded 
in having the minimum wage indexed to inflation, but an effort led by Republicans defeated 
this proposal in committee (Krehbiel and Rivers 1988). The Reagan administration was 
opposed to any increase in the minimum wage and was able to block it successfully, which 
began a decline in the real value of the minimum wage.16 In April 1989, the House of 
Representatives and Senate passed a minimum wage increase to $4.55. 24 House Democrats 
and two Senate Democrats voted against, mostly from the South. 22 House Republicans and 
10 Senate Republicans voted in favor (Rasky 1989, Senate Role Call 1989). President 
George H.W. Bush vetoed the bill. Though he had promised a minimum wage increase, 
which had not been passed during the entire Reagan administration, he argued that it should 
not be implemented without a subminimum wage allowed for teenagers and other workers 
likely to be in training. In November 1989, Congress passed a smaller minimum wage 
increase to $4.25 by a wide margin including the support of most Republicans. It was signed 
by President Bush (Raum 1989). In 1996, all Democrats voted for the minimum wage 
increase along with 93 House Republicans and 20 Senate Republicans. The 1996 minimum 
wage increase was a significant victory for President Clinton in a Republican Congress, in a 
compromise by which Democrats agreed to support tax breaks for small businesses (Clymer 
1996, Hill 1996). 
                                                 
16 A wide variety of academic works address this development, including Bartels (2008), Snarr 
(2011), and Waltman (2011). 
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In 2007, all Democrats voted for the Minimum Wage increase in all votes. In the 
initial House vote, 82 House Republicans voted in favor. Five Senate Republicans voted in 
favor of the initial cloture, not enough to defeat the demands of President Bush and 
congressional Republicans for the minimum wage to be passed along with other legislation. 
The Minimum Wage was later agreed to overwhelmingly as an amendment to a war 
spending bill which included various domestic spending and, as in 1996, tax breaks for 
small businesses (Hulce 2007, Senate Role Call 2007, Zapin 2007). 
Congressional roll call votes cannot easily articulate the position of the political 
parties on the minimum wage, because they can change depending on the specifics of the 
proposal, what else is in the bill besides the minimum wage increase, and other political 
considerations. However, it can be determined that most Democratic opposition to minimum 
wage increases has disappeared since the 1980s. However, Republicans generally support 
smaller increases, more exemptions, and more adoption of their own policy goals in 
exchange for agreeing to the minimum wage. Since nearly all Democratic politicians are in 
favor of the Minimum Wage, it is no surprise that most religious organizations associated 
with liberal politics are in favor of Minimum Wage increases. 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion in favor of the Minimum Wage has been consistently positive over 
time. As of 2008, over 80% of those surveyed favor at least some minimum wage increases 
in nearly every poll, and over 60% favor even large minimum wage increases. Additionally, 
nearly 2/3 of Republicans favor minimum wage increases (Bartels 2008). Religious efforts 
to increase the minimum wage such as Let Justice Roll have repeatedly used polling data as 
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an argument in favor of their views.17 As will be discussed later, minimum wage increases 
usually pass when they are put on the ballot as local and state measures. One significant 
factor in the politics of the minimum wage is that the Minimum Wage is a government 
regulation rather than a program. It does not directly result in higher taxes or spending. A 
Public Religion poll in 2013 found that the Minimum Wage still has majority support among 
Republicans, but about 40% support among those identifying with the Tea Party Movement. 
The availability of polling on the minimum wage based on religious identification is 
limited. However, according to the Public Religion Research Institute, the 2013 American 
Values Survey indicates that majorities of every religious group support a $10 minimum 
wage. This includes 89% of black Protestants, 78% of Catholics and 77% of mainline 
Protestants. As will be discussed later, these denominations have social teachings in favor of 
the minimum wage, meaning that most adherents are in line with their denominations on this 
issue.  In the 1980s, evangelicals were even more likely than other Americans to support the 
minimum wage (Schafer 2012). Evangelicals are now among the least supportive religious 
groups for minimum wage increases, yet even for this group, a majority (around 60%) are in 
support (Bellinski 2014). Public opinion in favor of the Minimum Wage even among 
conservatives may encourage the Catholic Church’s support of the minimum wage and 
neutrality by conservative evangelical organizations. Particularly for the Catholic Church, 
because the minimum wage has little or no impact on abortion policy, bishops have been 
able to support it. They can use the issue to gain favor with those Catholics primarily 
interested in social and economic justice, without compromising their socially conservative 
values or receiving much backlash from pro-life Catholic organizations. 
                                                 
17 E.g. Public Religion Research Institute. (2010, October). New Poll: 67 percent support raising 
minimum wage to $10. Retrieved from Letjusticeroll.org. 
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On the other hand, support for the minimum wage, though widespread, is also 
shallow (Bartels 2008). Members of Congress rarely hear from the public regarding 
minimum wage increases, and do not claim to vote for candidates strictly based on their 
minimum wage position. By contrast, when living wage advocates use ballot initiatives 
where that option is available, soft supporters of the minimum wage can vote for it and 
increase its chances of passage even though they did not contribute to lobbying of 
legislators. 
Building the Religious Case for a Minimum Wage 
As indicated previously, religious groups have not been a significant player in the 
federal minimum wage debate. However, when religious advocates have testified before 
Congress, they have articulated clear justifications for the minimum wage that combine 
social justice with an awareness of economic realities, both the statistics produced by their 
coalition partners and the experiences of their work with the poor. 
In general, most religious advocates of the Minimum Wage tend to use their 
economic arguments as a necessary tool but focus on the moral obligation of society to 
protect the poor. As United Church of Christ minister Paul Sherry said at a minimum wage 
event at the beginning of the Let Justice Roll movement, “Don’t get caught in debating 
numbers” but emphasize the values of “fairness, hard work, and just wages.” (Snarr 2011, 
15). Catholic bishop Stephen Blair’s testimony to a Senate committee in June 2013 echoed 
this sentiment, stating “I testify before you today not as an economist, a statistician, or a 
labor market expert, but rather as a pastor and teacher concerned with human development 
and the protection of human dignity. I will not speak to the specifics of policies, but rather to 
the conditions that must emerge in society and in the family to make those policies just.” A 
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letter by Catholic bishop Thomas Wenski representing the US Conference of Catholic 
Bishops Committee on Domestic Justice, and Catholic Charities director Larry Snyder 
(2014), also states that they are writing as teachers rather than as economists. These moral 
arguments align with what Hofrening (1995) calls “prophetic lobbying”, where religious 
groups act primarily by reminding politicians and others of core moral teachings. Instead of 
starting from the argument that the minimum wage is a beneficial policy, prophetic 
advocates start their argument from the need to solve the problem of poverty, and then 
suggest the minimum wage as a step in the right direction. 
Religious living wage advocates do, however, supplement their religious appeals 
with economic arguments. At testimony before a congressional committee in 1987, Archie 
Lemoen of Interfaith Action for Economic Justice provided specific numbers and 
percentages of workers whose standard of living had gone down because the minimum wage 
was not raised to compensate for inflation (Fair Standards Act 1987). Father J. Bryan Hehir, 
representing the Catholic Bishops as the Secretary of the Department of Social Development 
and World Peace of the United States Catholic Conference, summarized the Catholic case 
for the minimum wage in primarily moral terms at testimony for a congressional hearing in 
1987. He stated “the way you protect the dignity of the human person in a social setting, is 
you surround the person with a spectrum of rights, moral claims that a person can make 
because he or she is a person. Those claims run across a wide variety of needs. But one of 
the needs is the right to be able to work, and to be able to work in a way that provides decent 
income so that one can support one's self and one's family. So, our argument really runs 
from protecting human dignity to the essential nature of the right to a job, and a job that 
provides adequate income as being essential to the protection of human dignity. And then it 
  
193 
runs from that to an argument that says that the government has some responsibility to see 
that in a society, that right is protected.” This statement indicates that the minimum wage is 
not enough on its own to reduce poverty, because not everyone is able to find a job. 
However, presuming that most people will work if they can find a job, it insures that those 
who do work will not be in extreme poverty. Heher also quotes Pope John Paul II’s 
encyclical Laborem Exercens (1981), stating that the main test for whether an economic 
system works is just wages (Fair Labor Standards Act 1987). 
Almost two decades later, the inaugural letter to Congress by Let Justice Roll in 
November 2005 states that minimum wage workers at the time made “$10,700 a year – 
$5,000 below the federal poverty line for a family of three.” The letter also state that “the 
real value of the minimum wage today is nearly $4.00 less than it was in 1968.” It 
additionally cites arguments against the contention that the minimum wage leads to 
unemployment. This material was also collected in a book (Sklar and Sherry 2005). Some of 
the most frequent arguments of LJR include the contention that minimum wages do not hurt 
the economy because poorer people are likely to spend their salary increases, putting the 
money back into the economy (e.g. Goldberg 2009). Additionally, women are more likely to 
earn minimum wage jobs. Teenagers also need a minimum wage increase to fund their 
education. 
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has also used economic 
arguments. Wenski and Snyder (2014) state in their letter to Congress that 
A full-year, full-time worker making the minimum wage does not make enough 
money to raise a child free from poverty. Because the minimum wage is a static 
number and does not change, each year it becomes more difficult for workers 
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making the minimum wage to survive. Additionally, while some minimum wage 
workers are teenagers, research suggests as much as 25 percent of workers who 
would benefit from a minimum wage increase are parents. 
One difficult question surrounding the rhetoric of religious groups regarding poverty 
and the minimum wage is the extent to which theology in favor of the minimum wage is 
motivated by a general interest in taking care of the poor, or an interest in taking care of hard 
workers who may be more deserving than those without a job. The Catholic Church’s 
arguments surrounding the minimum wage focus largely on the dignity of work. The 
progressive religious coalition Let Justice Roll’s slogan for the living wage movement; “a 
job should get you out of poverty, not keep you in it” also refers to work. This question has 
been dealt with further in the chapter on welfare reform, where I argue that progressive and 
moderate religious activists do support a safety net for those out of work, particularly for 
mothers of children. Still, recent activists and scholars are aware of the implications of this 
question. In 2006, Paul Sherry stated that much else needs to be done including significant 
welfare programs to help all poor people. However, the Minimum Wage is a simpler 
regulation which establishes a standard below which no working person should fall. 
Therefore it achieves more political support.18 He also stated in an interview with The 
Nation that during the group’s previous work in 2004, it became apparent that Minimum 
Wage increases achieved the most enthusiastic and bipartisan support (Vanden, Heuvel, and 
Graham-Felson 2007). This indicates that religious activists believe in the economic efficacy 
of the minimum wage, but their analysis of politics also leads them to focus on the issue. 
                                                 
18 The Street Spirit, for which Sherry provided this information, is a Quaker website. 
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Snarr’s book also critiques rhetoric in the living wage movement which indicates that the 
working poor are more deserving of help than the unemployed poor. 
Overall, it is clear that the leaderships of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and 
the National Council of Churches (especially its mainline and black Protestant 
denominations), are about equally committed to a theology which holds that workers have a 
right to a certain standard of living, and that mandating higher wages is a good way to 
achieve that standard. As discussed in Chapter 2, The American Catholic hierarchy is in line 
with teachings coming from the Vatican, and mainline Protestants also have historical 
influences through the social gospel. 
Impact on Religious Organizations 
One factor which may limit religious activism in favor of the minimum wage, 
however, is that the minimum wage has less direct impact on religious organizations than 
other public policies. The chapters on welfare reform and health care reform showed how 
faith-based service providers have become involved in these policy debates, which include 
the provision of government funding to such organizations. There are, however, less direct 
ways in which minimum wage laws might negatively or positively impact religious 
organizations. Negatively, religious groups are employers, and their running costs may 
increase because of higher minimum wages. The National Association of Evangelicals’ only 
official action regarding the Minimum Wage was a resolution on the Fair Labor Standards 
Act in 1958 which called for an exemption for religious volunteers.19 The Catholic Church 
                                                 
19 The NAE’s Fair Labor Standards Act resolution is not listed on the most accessible list of 
resolutions from the NAE’s website. Along with other older resolutions considered by the NAE to be less 
relevant, it is available in a Full List of resolutions on a link which the NAE provided upon request. 
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has at times been accused of failing to pay a living wage to its own employees (e.g. How the 
Church Measures Up, 1997). 
On the other hand, recent living wage movements have cited personal work with the 
poor as a significant factor motivating religious involvement, with the argument that 
religious charities should not be responsible for feeding the working poor when a relatively 
simple government regulation can insure that they provide for themselves. Churches joined 
some of the first contemporary local living wage movements, such as the Baltimore effort in 
1994, because they started seeing increasing numbers of working poor at their food banks 
(Gertner 2006). Such groups would certainly argue that minimum wage laws are necessary 
to solve the national problem of poverty. Additionally, they even argue that more local 
ordinances are necessary to solve the problem of poverty in particular communities, and that 
religious charities are not an adequate substitute. Charities, according to this argument, are 
designed to take care of those who cannot work or have particular difficulties which can be 
taken care of more efficiently by religion than by government. 
Religious groups with significant numbers of racial minorities have a particular 
interest in the living wage movement. Snarr (2011) discusses the involvement of black 
Protestant and Hispanic Catholic groups in living wage campaigns as an effort to address 
poverty and inequality in their own communities. The 1987 congressional hearing testimony 
by Archie LeMoen, who belongs to the predominantly black Progressive National Baptist 
Convention, noted that minorities are among those most impacted by low wages (Fair Labor 
Standards Act 1987). 
Some media accounts of the Let Justice Roll campaign in 2006 also show the 
continuing relevance of personal work with the poor as a factor. For example, during Let 
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Justice Roll’s 2006 campaign, the Toledo Blade quoted a food bank director as saying “we 
can’t just keep giving these people handouts; we have to address the systemic problems that 
keep people in poverty.” (Yonke 2006A). The New York Catholic Bishops, in their May 
2012 statement backing a minimum wage increase, they point out “we do oversee the largest 
nongovernmental network of health, education and charitable ministries” and ““What we 
can tell you from first-hand experience is that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the 
working poor of our state to make ends meet.” (Catholic News Agency 2012). Overall, for 
most denominations, the costs of minimum wage laws are mitigated by the benefits of such 
laws, including the lesser poverty of its members and others who may seek help from its 
service providers. The activism of Let Justice Roll and other groups advocating for state 
minimum wages seamlessly combines morality, economic justice and the practical 
overburdening of religious charities. 
Minimum Wage Activism: The Growth of a State and Local Movement 
It is fair to conclude that religious activism in favor of the minimum wage became 
stronger in the 1990s than at any time since the Great Depression, when religious groups, 
armed with theological and practical points from the social gospel era, supported the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Reichley 1985). However, academic works and newspaper 
articles do not accurately represent religious contributions to federal minimum wage efforts 
during the mid-twentieth century. Such works certainly yield little evidence that religious 
groups were very influential in the debate about the federal minimum wage before 2000.   
The study of academic texts also provides little evidence that religious activity on the 
minimum wage has been very influential even after 2000. Willis Nordlund’s history of the 
federal minimum wage program, does not mention churches as actors in the minimum wage 
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debate except during the program’s passage in the 1930s. Wuthnow and Evans’s study of 
mainline Protestant denominations, ignores the minimum wage but finds significant 
mainline Protestant involvement in federal legislative debates about poverty such as welfare 
reform. Gerald Waltman’s comparison of minimum wage policy in the United States and 
United Kingdom, mentions religious groups as supporters of the minimum wage, but 
primarily in the context of local and state efforts. Bartels (2008) singles out the Episcopal 
Church as a significant supporter of the minimum wage in recent years. It should be noted 
that some of these sources were written after the 2007 federal minimum wage increase, 
indicating that religious interest groups have never become a critical part of the federal 
minimum wage debate. The Congressional Record of House and Senate floor proceedings 
also mentions few statements by members of Congress regarding religious influence on the 
federal minimum wage. Finally, media reports regarding the minimum wage increases in 
1977 and 1989 do not mention religious groups as a significant interest group, framing the 
debate as one between business and labor (e.g. Miller 1977; Weinraub 1989). 
However, a search of the ProQuest Congressional database finds that representatives 
of the National Council of Churches testified at congressional committee hearings regarding 
the Minimum Wage during the 1950s and 1960s, while representatives of the Catholic 
Church testified at hearings in the 1950s and 1980s. Scholars have previously failed to study 
these, either because they searched other databases which did not include these hearings, or 
because they did not consider these hearings to be worthy of attention. 
Local Living Wage Movements in Context 
The turn of religious groups toward state and local activism should be placed in the context 
of the relationship between state and federal minimum wage increases since the 1980s. 
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There were some state minimum wages higher than the federal minimum wage before the 
rise of the contemporary living wage movement. The social movement likewise continues, 
as minimum wage advocates argue that even the small minimum wage increases that are 
often achieved do not make the minimum wage high enough, or help workers in places 
which will not increase the minimum wage. 
As Bradley (2014) summarized in a report for the Congressional Research Service, a 
few states continued to have higher minimum wages than the federal level even when the 
federal minimum wage was increased more often from the 1940s through the 1970s. 
However, the number of states with higher minimum wages increased dramatically in the 
1980s as the length of time between further increases extended. In 1983, two years after the 
1981 increases ended those mandated in 1977, only three states had higher minimum wages 
than the federal level, and this number increased to 16 states by the time of the next 
minimum wage increases in 1989. During the 1990s, a federal minimum wage increase 
caused a decline in growth of state minimum wages, as the social movements in favor of a 
living wage began by focusing on local municipalities starting with Baltimore in 1994. The 
next significant round of increases in state minimum wages occurred between 2003 and 
2006, another period in which the federal minimum wage had not been increased for nearly 
a decade, when the number of states with a higher minimum wage climbed from 12 to 22. 
This effort included significant contributions from religious groups including legislative 
lobbying, social protests and public mobilization, especially after the formation of the Let 
Justice Roll coalition in 2005. This time, many of the states which had higher minimum 
wages continued to have higher minimum wages than the federal level even after the 
increases passed in 2007. By 2010, 15 states had higher minimum wages. In 2014, over a 
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dozen states passed minimum wage increases, continuing the pattern in which states begin to 
increase their minimum wages when the federal government does not increase the minimum 
wage for a long period of time. As of November 2014, following the 2014 legislative and 
election cycle, a record 29 states have higher minimum wages than the federal level.20 
In periods where the numbers of state minimum wage increases have gone up, there 
is generally an increase in religious activism. While those calling for state minimum wages 
are usually genuinely interested in improving public policy in their own states, they also 
hope to pressure the federal government to take action nationally, and use their ability to 
gain significant political support in the states as a talking point to show that there is 
significant support across the country for higher minimum wages. 
The Rise of the Local and State Living Wage Movement (1994-2006) 
In 1994 religious groups began to be heavily involved in campaigns to increase the 
minimum wage in local areas, starting in Baltimore with a minimum wage campaign only 
for city contractors. Catholic and mainline Protestant clergy worked with labor and 
community organizers to form Baltimoreans United for Leadership Development (BUILD), 
which engaged in grassroots activism. Campaigns in other cities followed (Pearce 1996).     
A coalition between religious denominations including the Catholic Church and mainline 
Protestants with labor and community groups was particularly strong in Boston (Waltman 
2011) and Los Angeles (Solidarity, 1999). The Boston effort involved labor, community and 
religious groups in roughly equal numbers personally lobbying city council members. There 
                                                 
20 All data for this paragraph taken from Bradley (2014). 
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were an increasing number of articles in favor of the Minimum Wage in the Catholic media, 
responding to these efforts (e.g. Haas 1994; Bole 1995; O’Shaughnasy 1999).21 
The Baltimore movement and its successors across the country did not come with an 
increasing voice for religious groups in the debate about the federal minimum wage in 1996. 
As in 1989, news stories also framed the issue of the minimum wage as a struggle between 
labor and business (e.g. Clymer 1996). A search of Worldwide Faith News, an aggregator 
which collects religious press releases, did not even yield any press releases about the 
minimum wage from the NCC and mainline denominations, which started to appear in 
subsequent minimum wage campaigns. When Democrats unsuccessfully attempted to pass a 
minimum wage increase in 2000, the National Council of Churches and other religious 
organizations only became involved by writing letters to Congress which they published as 
press releases. 
In March 2000, the National Council of Churches advocated for an increase in the 
Minimum Wage by sending a letter to Congress as part of an interfaith effort. The letter was 
signed by leaders of all seven mainline denominations and the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church. The letter advocated increasing the Minimum Wage by $1, so that all workers could 
afford to support themselves and a family. In addition, it was signed by Thomas Gumbleton, 
a Catholic auxiliary bishop of Detroit.22 It was not signed by the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops. This letter was entered into the Congressional Record by Michigan 
Democratic representative David Bonior, a Catholic, during a debate on the House floor 
about legislation to raise the minimum wage. 
                                                 
21 The National Catholic Reporter devoted particular attention to the minimum wage issue in the late 
1990s. It has a long-standing record of covering Catholic social justice issues.  
22 Gumbleton is known as one of the most progressive Catholic bishops, notable for his opposition to 
the Church’s position on gay rights, in addition to his outspokenness on economic justice issues. 
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Following the election of President George W. Bush, faith leaders sent another letter 
to Congress (Ortiz 2001). However, efforts to increase the minimum wage did not go far 
during George W. Bush’s first term despite the continuing decline in its real value (Waltman 
2011). Possible reasons include the government’s pre-occupation with foreign policy, and 
Republican victory in the 2002 elections. 
The living wage movement achieved victories in state ballot measures in Washington 
in 1998 and Oregon in 2002 (Bradley 2014). Religious groups appear to have focused on 
more local efforts during this time. Catholic clergy and laity were significantly involved 
along with other religious groups in a campaign to raise the minimum wage in Santa Fe, 
New Mexico in 2003, where the Catholic population is high (Gertner 2006; Waltman 2011). 
Clergy spoke at city council meetings regarding the living wage in Eugene, Oregon in 2002 
and 2003 (Moseley 2002). Catholic and Protestant leaders were involved significantly in the 
successful living wage effort in San Diego in 2005, arguably more than in any other city. 
They spoke at city council meetings, held congregational meetings, and engaged in 
neighborhood activism (Snarr 2011).23 
The Beginning of Let Justice Roll 
By the time Congress made its next serious attempt at a minimum wage increase in 
2006, Let Justice Roll had begun its efforts which focused on state minimum wage 
increases. However, the foundational efforts of LJR a few months earlier called for a federal 
increase, even as it pledged to use state legislation and ballot measures as a means toward 
that end. 
                                                 
23 Snarr’s book presents an argument that the religious living wage movement was stronger in San 
Diego than in other cities she studied, most of which were in the South. 
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Let Justice Roll’s first action for the Living Wage was a November 2005 letter to 
Congress. It was signed by NCC general secretary Bob Edgar, leaders of all seven mainline 
denominations, and ministers from most of those denominations. In addition, it was signed 
by Father Jim Hug, of the progressive Catholic group Center of Concern. The organization's 
leaders held a press conference with Senator Ted Kennedy (who is himself a Catholic and a 
consistent leader in minimum wage efforts for his entire Senate career) in Washington DC, 
according to LJR’s first press release on November 7, 2005. It received some media 
coverage (e.g. Religious leaders launch campaign 11/8/2005; Carpenter 11/8/2005).24 
In June and July 2006, there was an attempt by the Democratic minority in Congress 
to pass a federal minimum wage increase, when Ted Kennedy proposed an amendment to 
the defense authorization bill. Let Justice Roll lobbied specific senators, in addition to 
sending general press releases calling on both houses of Congress to support the legislation 
(Vanden Heuvel 2006). 
However, the efforts of Let Justice Roll and other religious advocates in the 2006 
elections centered on its state campaigns, with hope that a series of statewide victories and 
Democratic election victories would lead to a federal minimum wage. The group excelled at 
outsider tactics, including mobilizing congregations and outreach to voters for ballot 
measures. However, when necessary, it was able to lobby legislatures in some states through 
insider tactics such as private meetings at State legislative buildings. 
LJR’s primary purpose was to coordinate a variety of local movements across the 
country. However, the organization sought to motivate activists through symbolic activities 
in large cities (Snarr 2011). For example, nationwide efforts began with a campaign called 
                                                 
24 Human Events, for which Carpenter published her article, is a conservative magazine. 
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Living Wage Days on Martin Luther King Day weekend 2006, which involved dozens of 
“rallies, special services and other community events” at churches mostly in states where the 
group would soon attempt to pass a minimum wage increase, including an event in Boston 
with Ted Kennedy, an event at the large Riverside Church in New York City, 60 in Ohio and 
20 in Arkansas (Francis 2006A). The event in Boston with Ted Kennedy received media 
coverage (Kennedy Keynotes, 2006). Though mainline Protestant and Unitarian ministers 
were most prominently featured, Senator Kennedy was involved and at least in Arkansas, 
events were held at Catholic congregations. 
State-Level Minimum Wage Successes (2006) 
During the spring and summer of 2006, the state legislatures of West Virginia, 
Arkansas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Michigan passed minimum wage increases, 
with minor LJR involvement in the lobbying effort in all states and substantial effort in 
others. The first of these state efforts to be successful was West Virginia. The West Virginia 
Council of Churches was among those lobbying the legislature to pass a minimum wage 
increase, (WV Minimum Wage Hike 2006), which yielded media coverage from the 
Charleston Gazette, but there is little other available evidence of religious influence. In 
Arkansas, the state legislature passed a minimum wage increase with only three dissenting 
votes and Republican governor Mike Huckabee signed it into law in April 2006. This effort 
included significant LJR involvement (National Council of Churches News 2006A). NCC 
denominations involved in the Give Arkansas a Raise coalition included two African-
American churches (African Methodist Episcopal Zion and National Baptist Convention 
USA), and most of the mainline denominations. Roman Catholics were also included, but I 
have found no evidence that Catholic bishops in Arkansas were involved. The minimum 
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wage increase was not as large as was previously proposed, but based on new polling 
indicating that support for the minimum wage among conservatives decreases as the 
proposed increase becomes larger, LJR and other coalition partners agreed to the strategy of 
advocating for a smaller increase (Brush 2006). The Arkansas Times cited Steve Copley, a 
Methodist minister, as the leader of the Give Arkansas a Raise coalition, involved in 
negotiations to increase the minimum wage through the state legislature (Sabin 2006). 
Religious groups also lobbied specific legislators in North Carolina and held events at the 
state capitol (Kane 2006). An account of LJR’s activities written after the election singled 
out Arkansas and North Carolina as states where LJR was most involved in the legislative 
effort (Vanden Heuvel and Graham-Felson 2007). In Michigan, the Interfaith Council for 
Peace and Justice claimed on its website that it was circulating petitions for a ballot 
measure, but the state legislature passed a minimum wage increase before the petition drive 
was complete. There is less evidence of religious involvement in Pennsylvania, but the 
Pennsylvania Council of Churches did pass a resolution asking the legislature to act on the 
minimum wage. Overall, Let Justice Roll’s most significant contribution in this round of 
legislative efforts was mobilizing religious involvement in southern states where there was 
already a living wage movement and some promising indications of willingness by 
legislators to compromise. 
The National Council of Churches and Let Justice Roll participated significantly in 
the fall 2006 elections to mobilize voters in support of minimum wage increases in several 
states where the issue was decided as a ballot measure. Preparations began as early as the 
spring (Brush 2006). This included gathering petition signatures for the ballot measures 
(Vanden Heuvel and Graham-Felson 2007). Living Wage Days included instructions for 
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churches to devote some of their worship in October to living wage campaigns. Rallies, 
interfaith study groups, worship services and prayer breakfasts were sponsored (Francis 
2006B). Newspapers in three of the six states verify that Let Justice Roll and other religious 
groups did significant work to mobilize voters for minimum wage propositions. 
Colorado 
For the ballot measure campaign in Colorado, Let Justice Roll in Colorado partnered 
with Lutheran Advocacy Ministry. The campaign included having ministers talk about the 
issue with congregations and campaign members distributing literature to congregations. 
Additionally, in a separate but related campaign, Colorado’s Catholic bishops decided that 
the Colorado Catholic Conference would endorse the ballot measure to increase Colorado’s 
minimum wage (Gorski 2006). On the other hand, some articles about the living wage 
campaign neglected to mention religious interest groups among the supporters of the effort 
(McGee 2006). 
Missouri 
The Missouri Catholic Conference, representing the state’s bishops, endorsed the 
minimum wage increase and planned to urge laity to vote for it (St Lewis Review 2006). Let 
Justice Roll’s Audrey Hollis was a key organizer for the Missouri group Jobs with Justice, 
which mobilized for the campaign (Gerian 2006). One effort of Let Justice Roll was a 
“Labor in the Pulpits” campaign on Labor Day weekend, which received media coverage 
(Corrigan 2006). 
An exit poll from CNN shows significant religious support for the minimum wage in 
Missouri. The results indicated that 77% of white Catholics voted for the minimum wage. 
This is slightly ahead of the Protestant vote in favor of the minimum wage. 73% of 
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Protestants voted yes, with the vote in favor decreasing to 70% when counting only white 
Protestants, and decreasing to 65% when counting only white evangelicals. This indicates 
that white mainline Protestants likely voted for the minimum wage at a similar rate as white 
Catholics, but support even among evangelicals was still considerable. These results indicate 
that religious advocates in general, and the Catholic Church in particular, had significant 
success in Missouri. On the other hand, though about 70% of weekly churchgoers voted for 
the increase in Missouri, those not attending church were even more likely to vote in favor, 
at 85%.25  
Ohio 
LJR devoted particular attention to the Ohio campaign throughout 2006. In March 
2006, the Wall Street Journal quoted LJR leader Paul Sherry as saying that he would be in a 
delegation visiting the state legislature (Precifs 2006). The Ohio Council of Churches, the 
United Methodist Church and the Catholic Archdiocese of Cincinnati were among the 
religious groups to endorse the minimum wage proposition and promise a week of action in 
July to make sure it got on the ballot (Yonke 2006A). The most substantive actions included 
mobilizing volunteers to collect signatures to put the initiative on the ballot. Those quoted in 
media accounts noted that churches had never before come out so strongly to support a 
ballot initiative. Representatives from over a dozen Christian denominations were among 
those attending a press conference at Central United Methodist Church in Toledo (Yonke 
2006A). In addition to gathering petition signatures for the minimum wage initiative, some 
congregations engaged in voter registration drives after Sunday services (Camiskey and 
Johnson 2006). 
                                                 
25 These exit polls were taken in Missouri, Ohio and Montana, but not in Colorado, Nevada or 
Arizona. They were reproduced partially in Waltman (2011). 
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Specific events received some media coverage in the weeks leading up to the 
elections. In Athens, Ohio, there was a meeting at a Lutheran Church to educate and 
motivate campaigners from local churches. Although only 20 people attended, one of the 
speakers was an organizer of similar meetings throughout the state, along with rallies and 
voter outreach efforts (Tillotson 2006). Another example of an event was a Voting our 
Values Rally at a Presbyterian Church in Columbus, Ohio, a few days before the election. It 
was sponsored by Let Justice Roll along with Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good 
and We Believe Ohio. This event also included Evangelicals, including a pastor from the 
Vineyard Church (a National Association of Evangelicals member denomination) and a non-
local visitor, Sojourners leader Jim Wallis (Johnson 2006A). An article after the election 
noted that religious groups worked together to oppose an initiative to allow slot machine 
gambling in addition to supporting the minimum wage increase, especially by preaching, 
putting out signs at churches, and distributing lawn signs (Briggs 2006). Finally, in a special 
effort to reach out to evangelicals, LJR bought Christian radio ads shortly before the election 
(Faith in Public Life 2006). These events on their own may not have been significant for an 
effort involving lobbying of legislators, but they provide evidence of somewhat effective 
activism for a ballot initiative. After the election, religious leaders did engage in lobbying 
and social protest at the state capitol when Republicans attempted to block implementation 
of the passed initiative (Johnson 2006B). 
On the other hand, some news articles about Ohio’s minimum wage campaign 
neglected to mention the role of religious groups. The Washington Post, for example, 
portrayed the campaign as an effort of unions and 527s tied to the Democratic Party 
(Goldfarb and Broader 2006). CNN exit polls also cast some doubt on the role of religious 
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efforts on behalf of the measure. The poll found that 52% of Catholics and 40% of 
Protestants in Ohio voted against the minimum wage increase. The Catholic opposition is 
significantly high given that the Ohio Catholic bishops endorsed the initiative, and Catholics 
usually support minimum wage increases at much higher percentages. Regrettably, polling 
of Protestants was divided only by race; 85% of black Protestants and 55% of white 
Protestants voted Yes. There is no distinction among white Protestants between mainliners, 
whose denominations were in support of the increase, and evangelicals, whose 
denominations were less supportive. Finally, 55% of those who attend church weekly voted 
in favor of the increase; one point below the statewide vote of 56%. Therefore, while certain 
congregations and constituencies may have been mobilized effectively, this poll indicates 
that religious groups were not able to live up to their promise of persuading conservative 
Catholics and evangelicals. Religious groups were doubtless were still an important part of 
the coalition, but they were only able to reach those who already agreed or at least were 
open to their theological and political orientation toward social justice. 
  National Campaign 
At the national level, LJR also launched a campaign to get business owners to speak 
out in favor of a living wage. This effort received some media coverage before the election 
(Business Briefs 2006) and after the election (Zeller 2006). I have found no examples of 
business owners, conservative activists or politicians directly addressing the arguments of 
religious leaders during the 2006 campaigns, as opposed to their responses against secular 
arguments. 
Overall, there is enough media coverage to prove that religious groups put forward a 
significant effort in the 2006 state minimum wage campaigns, especially the state legislative 
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effort in Arkansas and the ballot initiatives in Colorado, Missouri and Ohio. The impact of 
LJR was well respected enough by other coalition partners that they were introduced by 
Senator Ted Kennedy at a celebratory press conference in Washington DC on November 16, 
2006. C-Span video of the event shows Paul Sherry speaking after Senators Kennedy, 
Schumer and Clinton and AFLCIO director John Sweeney (“Minimum wage increase,” 
2006). They certainly did not eclipse unions as the most active and influential backers of the 
initiative. However, their attempt to frame the minimum wage issue as a part of Christian 
values received recognition from non-religious media sources. Paul Sherry stated after the 
election that the Minimum Wage became “the values issue of the 2006 elections.” (Gerian 
2006). In an interview with The Nation on December 4, 2006, Sherry stated that the issue of 
the Minimum Wage “crossed political lines.” He pointed out that in his speeches across the 
country, he was able to change people’s minds by pointing out that people working full time 
minimum wage at the time made only about $10,000 a year. He also pointed out failures of 
conservative ballot measures on both fiscal and social issues in the 2006 elections, 
contrasting these results with the victory of the minimum Wage (Hayes 2006). 
The 2007 Federal Minimum Wage Increase 
The NCC’s reaction to the 2006 elections noted that a Democratic Congress would 
be likely to pass a Minimum Wage (NCC News 2006C). During their campaigning for state 
minimum wages in 2006, religious activists repeatedly stressed that low wages are a 
nationwide problem. Therefore, it is possible to argue that though Let Justice Roll and other 
religious groups had minimal impact on the legislative debate which ended with passage of 
the 2007 Fair Minimum Wage Act, they sought to gain influence through their work in the 
states which would later translate to the federal level, and they achieved this goal. They did, 
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however, make some effort to pressure members of Congress, and encourage allies in 
Congress to highlight their support. Paul Sherry’s (2006) interview in The Street Spirit noted 
that his expectation was for congressional Democrats to fight for a minimum wage increase 
precisely because the 2006 elections would show the minimum wage’s popularity, both 
because of Democratic campaign promises and the anticipated passage of the state ballot 
measures.   The Washington Post acknowledged that one of the NCC’s major legislative 
goals was a minimum wage increase, though it did not give any examples of their 
contributions (Cooperman 2007). 
Evidence from the congressional record substantiates the claim that congressional 
allies in addition to Ted Kennedy respected the contributions of religious activism. When 
introducing legislation to raise the federal minimum wage at the beginning of the 
congressional session in 2007, with the Democrats newly in control of Congress, California 
Democratic Congressman George Miller, a Catholic, acknowledged churches and other 
religious groups as key supporters of the effort, in a speech preserved in the Congressional 
Record (Miller 2007). On January 7, 2007, days before the House’s scheduled minimum 
wage debate, Let Justice Roll presented a letter signed by over a thousand faith leaders. The 
vast majority were mainline Protestants, including the leaders of all the mainline 
denominations, dozens of bishops, and hundreds of ministers. Evangelicals were represented 
by Sojourners leader Jim Wallis, but few others. Catholics included Bishop Gumbleton, Los 
Angeles auxiliary bishop Gabino Zavala, a layman named Francis X. Doyle who had served 
as the Associate General Secretary of the USCCB, the leaders of Pax Christi and Catholics 
in Alliance for the Common Good, and the leaders of several orders of nuns. LJR also 
announced the continuation of its campaign to get business leaders to support the living 
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wage movement publicly (Vu 2007). LJR touted its successful efforts to get state minimum 
wage increases, and lamented the increased cost of living combined with the record-
breaking period without a wage increase. LJR’s letter was entered into the congressional 
record on January 23 by Senator Kennedy. The United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops sent a separate letter to Congress on January 8, signed by Bishop Nicholas 
DiMarzio, chair of the domestic policy committee. It quoted Pope Benedict XVI’s recent 
encyclical as an argument that the Minimum Wage was part of the necessary effort to 
achieve a “politics of justice and dignity.” (DiMarzio, 2007). While other denominations 
sent letters, it appears that most of the influence that religious organizations did bring to the 
table derived from religious groups in an ecumenical sense rather than any particular 
denomination. On the other hand, Senator Kennedy, in a floor debate on February 1 from the 
Congressional Record, read a letter from Catholic Charities director Larry Snyder, 
discussing increasing requests for help by the working poor. 
After the initial round of legislative debate in January, there are few available 
examples of religious lobbying on the bill. In March 2007, NCC General Secretary Edgar 
criticized a proposal which put a minimum wage increase in a bill which also included war 
funding (NCC News 2007). A leader of LJR was interviewed in a Cox News Service article 
about the congressional battle over the Minimum Wage, expressing frustration over delays 
caused by Republican efforts to insert tax cuts for small businesses (Kelly 2007). When the 
2007 Fair Minimum Wage Act was passed, LJR leaders were at a rally on Capitol Hill 
celebrating the increase according to its own press release. However, media reports do not 
mention the efforts of LJR or other religious leaders. The New York Times framed the 
minimum wage as a cause primarily for labor unions. On the other hand, it also noted that 
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the usual business opponents of the minimum wage sent letters of opposition but did not do 
the rest of their usual lobbying. The consensus among these interests and congressional 
analysts was that the Minimum Wage was a foregone conclusion with a strong Democratic 
mandate in Congress and a record length of time without an increase. Though business 
groups lobbied for tax breaks, they did not make a serious attempt to block the minimum 
wage increase as a whole (Hulce 2007). Therefore, it is possible that religious leaders could 
have built a stronger lobbying effort if they felt that the success of the bill was in doubt. 
Religion and the minimum wage since 2007 
Religious backers of the 2007 minimum wage increase soon started advocating for a 
federal minimum wage increase to $10 according to banners on the LJR website. Sherry 
attended a Senate press conference with Ted Kennedy and labor leaders advocating a further 
minimum wage increase on November 7, 2007. In July 2008, the group began circulating a 
Faith Leader letter to Congress advocating for “$10 in 2010.” The campaign began when 
one of the incremental federal minimum wage increases passed in 2007 took effect. LJR set 
a goal of gathering signatures from faith leaders in every congressional district. This faith 
letter is still linked from the home page on the LJR website. Because of broken links, it is 
unclear if LJR ever achieved this milestone. A list of signatories by state was released in 
January 2011, however. A disproportionate number of the local signatories were from 
Unitarian Universalists. While some Catholics and black Protestants signed, outreach to 
Jews, Unitarians and a few of the mainline denominations (especially United Church of 
Christ) appeared to be much more successful. A majority of the other local signatories were 
Mainline Protestant ministers. The leaders of the Catholic organizations Network and Pax 
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Christi were represented under Washington DC, as was Jim Wallis of Sojourners and some 
of the Washington office directors of the mainline denominations (Let Justice Roll, n.d.). 
LJR also continued state and local minimum wage campaigns after the federal 
victory in 2007, most prominently in Memphis, Tennessee (Snarr 2011). In March 2008, 
LJR announced an event in Memphis, Tennessee, co-convened along with a labor group, 
which called for a living wage on the 40th anniversary of Martin Luther King’s visit to 
Memphis on behalf of striking sanitation workers, during which he was assassinated. The 
event included a 24-hour fast and calls for people to pressure Memphis city councilors to 
mandate a living wage for Memphis. The event included mainline Protestant and black 
Protestant clergy, along with a speaker from Sojourners and Jewish and Catholic 
participants. Snarr (2011) stated that religious groups played a minor role in the Memphis 
fight as compared to the 2005 San Diego fight, but still participated significantly through 
social protest, education of congregations, and lobbying of city councilors. 
The inauguration of President Obama and an even stronger Democratic hold on 
Congress inspired a renewed push by LJR in January 2009 for another federal minimum 
wage increase. LJR’s own press release supplemented releases by four mainline 
denominations; the Presbyterian Church USA, United Methodist Church, United Church of 
Christ and Disciples of Christ, which stated that increasing numbers of faith leaders were 
signing the letter advocating “$10 in 2010.” A newspaper article quoted LJR’s new chair, 
United Methodist minister Steve Copley, who had coordinated the 2006 Arkansas campaign, 
stating that the 2008 financial crisis made a minimum wage increase even more necessary, 
and that states with higher minimum wages than the federal level actually have lower 
unemployment (National Faith Leaders, 2009). Holly Sklar did several media interviews in 
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July 2009, providing evidence of LJR’s potential to continue as a relevant player in the 
minimum wage debate (e.g. Krerowicz 2009). Democrats accused Republicans of blocking 
minimum wage increases during the 2010 elections, and organized labor continued their 
interest in the issue of the Minimum Wage (Stein, 2010). However, the Minimum Wage was 
a less pressing issue for congressional Democrats compared to budget negotiations and 
health care reform. 
The Republican takeover of Congress and many state legislatures in the 2010 
election occurred as the living wage movement, and its religious participation, went into 
what turned out to be a temporary decline. Few states had minimum wage increases between 
2008 and 2012, according to data from the National Conference of State Legislatures and a 
2014 report from Congressional Research Service. The recently increased federal minimum 
wage caused interest in immediate minimum wage increases to be limited. Interest was 
revived after the 2010 elections, but by then, conservative victories made making progress 
on these increases impossible. However, some work by religious advocacy groups did 
continue. LJR’s faith leader letter, and a separate letter from the United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, were sent to Congress in 2011. 
Minimum wage efforts revived in the wake of President Obama’s reelection in 2012, 
as fast food workers began protests across the country in November 2012. Ministers were 
involved in these protests, especially in New York City (Resnikoff 2014). As protests 
continued throughout 2013, the Presbyterian Church USA was particularly involved in these 
protests, though there was backlash by conservatives with the Presbyterian Church and other 
denominations (Weber 2013). The apparent slowness of most denominations to get involved 
in this effort likely did not prevent local ministers and congregations from joining protests, 
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but did limit the immediate mobilization of a potential national constituency for the 
movement. 
Religious groups also participated in renewed conventional lobbying efforts for a 
federal minimum wage increase in 2013 and 2014, despite the refusal of House Republicans 
to seriously consider them. President Obama has consistently supported a minimum wage 
increase, yet he has so far been the first Democratic President since before Franklin 
Roosevelt not to be able to sign a raise. This included a significant increase in the activity of 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in its campaign for the federal minimum 
wage. In June 2013, as noted earlier, Bishop Blair of the Domestic Justice, Peace and 
Human Development Committee testified before a Senate committee in commemoration of 
the 75th anniversary of the Minimum Wage. Over the following months, this testimony and 
some nationwide protests regarding Congress’s refusal to increase the minimum wage 
resulted in more articles about the minimum wage in the Catholic media, including America 
magazine and The National Catholic Reporter (e.g. Roewe 2013, Clark 2013, Rotandaro 
2014). 
In January 2014, Miami bishop Thomas Wenski, the new chair of the USCCB 
Justice, Peace and Human Development Committee, and Father Larry Snyder of Catholic 
Charities USA, sent a letter to Congress, which received attention in the Catholic media (e.g. 
Archbold 2014, Magliano 2014). It appears that the USCCB, barring further changes, has 
formed a habit of sending letters to Congress in favor of minimum wages, which mobilize 
interest from Catholic media. Blaire’s hearing testimony, which appears to be rare for 
religious organizations on the issue of the minimum wage since the 1960s, displays 
increased involvement by the USCCB on this issue. 
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The National Council of Churches has been involved in recent efforts primarily 
through the associations of many of its leaders and denominations with the coalition 
Interfaith Worker Justice, along with other social justice organizations with significant 
mainline and black Protestant participation, such as Faith in Public Life and the Ecumenical 
Poverty Initiative. Interfaith Worker Justice wrote a letter to Congress on behalf of efforts to 
increase the federal Minimum Wage in April 2014, signed by the leaders of the mainline 
denominations and several Catholic organizations such as Network and the conferences of 
men and women religious, among others. It also included the signatures of leaders from 
denominations which normally avoid politics, such as the Moravian Church, Swedenborgian 
Church, and the two Dutch Reformed denominations; the Reformed Church in America (a 
National Council of Churches member) and the Christian Reformed Church (a National 
Association of Evangelicals member) (Faith Leaders Urge Congress, 2014). However, 
efforts by congressional Democrats in 2014 were unsuccessful because of the categorical 
refusal of Senate Republicans to compromise, and the necessity of defending social 
programs such as unemployment compensation from further cuts. Additionally, state 
minimum wages, which in the Democratic Congress of 2007 were used to apply pressure for 
a federal minimum wage, are now used as an excuse by Republicans to block federal 
increases. Republican Senators Rob Portman (Ohio, United Methodist) and Dean Heller 
(Nevada, Mormon), both from states with high minimum wages passed by ballot initiatives, 
stated in 2014 that these state efforts prove that the minimum wage should be left to the 
states (Bolton 2014). 
Despite these drawbacks, living wage advocates renewed their efforts to get state 
minimum wage increases, especially in 2014, as it became clear that Democrats would likely 
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lose the 2014 congressional elections. Religious groups were significant in these efforts in 
some states, and had minor involvement in most states. In 2013, according to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, minimum wages were raised in only five states, though 
these included two of the largest, California and New York, in addition to Connecticut and 
Rhode Island through legislation, and New Jersey through a ballot measure after the 
governor vetoed legislation. Two other states had minimum wage increases passed in the 
legislature but they were vetoed by governors. According to the NCSL, state minimum wage 
victories were even more substantial in 2014. 14 states increased their minimum wages in 
2014. This was an even more significant number of state minimum wage increases than in 
2006. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia and the District of Columbia increased the minimum 
wage through legislation. Meanwhile, four states (Alaska, Arkansas, Nebraska and South 
Dakota) increased their minimum wages through ballot measures. Though these are all 
small, conservative states, they are very diverse geographically. A non-binding ballot 
measure calling for a minimum wage increase also passed in Illinois (National Conference 
of State Legislatures 2013, 2014). All of these occurred with minimal evidence of religious 
involvement. 
In 2013, religious organizations were not very involved in the campaigns in 
California, Connecticut and Rhode Island, but were somewhat involved in the legislative 
campaign in New York and the ballot measure campaign in New Jersey. The evidence for 
lack of involvement is the absence of mentions in major newspapers in the relevant state, 
and the lack of a website on which religious supporters of the minimum wage could be 
listed. The lack of involvement in California is somewhat surprising, since there has been a 
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history of churches advocating for local minimum wage increases, especially in Los 
Angeles. 
The following paragraphs compare church involvement in New York and New 
Jersey New York’s Catholic bishops had some influence in the debate over New York’s 
minimum wage during the long campaign for an increase. On April 19, 2012, Albany bishop 
Howard Hubbard testified at a public forum sponsored by state Senate Democrats (Seiler 
2012). The Albany Times Union noted that other “progressive” faith leaders were present, 
but did not name them. In May 2012, the New York Catholic Bishops, including Cardinal 
Timothy Dolan of New York City, released a statement which received media attention (e.g. 
Kaplan 2012). The minimum wage increase was finally passed the following year. 
The New York Raise the Minimum Wage Coalition includes several religious 
organizations, including the New York Council of Churches and the New York Episcopal 
Public Policy Network. The New York Conference of Catholic Bishops is not a member, but 
Albany bishop Howard Hubbard is involved in one of the member organizations, the New 
York Labor Religion Coalition (Raise the Minimum Wage, n.d.). Though the Catholic 
Church in New York is not a member of the coalition, it appears that the Catholic hierarchy 
was more publicly involved in the debate in 2012 and 2013 than the Episcopal Church or 
other denominations associated with the New York Council of Churches. Protestant 
churches in New York were involved in some local efforts to increase the state minimum 
wage, including a rally in Buffalo in June 2012. There was also a rally to raise the minimum 
wage in Albany in January 2013, for which the New York Labor Religion Coalition 
provided busses to transport people from New York City and other places throughout the 
state (Statewide Action to Raise the Minimum Wage 2013). Michael Livingston, the director 
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of Interfaith Worker Justice, claimed in an article published on the Methodist General Board 
of Church and Society’s Website, that his organization provided support to the New York 
Religion Labor Coalition in its legislative lobbying efforts (Livingston 2013). 
The New Jersey Ballot Measure 
Churches were among the supporters of New Jersey’s ballot measure to raise the 
minimum wage. Christian groups involved in the Raise the Minimum Wage NJ coalition 
include Christ Worship Centers Worldwide, Concerned Pastors of Trenton, Interfaith 
Worker Justice, La Iglesia del Pueblo Clifton, PICO, Samaritan Baptist Church, St. 
Augustine Presbyterian Church in Paterson, St. Luke’s Baptist Church, St. Paul’s Baptist 
Church in Trenton, St. Paul’s African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Trenton 
Deliverance Center Church, and the United Christian Institute (Trenton Extension). Most of 
the congregations in the list are black Protestant churches in Trenton. Most of the other 
organizations are groups which have the primary purpose of social justice advocacy, such as 
Raise the Wage New Jersey (http://www.raisethewagenj.org/). While mainline 
denominations and state conferences of Catholic bishops were often involved in advocacy 
for minimum wage ballot measures in 2006, there is no sign of their activity in New Jersey 
in 2013. This is despite the fact that New Jersey borders New York, where religious groups 
including the Bishops were more involved in the living wage campaign at the same time. 
This finding also undermines the argument that religious groups are automatically more 
involved in ballot measures than legislation. 
2014 State Campaigns  
From the available evidence, religious activists were more involved in the minimum 
wage campaigns in Minnesota and Arkansas than in other states. While Minnesota increased 
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its minimum wage through legislation, Arkansas increased its minimum wage through ballot 
measures. These two states have no geographical or political commonalities. They do, 
however, have established records of religious involvement in social justice issues, 
especially by mainline denominations but with support from Catholics and other religious 
groups. 
Minnesota 
Political scientist Katherine Knutson’s 2014 book Interfaith Advocacy is a study of 
Minnesota’s Joint Religious Legislative Coalition. The book documents, based on her own 
interviews and Minnesota media sources, that the Joint Religious Legislative Coalition is 
one of the most established state level religious advocacy groups in the United States, and 
that it has been lobbying for minimum wage increases since at least the 1990s. It has paid 
for radio advertisements, conducted advocacy training, and lobbied legislators, among other 
tactics. The JRLC, founded in 1971, is an interfaith advocacy organization which lobbies for 
a range of progressive anti-poverty policies in Minnesota, and the abolition of the death 
penalty. It is a project of the Minnesota Catholic Conference and the Minnesota Council of 
Churches, along with Jewish and Muslim associations (Knudson 2014). In February 2013, 
Peg Kemberlyn of the Minnesota Council of Churches, one of the sponsors of the JRLC, 
testified before a legislative committee (Snowbeck 2013). In October 2013, the Joint 
Religious Legislative Coalition (JRLC) announced that the Minimum Wage would be a 
priority issue for 2014, in a public forum at Grand Rapids Presbyterian Church (Teod 2013). 
A summary written by JRLC provides a list of concrete activities which indicate 
their influence in the minimum wage campaign during 2014. A JRLC leader was co-chair of 
Minnesota’s campaign to raise the minimum wage along with leaders of the Children’s 
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Defense Fund and AFL-CIO. The JRLC’s 2014 session summary states “We were 
successful in framing the issue in terms of a full-time worker being able to secure, at a 
minimum, a poverty-level income for a family of three. We were also responsible for much 
of the research and the final negotiations around the cost-of-living adjustment.” JRLC also 
lobbied legislators regarding the minimum wage at their annual Day on the Hill, organized 
four phone banks, held several “in-district meetings” with state legislators, mobilized 
turnout for town hall meetings, and submitted newspaper editorials. This broad range of 
tactics is remarkable for a state religious advocacy group. When the minimum wage increase 
took effect in August 2014, the public policy director of the Minnesota Council of Churches 
was interviewed by Minnesota Public Radio (Sepic 2014). Although media accounts of 
JRLC’s claims are difficult to find, few other religious advocacy groups have made such 
detailed claims to record their combination of insider and outsider activity, and their 
credibility as activists is backed by Knutson’s work regarding their earlier campaigns. 
The significant religious effort in Minnesota can largely be explained by the political 
infrastructure of the JLRC and Minnesota Council of Churches. These organizations had a 
record of political work with the Minnesota legislature, and an effective ability to mobilize 
the public while working with coalition partners. 
Arkansas 
Arkansas had increased its minimum wage in 2006, with participation from Let 
Justice Roll and other religious groups. Steve Copley, the Methodist minister who was 
already leading the Give Arkansas a Raise coalition in 2006, continued to lead legislative 
efforts after the federal minimum wage overtook the state minimum wage in 2009. 
However, in 2014, as Copley described in an interview with the Arkansas Educational 
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Television Network, their legislative efforts failed and the group decided to undertake the 
arduous process of putting the minimum wage increase on the ballot in 2014 (Hiblin 2014). 
This involved deciding how much of a minimum wage increase to try for, and it was decided 
that the measure would provide a relatively conservative increase to $8.50 over three years. 
The Arkansas Interfaith Alliance headed the group of volunteers gaining petition signatures 
(Sargent 2014). When the measure was passed with overwhelming support, Copley, still 
serving as chair of Give Arkansas a Raise coalition, received media recognition as the 
initiative’s sponsor (e.gg. Lyon 2014). Arkansas, as the only state in the Deep South to have 
passed a minimum wage increase in recent years, is also the state with the most religious 
involvement in the campaign. It seems likely that the organizational efforts of Copley are 
instrumental to its success. An unanswered question is why Arkansas has developed such a 
sustained living wage campaign, and a significant level of religious involvement, compared 
to many of the other states in its geographic region. The effort is headed primarily by United 
Methodists and other mainline Protestants, with some Catholic involvement and relatively 
little participation from Arkansas’s large evangelical community. 
Other states  
Some other states that had legislative minimum wage increases did have religious 
involvement in the campaign. 
Maryland. Maryland also had some significant involvement by religious 
organizations. Like Minnesota and Arkansas, its religious groups have a history of social 
justice advocacy, including the minimum wage, as the Baltimore campaign in 1994 was 
groundbreaking. Maryland also has a significant history of political involvement by the 
Catholic Church and black Protestant denominations, and its proximity to Washington DC 
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means that it is close to the offices of religious lobbyists. Yet Maryland’s religious efforts 
were not as sustained as those in Minnesota and Arkansas. 
In Maryland, the state Catholic conference expressed support for a state minimum 
wage increase in 2014 (Wagner 2014). The Washington Post noted that Maryland, for 
historical, demographic and geographic reasons, has always had more Catholic political 
influence than many other states. 
The Catholic Church, mainline Protestant churches and black churches were also 
involved in outsider tactics. On Labor Day weekend 2013, minimum wage workers were 
invited to speak to dozens of congregations, especially in Baltimore (Roewe 2013). In 
February 2014, the Democratic governor of Maryland and mayor of Baltimore spoke at a 
rally outside a Baltimore Catholic church, along with an auxiliary Catholic bishop and a 
variety of mainline and black Protestant ministers (Wenger and Bottalico 2014). 
West Virginia. In West Virginia, in April 2014, mainline Protestant ministers were 
involved in efforts to increase the state minimum wage again by lobbying legislators (Nyden 
2014). West Virginia, like Arkansas, had been one of the first successful campaigns 
associated with Let Justice Roll in 2006. 
Northeastern states and Hawai’i: minor involvement. Rhode Island’s Jobs for 
Justice Coalition included an interfaith network of activists. The executive director of the 
Rhode Island Council of Churches was among those speaking at a rally at the Renaissance 
Hotel in Providence on June 26, 2014.26 In neighboring Vermont, the American Friends 
Service Committee (Quakers) was included on the steering committee of Raise the Wage 
Vermont, and the campaign was also endorsed by the Vermont Interfaith Council. In 
                                                 
26 Need a specific article from this site - https://rijwj.wordpress.com/ 
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Delaware, the advocacy group Delaware ADA included a letter on its website from a dozen 
clergy, including Episcopalian and Methodist bishops (Americans for Democratic Action, 
Delaware Chapter, n.d.). Finally, in Hawaii, an interfaith organization called Faith Action 
for Community Equity campaigned for the successful minimum wage increase to $10.10, 
including a visit to the state legislature (Faith Action for Community Equity, n.d.). However, 
all of these efforts did not have the sustained level of organization that was displayed in 
Minnesota and Arkansas. They received little media attention, had minimal claims of 
activity from their own websites, and had no record of lobbying on the websites of their state 
legislatures. 
Other ballot measure campaigns 
Although Arkansas’s ballot access campaign had significant, possibly even decisive 
religious involvement, it cannot be determined that religious groups are automatically more 
involved in minimum wage campaigns when they are on the ballot, because the other three 
states where minimum wages were passed in 2014 by ballot measure, appeared to have little 
religious campaigning. These states had not had ballot measures on this issue before, but 
neither did five of the six states which passed minimum wages by ballot in 2006. 
In Alaska, Reverend Michael Burke of Saint Mary’s Episcopal Church was a 
significant enough campaigner that he was invited to testify at a public forum sponsored by 
the Alaska legislature in March 2014 (“Yes on 3,” 2014). However, there is no evidence of a 
sustained campaign by religious organizations. In Nebraska and South Dakota, it does not 
appear that churches were significantly involved. An October 2014 article in the Omaha 
World Herald about organizations donating to the campaign, and a search of the Facebook 
page Nebraskans for Better Wages, along with analysis of other media accounts, does not 
  
226 
yield any evidence of church involvement (Stoddard 2014). On the other hand, the Omaha 
World Herald notes that there was no significant opposition campaign. Researching media 
accounts of South Dakota’s minimum wage campaign also does not yield any mention of 
churches. 
Overall, the states where churches were most involved already had established 
interfaith coalitions with experience working at the state level. National coalitions such as 
Let Justice Roll have the potential to strengthen these groups, as happened in Arkansas and 
to some extent West Virginia, both conservative states, in 2006. Minimum wage campaigns 
at the local level can develop based on local conditions, but networking at the state level 
requires more organizational commitment. Minnesota’s unusual level of religious social 
justice lobbying was not begun by a national coalition, but involved political and social 
conditions particular to that state. 
Fight for 15 
More local efforts also continued in 2014 and beyond. In Seattle and its suburbs in 
2013 and 2014, the Church Council of Greater Seattle encouraged its congregations to 
actively support the proposals and maintained a Living Wage journey website 
(http://www.livingwagejourney.org). The Republican victory in the 2014 elections has not 
demobilized living wage movements in local contexts, including religious congregations. On 
Palm Sunday 2015, congregations of several churches marched into a Chicago McDonald’s 
to protest low wages (Rodriguez 2015). Religious leaders, along with labor union activists, 
conducted more events in April 2015 including a fast from food initiated by religious 
activists (Moberg 2015). Most recently, ministers at least in New York City, Chicago and 
  
227 
Detroit mobilized their congregations for “Fight for 15” protests, also supported by labor 
unions and community groups (Greenhouse 2015). 
Such episodes support the indication that churches are still more likely to support 
living wage campaigns when they work within interfaith coalitions. While the less 
hospitable political climate for living wage campaigns may have decreased religious 
involvement for a time after the 2010 elections, such activism appears to be on the rise again 
at the local and state level, even without a broad-based organization such as Let Justice Roll. 
However, classic, insider lobbying efforts by single organizations do exist at the state level. 
In 2015, Catholic bishops in Iowa lobbied the legislature on behalf of the Minimum Wage, 
by meeting with legislators. This effort yielded the only direct response to religious 
advocacy of the minimum wage by a legislator opposed to an increase, as Republican Walt 
Rogers told The Sioux City Journal in 2015 regarding his meeting with the Catholic bishops, 
“I don’t agree with them on everything; we’re on the same page when it comes to saving 
babies.” This statement provides a recent example of Catholic bishops trying but failing to 
persuade socially conservative Republicans to support them on a progressive issue. 
Conclusion 
This study has argued that religious groups had a particularly high level of activity in 
living wage campaigns during the 2006 election campaign and shortly after, culminating in 
the passage of the 2007 Fair Minimum Wage Act. In 2006, the federal government had not 
increased the minimum wage for about a decade, causing the real value of the minimum 
wage to fall, and pastors noticed increasing demand for help from their congregations by the 
working poor. The local living wage movement active since the 1990s was growing, with 
several previous examples of working relationships between religious congregations of a 
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variety of backgrounds, and secular coalition partners. The stability of these coalitions, 
combined with a good election cycle for the Democratic Party, mobilized progressive 
religious activists for a successful effort at the local, state and federal level. Some moderate 
religious leaders, such as the Catholic bishops, have also worked on behalf of living wage 
campaigns, partially because of denominational social teachings about the Christian duty to 
insure protection for the poor, and partially because the living wage attracts more support 
from across the political spectrum compared to other progressive legislation. However, 
mainline, black Protestant and Quaker denominations distinguished themselves at the peak 
of the living wage fight, and are likely to continue their leadership in future campaigns. The 
living wage movement is also a significant example of an issue which receives the most 
attention from religious groups at the state and local level rather than the federal level. The 
Fight for $15 movement was meant to gear up religious advocates and other living wage 
advocates for a federal fight following some successful local fights, in the likely event of a 
Democratic victory in the 2016 elections. Given that the minimum wage still did not 
increase by the end of the Obama administration, and that the Republicans won the 2016 
election, local battles are likely to continue for some time, even though the record for the 
longest time without a minimum wage increase is less than two years away from being 
broken. Still, despite the low probability of short-term success, these efforts are likely to 
concentrate at the local and state level, not only for the benefit of particular communities, 
but also to express demand for a minimum wage at the federal level. Throughout, religious 
groups will argue not only that minimum wage increases are morally right and economically 
sound, but also that they prevent religious charitable agencies from being asked for help by 
the working poor, so they may focus on those out of work.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
How do religious groups develop positions on progressive efforts to address poverty 
such as minimum wages, welfare policy and health care policy? My findings, from research 
of previous books on the subject, media accounts and congressional committee transcripts, 
confirms the general scholarly consensus that the theological orientations of denominations 
largely explain the positions taken by the leaderships of denominations and 
interdenominational organizations. Critically, however, these theological orientations 
combine with political ideologies to form a lens through which groups examine social and 
economic issues. Evangelical denominations such as the Southern Baptist Convention, 
especially since the mobilization of conservative forces within the Church, argue that 
Christian faith is a key part of solving multi-generational poverty. Governmental programs 
which do not promote religious faith will be ineffective because they do not address the root 
causes of poverty. By contrast, mainline Protestants place far less importance on personal 
salvation as a necessity, and certainly do not believe that religious faith will, in itself, 
address poverty. Rather, under the influence of social gospel thinkers from the early 
twentieth century, they argue that governmental initiatives that do not address structural 
inequality will not address the root causes of poverty. The ways in which theology and 
economic ideas are connected are concisely articulated by Gerson (the Bush speechwriter 
and “compassionate conservative” who came to support the Circle of Protection), who stated 
in The Washington Post that religious activists on both the left and the right “pray to the 
same God but different economists” (Gerson 2011). 
My research shows how religious groups consistently supplement their expressions 
of moral concern with arguments that policies will be effective. Christian Right opponents 
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of welfare and health care tout the successes of “faith-based compassion” and tax credits to 
incentivize marriage as replacements for social programs (e.g. Contract with the American 
Family, 1995), and argue that health care reform will cause rationing rather than improving 
care. Mainline Protestant, progressive evangelical and Catholic advocates of social welfare 
programs, health care reform and the minimum wage began using the slogan that “budgets 
are moral documents” during the Reagan Administration (Tipton 2007). They argue that 
governmental initiatives which provide income support to the poor, prevent the poor from 
having to spend inordinately on health care, and to earn more money from working, will 
strengthen families and improve the economy long-term, while moving the US toward being 
a socially just, Christ-like society at the same time. When these two theological and 
economic ideologies are compared, Earned Income Tax Credits are one of the few policies 
where there is agreement. 
While I had suspected most of these dynamics early in my research, I still needed to 
answer further research questions: Under what circumstances have religious groups gone 
beyond taking positions on poverty, and aggressively lobbied in order to seek policy 
outcomes? More importantly, under what circumstances are religious groups most effective 
in lobbying on issues of poverty? Are they generally more successful when they focus on 
their theological teachings and moral vision? Or are they often better off engaging in more 
secular arguments on the social and economic effectiveness of policies? Which religious 
group is the most effective in lobbying for the poor overall? 
I argue that the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and perhaps to an 
even greater extent its two large service agencies, Catholic Charities and the Catholic Health 
Association, are the most effective lobbyists for the poor. This is despite the fact that their 
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theological priority, over and above economic issues, is preventing access to abortion, and 
also despite the fact that they have a vocal plurality of economically conservative 
congregants and activists within their denomination. Catholic lobbyists for the poor 
compensate for these factors by relying on their expertise as leaders of charitable agencies 
and as health care providers. Their testimony at committee hearings for the past 70 years, as 
described in chapters 2 through 5, shows their ability to argue that they cannot provide the 
comprehensive services to families that government programs can provide. They have also, 
occasionally, been able to use their opposition to abortion to persuade conservative 
Republicans to weaken legislation cutting back welfare, including on the issue of family 
caps during the Clinton administration. 
The story of the Catholic Church in the United States shows that there is a clear 
middle ground between the theologically liberal mainline Protestant lobbyists and the 
theologically conservative Southern Baptist lobbyists, which should not be surprising given 
American religious history. In the early twentieth century, social gospel Protestants and the 
founders of Catholic social teaching deeply believed that bringing religious faith to the poor 
was critically important, just as conservative Protestants did. But at the same time, having 
seen the plight of the poor, they argued that justice demanded that the government provide 
comprehensive programs. The Catholic Church, and some of those who may be termed 
moderate evangelicals, still believe that there are important religious values which must be 
maintained over and above economic justice, such as the protection of life beginning at 
conception, and, like conservatives, they are distressed that the government does not accept 
their position on these matters. But their belief in social injustice as a cause of poverty and 
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their expertise as charitable organizations combine to make them effective lobbyists for the 
poor regardless. 
I sought in my research to make sure that the Catholic Church took concrete actions 
to argue for progressive policies, and the lists of media accounts and congressional hearing 
transcripts supplement the documents by the Bishops to provide a strong case that they 
exerted significant pressure to oppose welfare reform during the Clinton administration, and 
that the Catholic Health Association was instrumental in the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. McAndrews (2012) notes that the Catholic Bishops 
were more willing to adopt compromise proposals than the mainline Protestants in the early 
1970s, and I find that this trend has largely remained. However, even in the least likely case 
of support for progressive policies, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops wanted the same 
expansion of health care provisions for low income families and immigrants as the mainline 
Protestants during the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, even as 
they criticized the Obama Administration from the opposite ideological direction on 
abortion. 
The recent turn of the National Association of Evangelicals toward support for 
progressive efforts to address poverty provides more evidence that social conservative 
organizations have the potential to be powerful lobbyists for the poor. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, there are a couple possible reasons for the change in attitude by the NAE. First, 
they became disillusioned with the plans for faith-based partnerships which evangelicals had 
begun to support after they allowed that government may financially support the work of 
religious organizations helping the poor in the 1950s. The Bush Administration’s failure to 
establish durable, well-funded programs convinced some that there would be no alternative 
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to governmental comprehensive programs. Second, just as the Catholic Church used 
arguments based on welfare’s effect on abortion rates during the Clinton administration, 
other religious groups courted conservative evangelicals by agreeing to make proposals 
addressing the national debt after the 2010 election. 
One may have expected that the National Council of Churches and its mainline and 
black Protestant denominations may be more effective in lobbying for the poor than 
Catholics and evangelicals. Mainline Protestant denominations, at least, have completely 
abandoned political movements against abortion and gay rights. Thus, they have little 
trouble accepting the Democratic Party’s platform, except for those who believe it is not 
progressive enough. Black Protestant denominations, while more socially conservative, also 
have strong connections to the Democratic Party. NCC denominations too, have charitable 
organizations which testify at committee hearings, a variety of lobbying arms in Washington 
DC, and the Protestant Health Alliance was once powerful. Yet Catholic Charities is 
universally touted by media and academic accounts as being larger and more organized than 
the mainline charities combined. Additionally, while mainline denominational leadership is 
mostly liberal, there remains a gap between membership and leadership. This gap, in fact, is 
most pronounced on economic issues, where according to the 2015 Pew Landscape survey, 
mainline Protestants are split on whether aid to the poor does more harm than good; a lower 
percentage than among Catholics. The combination of a historic presence of fiscal 
conservative mainline denominations, the comparative lack of racial diversity (given that 
racial minorities are much more progressive on issues of poverty), and the influence of 
conservative think tanks to undermine the authority of mainline denominations are all 
factors. 
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It has been made clear repeatedly throughout this project that denominations cannot 
rely on the support of their members when it comes to economic policy. That is a key part of 
the reason why religious groups do lobby more effectively using their expertise on poverty; 
thus, in their secular rather than explicitly religious capacity. This does not detract from the 
importance of religion, as denominations need the right theological views in order to be 
interested in making those secular arguments. But when politicians realize that there are 
competing interpretations within a denomination, the moral authority of the leadership is 
undermined. This is also why religious groups have also relied on the tactic of mobilizing 
interfaith and secular coalitions. On the progressive side, they hold out hope that when they 
speak as a united voice of the faith community, or when they lend their support to secular 
anti-poverty groups, their moral vision will be listened to. The addition of the National 
Association of Evangelicals and other moderate conservative evangelicals made the moral 
unity of the Circle of Protection even stronger during the debt ceiling crisis in 2011. 
However, now that it is clear that evangelical public opinion on economics did not change 
with the NAE, and that evangelicals are as Republican as before, the effectiveness of the 
Circle of Protection is lessened. 
Are there any circumstances when religious groups, including their supporters in the 
charitable agencies and secular coalition partners, can mobilize the support of their 
congregants based on a moral vision? I have argued that local and state minimum wage 
movements are the best contemporary example of success in this area. The minimum wage 
is a simple policy which can be changed at the state level and sometimes the local level, 
often by ballot measure. It has also not been increased at the federal level in a record amount 
of time, a fact of which most of the working poor are well aware. While the evidence that 
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religious identity impacts voting decisions on minimum wage ballot measures is lacking, the 
minimum wage is the most popular progressive issue among the religious, and local clergy 
and congregants have been most likely to work on it compared to welfare and health care. 
Given falling rates of civic participation and social capital (Putnam 2000; Verba 
Schlozman and Brady 2011), it should not be too surprising that religious progressives have 
often been unable to generate lasting social movements. Division between progressives and 
conservatives within denominations, competing priorities, lack of organization, and apathy 
among progressive congregants all play a part. If a more durable movement linking active 
networks of local and national religious leaders were to arise, it would likely bolster the 
inside lobbying of charitable organizations, their partners in denominational leaderships, and 
anti-poverty advocates who work with them. Despite the lack of such a movement, and 
despite the low number of policy successes that are obviously attributable to religious 
groups, lobbyists from faith groups do remain a part of the debate on income support, health 
care and the minimum wage. 
Based on this research, what can we expect from economic progressive religious 
denominations during the Trump administration and beyond? Malone (2017), in a profile for 
Reuters, describes a rising “religious left”, with more clergy attending activist meetings. A 
variety of faith leaders traveled to Washington DC when it appeared that a repeal of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act might pass the House. As the writing process for 
this project was concluding, Cox (2017), expressed skepticism about the rise of the 
Religious Left, given declining religiosity among liberals. The Religious Right, meanwhile, 
also faces declining numbers in some of its denominations and numerous defeats on cultural 
issues, even as it has arguably returned to political influence. 
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Part of the problem in these conversations is that the terms “Religious Left” and 
“Religious Right” are poorly defined. Cox (2015), for example, notes that many Hispanic 
Catholics are pro-life. Would they be a part of the Religious Left? Most likely not. However, 
they are also not in the Religious Right. Those who want to see comprehensive health 
coverage and a strong social safety net, but who are opposed to legalized abortion, should be 
classified as Christian centrists, and the Religious Left must accept them as allies in the fight 
for anti-poverty legislation because of their deep connections to charitable agencies which 
have experience in persuading difficult Republican congresses. The Catholic Bishops, the 
National Association of Evangelicals, and even some evangelicals to the right of the NAE 
are likely to advocate together for Earned Income Tax Credits, which are popular across the 
political spectrum of religious denominations. There is a good possibility that the Circle of 
Protection, including the USCCB and NAE, will continue advocating welfare, and it is 
possible that they can move the NAE and other evangelicals toward advocacy of some 
minimum wage increases. While the Catholic Health Association will continue to advocate 
for the maintenance of President Obama’s health reform legacy, and more progressive 
reforms should the opportunity arise, the Catholic Bishops and NAE are more likely to limit 
themselves to protecting specific health care programs for the poor, with little interest in 
broad reform agendas. 
A fascinating development for the Religious Center and Right comes in the form of a 
new book by Rod Dreher (2016) called The Benedict Option, which has been described by 
David Brooks (2016) as the most important spiritual book for the decade. Dreher, a 
conservative journalist, argues that theologically conservative Christians should disengage 
from the Republican Party, and focus on strengthening the religious faith of their 
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communities. Does disengaging from the Republican Party mean that these conservative 
Christians would be more likely to support economically progressive ideas? The answer is 
most likely no. The inclination of theologically conservative Christians toward fiscal 
conservatism, especially when they distrust the government for cultural reasons, means that, 
at best, they will not actively oppose progressive anti-poverty efforts. The primary 
possibilities for movement from the Christian Right to the Christian Center are that just as 
before, charities operated by evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and others come to see 
the benefits of government aid to the poor. 
Even if religion continues to decrease in popularity among the young, it is likely that 
the Christian Left, Center and Right will all survive in some form. Future research should 
focus on interviews with religious leaders seeking to mobilize the resources that 
denominations have remaining. It will be worth asking how denominations have in the past, 
and will continue in the future, to network with interfaith coalitions, encourage local 
congregations to engage with economic matters, oversee charitable organizations, and 
choose priorities. There is no doubt that, regardless of economic developments, cultural 
changes, and the party in power, religious groups will continue to be a powerful voice in 
American politics, and a key part of the debate on dealing with poverty. 
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Appendix: Tables of Voting Positions of Democrats For/Against Stupak Amendment  
 
Note: Table 3 immediately below runs to three pages; see caption at end. 
Member 
Name State Tenure Religion 
Stupak 
Amendment 
House 
Bill 
Senate 
Bill 
Jason 
Altmire PA 
2007-2013, defeated 
in primary during 
redistricting Roman Catholic Yes No No 
Joe Baca CA 
1999-2013, defeated 
by a Democrat Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
John 
Barrow GA 2005-2015, defeated 
Baptist 
(unspecified) Yes No No 
Robert 
Marion 
Berry AR 1997-2011, retired United Methodist Yes Yes No 
Sanford 
Bishop GA 1993-Present 
National Baptist 
Convention, USA Yes Yes Yes 
John 
Boccieri OH 2009-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes No Yes 
Dan Boren OK 2005-2013, retired United Methodist Yes No No 
Bobby 
Bright AL 2009-2011, defeated Southern Baptist Yes No No 
Dennis 
Cardoza CA 2003-2012 (resigned) Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Chris 
Carney PA 2007-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Ben 
Chandler KY 2004-2013 (defeated) 
Associate 
Reformed 
Presbyterian 
Church Yes No No 
Travis 
Childers MS 2008-2011 (defeated) Southern Baptist Yes No No 
Jim Cooper TN 1983-Present Episcopalian Yes Yes Yes 
Jim Costa CA 2005-present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Jerry 
Costello IL 1988-2012, retired Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Henry 
Cuellar TX 2005-present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Kathy 
Dahlkempe
r PA 2009-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Artur Davis AL 
2003-2011, retired to 
run for governor Lutheran Yes No No 
Lincoln 
Davis TN 2003-2011, defeated Southern Baptist Yes No No 
Joe 
Donnelly IN 
2007-2013, retired to 
run for Senate, 
successfully Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Mike Doyle PA 1995-Present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
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Steve 
Driehaus OH 2009-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Brad 
Ellsworth IN 
2007-2011, retired to 
run for Senate Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Bob 
Etheridge NC 1997-2011, defeated 
Presbyterian 
Church USA Yes Yes Yes 
Bart 
Gordon TN 1985-2011, retired United Methodist Yes No Yes 
Baron Hill IN 
1999-2005, 2007-
2011, defeated United Methodist Yes Yes Yes 
Tim Holden PA 
1993-2013, defeated 
in primary Roman Catholic Yes No No 
Paul 
Kanjorski PA 1985-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Marcy 
Kaptur OH 1983-Present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Dale Kildee MI 
1977-2013, retired 
and succeeded by his 
nephew Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Jim 
Langevin RI 2001-present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Dan 
Lipinski IL 2005-Present Roman Catholic Yes Yes No 
Stephen 
Lynch MA 2001-Present Roman Catholic Yes Yes No 
Jim 
Marshall GA 2003-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes No No 
Jim 
Matheson UT 
2001-2015, retired 
after several close re-
election campaigns 
and succeeded by 
Republican Mormon Yes No No 
Mike 
McIntyre NC 
1997-2015, retired 
after several close re-
election fights and 
succeeded by 
Republican 
Presbyterian 
Church USA Yes No No 
Charlie 
Melancon LA 
2005-2011, retired to 
run for Senate Roman Catholic Yes No No 
Mike 
Michaud ME 
2003-2015, retired to 
run for governor Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Allen 
Mollohan WV 
1983-2011, defeated 
in primary 
American Baptist 
Churches USA Yes Yes Yes 
John 
Murtha PA 1974-2010, his death Roman Catholic Yes Yes 
Died 
before 
vote 
Richard 
Neal MA 1989-Present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Jim 
Oberstar MN 1975-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Dave Obey WI 1969-2011, retired Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Solomon 
Ortiz TX 1983-2011 United Methodist Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3: voting positions of Democrats who voted for the Stupak Amendment 
  
Tom 
Perriello VA 2009-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Colin 
Peterson MN 1991-Present 
Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in 
America Yes No No 
Earl 
Pomeroy ND 1993-2011, defeated 
Presbyterian 
Church USA Yes Yes Yes 
Nick Rahall WV 1977-2015, defeated 
Presbyterian 
Church USA Yes Yes Yes 
Sylvester 
Reyes TX 1997-2013 Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Ciro 
Rodriguez TX 
1997-2005, 2007-
2011 Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Mike Ross AR 2001-2013, retired United Methodist Yes No No 
Tim Ryan OH 2003-Present Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
John 
Salazar CO 2005-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
Heath 
Shuler NC 
2007-2013, retired 
after close re-election 
fights and succeeded 
by a Republican Southern Baptist Yes No No 
Ike Skelton MO 1977-2011 Disciples of Christ Yes No No 
Vic Snyder AR 1997-2011, retired United Methodist Yes Yes Yes 
Zach Space OH 2007-2011, defeated Greek Orthodox Yes Yes No 
John Spratt SC 1975-2011, defeated 
Presbyterian 
Church USA Yes Yes Yes 
Bart Stupak MI 1993-2011 Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
John 
Tanner TN 1989-present Disciples of Christ Yes No No 
Gene 
Taylor MS 1989-Present Roman Catholic Yes No No 
Harry 
Teague NM 2009-2011, defeated 
Baptist 
(unspecified) Yes No No 
Charlie 
Wilson OH 2007-2011, defeated Roman Catholic Yes Yes Yes 
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Name State Tenure Religion 
House 
bill 
Senate 
bill 
John Adler NJ 
2009-2011, 
defeated 
Jewish (raised 
Episcopalian) No No 
Michael Arcuri NY 
2007-2011, 
defeated Roman Catholic Yes No 
Brian Baird WA 
1999-2011, 
retired 
Non-
Denominational 
Protestant No Yes 
Rick Boucher VA 
1983-2011, 
defeated United Methodist No No 
Allen Boyd FL 
1997-2011, 
defeated United Methodist No Yes 
Chet Edwards TX 1991-2011 United Methodist No No 
Stefanie Herseth SD 
2004-2011, 
defeated 
Evangelical 
Lutheran Church 
in America No No 
Larry Kissell NC 
2007-2013, 
defeated Baptist No No 
Suzanne Kosmas FL 
2009-2011, 
defeated United Methodist No Yes 
Frank Kratovil MD 
2009-2011, 
defeated Episcopalian No No 
Betsy Markey CO 
2009-2011, 
defeated Roman Catholic No Yes 
Michael McMahon NY 
2009-2011, 
defeated Roman Catholic No No 
Walt Minnick ID 
2009-2011, 
defeated 
Unitarian 
Universalist No No 
Scott Murphy NY 
2009-2011, 
defeated 
Methodist, 
though not on 
UMC's list No Yes 
Glenn Nye VA 
2009-2011, 
defeated Presbyterian No No 
Table 4: voting positions of Democrats who voted against the Stupak Amendment but 
also voted against either Reform bill 
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